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ABSTRACT 
 Human related accidents in high-risk industries amount to a significant economic hazard 
and incur tremendous damages, causing excessive operational costs and loss of life. The aviation 
industry now observes human-related accidents more frequently than in the past, an upswing 
attributable to cutting-edge technology usage and the complex systems employed by aviation 
organizations. Historically, aviation accidents have been attributed to individual unsafe behavior. 
However, contemporary accident causation models suggest that organizational-level factors 
influence individual safety performance, as human-related accidents take place in an 
organizational context.  
 The present study examines the formation of organizational safety culture and influence 
on individuals‘ safety behavior in a police aviation environment. The theory of planned behavior 
guides the study model in explaining individual variability in safety behavior via organizational 
safety culture. The study conceptualized organizational safety culture and individual safety 
behavior as multidimensional constructs. Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted for each 
latent construct to validate the construct validity for each measurement model. Organizational 
safety culture was observed via safety climate facets, which contained four subcomponents 
including individual attitude, group norms, management attitude, and workplace pressures. 
Individual safety behavior contained violation and error components observed by self-reported 
statements. Structural equation modeling was conducted to test the study hypotheses. Utilizing a 
sample of 210 employees from the Turkish National Police Aviation Department, a 53-item 
survey was conducted to measure individuals‘ safety culture perceptions and self-reported safety 
behaviors.  
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 The results suggest that individual safety behavior is significantly influenced by 
organizational safety culture. Except for the relation between workplace pressures and intention, 
all suggested relations and correlations were statistically significant. The four-factor 
measurement model of organizational safety climate fit reasonably well to the data, and most 
correlations between the safety climate components were significant at the .05 level. Individuals‘ 
self-reported error behavior is positively associated with age, and individuals‘ self-reported 
violation behavior is positively associated with years of service. Overall, along with 
organizational safety culture, age and service-year variables accounted for 65% of the variance in 
intention, 55% of the variance in violation behavior, and 68% of the variance in error behavior. 
Lastly, no significant difference manifested among pilots, maintenance personnel, and office 
staff according to their self-related safety behaviors. 
 The findings have theoretical, policy, and managerial implications. First, the theory of 
planned behavior was tested, and its usefulness in explaining individuals‘ safety behavior was 
demonstrated. The survey instrument of the study, and multi-dimensional measurement models 
for organizational safety climate and individual safety behavior were theoretical contributions of 
the study. Second, the emergence of informal organizational structures and their effects on 
individuals indicated several policy implications. The study also revealed the importance of 
informal structures in organizations performing in high-risk environments, especially in 
designing safety systems, safety policies, and regulations. Policy modification was suggested to 
overcome anticipated obstacles and the perceived difficulty of working with safety procedures. 
The influences of age on error behavior and years of service on violation behavior point to the 
need for several policy modifications regarding task assignment, personnel recruitment, health 
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reports, and violation assessment policies. As well, managerial implications were suggested, 
including changing individuals‘ perceptions of management and group attitudes toward safety. 
The negative influence of anticipated obstacles and the perceived difficulties of safety 
procedures on individual safety behavior pointed out management‘s role in reducing risks and 
accidents by designing intervention programs to improve safety performance, and formulating 
proactive solutions for problems typically leading to accidents and injuries.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
 Organizational influence on individual behavior is an important area in high-risk 
industries because human-related accidents take place in an organizational context (Maurino, 
Reason, Johnston, & Lee, 1995). An example of a high-risk industry is the aviation sector, which 
has experienced a decrease in machine-related accidents while the frequency of human error has 
increased due to cutting-edge technology usage and the complex systems involved in aviation 
organizations (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Shappell et al., 2007). Human-error-related 
accidents are more common than in the past in the aviation industry (Maurino et al., 1995). 
Understanding the complex relationship between an established high-risk environment and the 
individual can help to distinguish organizational criteria that promote high safety reliability and 
low rates of human error (Helmreich, 1999). This study aims to identify the influence of 
organizational safety culture on individuals‘ safety behavior in the police aviation environment.   
 Human-related accidents in high-risk industries cause significant hazards and tremendous 
damage, contributing to excessive operational costs and loss of life (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2003). The US National Safety Council (2002) estimated that the total cost of work-related 
injuries and deaths in 2001 amounted to $132.1 billion and 130 million work days lost. The 
intangible costs, such as physical suffering and psychological damage to individuals and 
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families, the diminished ability to perform social roles, and loss of community morale, are not 
included in this cost. Accident investigators name human error as the major causal factor in 85 
percent of all aviation accidents and incidents (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Li, Baker, 
Grabowski, & Rebok, 2001; Duffey & Saull, 2004; Dekker, 2005). Consequently, work-related 
injuries cause substantial monetary and personal losses to individuals and communities, as well 
as to organizations. Historically, the traditional perspective on these losses has focused on 
individuals and the most recent unsafe behaviors alone, but contemporary human error models 
emphasize organizational behavior as a latent factor contributing to unsafe behavior in the work 
environment (Reason, 1990; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Dekker, 2005).  
 Bird‘s (1974) domino theory and Reason‘s (1990) Swiss cheese model of error causation 
are two examples of contemporary human error models that emphasize the latent factors behind 
human-related mishaps. Latent factors include preconditions of unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, 
organizational influences, and social environment. Aviation accidents are the consequence of a 
series of events, in which the last one, the individual‘s unsafe action, is an output of these factors 
(Bird, 1974; Reason, 1990; Helmreich & Merritt, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
Therefore, reducing workplace accidents relies on reducing human error, as more than 85% of 
industrial accidents have been attributed to unsafe acts committed by an individual (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2000; Dekker, 2005). Unfortunately, these statistics on industrial accidents did not 
take into consideration the organizational context in which these errors were committed. Further 
analysis by safety researchers suggests that it is necessary to consider unsafe behavior in 
collective rather than individual terms (Maurino et al., 1995; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
Collective approach addresses human error at not only the individual performing last unsafe act 
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but it also examines all levels of the system, including the organizational factors and condition of 
aircrew. The act of focusing on the individual actions that result in human error has been 
compared to allowing mosquitoes to breed in stagnant water and then focusing on how to swat 
them away. In contrast, the collective approach offers a method of identifying the organizational 
factors contributing to unsafe acts. This approach addresses the latent failures that breed errors in 
an organization by locating the source of the issue—in other words, it first drains the pond where 
the mosquitoes breed (Maurino et al., 1995), solving the problem at the source.  
 Organizations performing in high-risk environments must institute high safety reliability 
standards to mitigate human-related accidents by establishing an organizational safety culture 
that can positively influence an individual‘s workplace behavior (Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & 
Fleming, 2001). However, several studies elaborate on how organizational factors influence 
employees‘ safety behavior in the workplace (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Glendon & Litherland, 
2001; Neal & Griffin, 2002; Hall, 2006; Shappell et al., 2007; Baron, 2008; Fogarty & Shaw, 
2009). Helmreich and Merritt (2001) have traced the national, professional, and organizational 
factors affecting individuals‘ safety behavior and determined that safety behaviors in the 
workplace can be achieved and sustained more successfully with a strong organizational safety 
culture. Hence, it would be useful to identify the organizational factors that contribute to safe 
behaviors among employees performing in high-risk industries. 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the organizational safety culture of the Turkish 
National Police (TNP) Aviation Department and its subunits, which consists of city units and 
task groups of pilots, maintenance personnel, and office staff, in order to identify the 
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organizational determinants of individuals‘ safety behavior. Police Aviation Units are supportive 
forces in law enforcement organizations that provide rapid response to life-threatening crimes, 
accidents, and incidents in progress (Alpert, 1998). The TNP Aviation Department is primarily 
comprised of several main subgroups: pilots, maintenance personnel, and office staff. The 
context in which police aviators perform their jobs classifies their activities as high-risk in both 
law enforcement and aviation. Therefore, determining the organizational factors behind police 
aviators‘ safety behavior, as well as sub-group differences, was proposed as a solution that would 
help reduce human-related accidents and incidents in the workplace. The theoretical premise for 
this approach, detailed in the literature section, is based primarily in the theory of reasoned 
behavior, which was selected for this application in order to explain the variability in safety 
behavior in the workplace (Ajzen, 1991, 2005). This study tests a model proposing that the safety 
culture of an organization influences the employees‘ safety behavior. Safety climate, the 
measurable facet of safety culture, was used to measure the organizational safety culture because 
of the measurement difficulty involved in assessing safety culture (Cooper & Phillips, 2004). 
The organizational safety culture was measured by safety climate surveys because climate offers 
a snapshot of the actual culture (Hall, 2006). Culture, climate, and behavior concepts were 
elaborately defined in the following section in order to formulate a basis for understanding. 
1.2 Definition of Terms 
 The study is based on several concepts, including organizational safety culture and 
climate, and safety behavior. Safety culture has many definitions within a considerable body of 
literature; however, researchers have yet to reach a consensus as to the definition of the term 
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(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Helmreich & Merritt, 2001; Zhang, Wiegmann, von Thaden, 
Sharma, & Mitchell, 2002). Zhang et al. (2002) aggregated the similarities of safety culture 
definitions and asserted that the significant aspect of safety culture is a deeply rooted, stable, and 
therefore dominant attitude toward safety throughout an organization—an attitude extremely 
resistant to change. As a result, the existing safety culture would have a tremendous influence on 
individual behavior within the organizational context (Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, 
& Mitchell, 2002). An alternate and more complete definition by Zohar (1980) portrays safety 
culture as defined by shared perceptions about leaders‘ commitment to safety, appropriate 
measures taken to mitigate probable risks, and level of devotion to safety standards and 
procedures. 
 This study aims to observe the influence of safety culture on an individual‘s behavior. 
Measuring an organization‘s safety culture can, however, be problematic (Cooper & Phillips, 
2004). Organizational culture refers to the climate of an organization as a whole, including 
codes, values, norms, rules, what is expected, and what is valued (Westrum, 1996). Cooper and 
Phillips (2004) claimed that psychometric safety climate measurement instruments can measure 
the safety culture construct in a particular time because climate is a measurable facet of 
organizational culture. Hence, organizational safety culture was observed by its safety climate 
facet as a latent construct in this study. 
 Safety climate is regarded as a subcomponent of safety culture (Zohar, 2000) and a 
snapshot of an organization‘s actual safety culture (Hall, 2006), as well as a measurable facet of 
safety culture (Zohar & Luria, 2005). In this study, safety climate stands for the shared 
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perceptions of employees regarding common attitudes in the workplace toward safety at a 
particular time (Hall, 2006). Zohar‘s (1980) definition of safety climate is also useful for this 
study. He defined safety climate as ―a summary of molar perceptions that employees share about 
their work environments‖ (Zohar, 1980, p. 96). Then this understanding of safety climate was 
further clarified as ―shared perceptions among members of an organization with regard to aspects 
of the organizational environment that inform role behavior, that is, the extent to which certain 
facets of role behavior are rewarded and supported in any organization‖ (Zohar & Luria, 2005, p. 
1). While safety culture is stable and difficult to modify, safety climate is particularly dynamic 
and subject to change at any time (Wiegmann et al., 2002).  
 Safety behavior is a notoriously problematic construct because of the variations that occur 
in defining the term and the difficulty involved in its measurement (Cooper & Phillips, 2004). 
For the purposes of this study, safety behavior refers to any behavior mode that mitigates the 
probability of human error (Glendon & Litherland, 2001). This study measures safety behavior 
based on the self-reported items. Safety behavior, as a dependent variable, is supposed to consist 
of actual behaviors performed by individuals at the workplace to the extent to which their actions 
comply with safety procedures (Griffin & Neal, 2000). Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) classified 
safety behaviors into two categories. While the term safety violation refers to willful and 
conscious disregard of approved safety regulations and procedures, safety error refers to 
situations in which an individual‘s activities accidentally failing to accomplish intended outcome 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  
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1.3 Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of the study is to explore the organizational determinants of employees‘ 
safety behaviors when working in an organization that require a high level of safety. Early 
studies focused on the individual and the aircraft itself as causal elements of accidents (Maurino 
et al., 1995; Helmreich & Merritt, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Shappell et al., 2007). 
However, contemporary safety studies focus on a collectivist rather than an individual approach 
to accident causation (Reason, 2000; Dekker, 2005; Wiegmann et al., 2005). Examining the 
relation between employees‘ actual safety behavior and employees‘ perceptions of organizational 
safety culture will help to avoid human-related accidents in high-risk industries (Helmreich & 
Merritt, 2001). In high-risk industries, even a small human error may lead to devastating 
disasters. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, poor safety culture was a 
causal and contributing factor in the Chernobyl nuclear accident (Cox & Flin, 1998). In other 
words, organizational factors have been pinpointed as the latent origin of accidents in high-risk 
industries. This study focused on the organizational factor of human error and the behavioral 
patterns that lead to safety incidents.  It is, therefore, postulated that the safety culture of an 
organization influences the safety level of employees‘ behavior at the workplace.  
 Establishing an effective safety culture is critical for organizations performing in high-
risk industries. Safety culture can reshape and color employees‘ attitudes and behaviors toward 
safety in the workplace. Because organizational culture takes time to establish as well as to 
modify, the existing cultural influence on individuals can be widespread and pervasive (Maurino 
et al., 1995). Helmreich (1996) emphasized the strength and weaknesses of organizational 
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culture in shaping individuals‘ attitudes and behaviors. Based on this premise, organizations can 
design and modify their culture by minimizing weaknesses and emphasizing strengths. Hence, 
identifying the organizational determinants of individuals‘ safety behavior can be useful in 
designing and modifying existing organizational culture. 
 Organizations performing in high-risk industries have broad Standard Operation 
Procedures (SOPs) and regulations, in compliance with which employees are expected to 
perform. Helmreich (1996) stated the importance of cultural factors in the design of SOPs and 
regulations. Not only aircraft technology, but also SOPs, flight and maintenance checklists, 
workflow charts, and safety procedures and regulations are designed to accommodate western 
culture. Countries importing aircraft technology operate their aviation systems regardless of 
cultural differences (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001), but designing culturally ergonomic aviation 
systems can help improve the safety performance of individuals and organizations (Cooper & 
Phillips, 2004). Consequently, this study‘s findings can help the police aviation community 
establish a highly reliable safety culture within the organizational context of the TNP Aviation 
Department.  
 Safety culture perceptions vary among subgroups despite the fact that they work in the 
same organization (Glendon & Litherland, 2001). This study aimed to identify any differences in 
safety culture perception and safety behavior among subgroups despite their placement in the 
same organization. The TNP Aviation Department has its headquarters in the capital city and 
five units in Turkey‘s largest regional cities. Three main task groups have responsibilities, 
including the pilot, maintenance staff, and office staff. Employees vary based on rank, age, 
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educational level, service years, and flight hours. Exploring the safety behavior differences based 
on the organizational and demographic characteristics of the TNP Aviation Department members 
can assist in identifying problematic areas, intervention points, and proactive measures. Hence, 
the study aimed to explore to what extent TNP Aviation Department members‘ safety behaviors 
are influenced by their organizational and demographic characteristics. These factors are critical 
in identifying compounding factors that can help to isolate the specific differences among 
employee sub-groups that exist despite their performing in the same organizational workplaces.  
1.4 Research Questions  
 This study focuses primarily on the impact of organizational safety culture on the self-
reported safety behavior of members of the TNP Aviation Department, based on the theory of 
planned behavior. This study seeks answers to the following research questions: 
 Q1: What is the organizational influence on the individual‘s safety behavior in the 
workplace?  
 Q2: What is the relation between organizational safety culture and individuals‘ safety 
behaviors? 
 Q3: What is the direction and magnitude of the relation between organizational safety 
culture and individuals‘ safety behaviors? 
 Q4: What is the impact of employees‘ organizational and demographic characteristics on 
their self-reported safety performance? 
10 
 
 Q5: Is there any difference among sub-groups in terms of their self-reported safety 
behaviors? 
 Q6: How do the four dimensions of organizational safety culture correlate with each 
other? 
 Q7: Which dimensions of organizational safety culture have strongest impact on 
individuals‘ safety behaviors?  
1.5 Significance of the Study 
 This study has theoretical, policy and practical implications. A comprehensive literature 
review on organizational safety culture, climate, and the safety behavior of employees 
performing in a high-risk environment is presented to indicate the human factor‘s role as a vital 
issue in aviation, medicine, construction, and nuclear plants (Li et al., 2001; Duffey & Saull, 
2004). In complex organizations, such as aviation departments, organizational failures are more 
common than individual errors (Maurino et al., 1995; Mearns et al., 2001). However, there is a 
shortage of empirical studies to demonstrate theoretical models in this regard (Cooper & Phillips, 
2004). Researchers have struggled to demonstrate the relation between organizational safety 
culture and individuals‘ safety performance; the relation has not to date been empirically 
demonstrated (Cooper & Phillips, 2004). This study has the potential to generate useful 
information about how the safety culture of an organization may influence the actual safety 
behavior of employees working in high-risk organizations.  
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 Determining the effects of organizational factors on individual safety behavior has 
practical implications for establishing a strong safety culture in organizations because human-
related accidents take place in an organizational context rather than in an isolated area (Maurino 
et al., 1995; Westrum, 1996). This study has the potential to help establish a strong safety culture 
in the TNP Aviation Department through an evidence-based analysis of its safety culture, 
supported by a comprehensive literature review. Because of the rapid development in aircraft 
technology, machine-related accidents have decreased since World War II, while human-related 
accidents have increased because of the increased complexity of aircraft systems (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). As a consequence, human errors in aviation are more common today than in the 
past. If employee attitudes and behaviors are shaped by organizational culture, which influences 
values, beliefs, and behaviors, it can be useful to determine the factors associated with an 
organizational culture that reduces human error (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). Human attitudes 
and behaviors can be shaped by a systematically designed safety culture to reduce safety errors 
and violations in high-risk organizations (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). 
 This study was conducted in the TNP Aviation Department and its subunits, where little, 
if any, literature appears on this topic. Few studies have been performed on employees’ behavior 
in the workplace and organizational influence, particularly in an aviation context (Baron, 2008). 
Although no empirical study has been conducted in a police aviation context, the organizational 
factors of safety behavior have been investigated in other industries, including construction, 
manufacturing, medicine, and nuclear plants. The members of the TNP Police Aviation 
Department are qualified personnel performing high-risk duties during their work hours (Alpert, 
1998). They have a semi-autonomous working environment guided by safety procedures and 
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regulations (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). However, they also have discretion in obeying 
procedures and regulations when conducting their missions. The nature of their duties presents 
an obstacle to the direct observation of aviation employees in determining whether they comply 
with safety rules and regulations during their shifts. Their attitudes and behaviors pertaining to 
safety can be observed via survey questions. The variance in TNP Aviation Department 
members’ safety behavior can be explained by the variance in the perceived organizational safety 
culture. Informal structures emerging in the organization also vary among sub-groups because 
members having different characteristics perform different tasks based on different SOPs, 
workflow charts, and regulations. Examining the differences among the subcultures of the TNP 
Aviation Department has the potential to contribute the safety culture literature in terms of 
subculture differences.  
 Conducting confirmatory factor analysis with structural equation modeling (SEM) was 
the methodological strength of this study. The structural equation modeling technique has been 
widely and effectively used in behavioral science because it can develop and validate the 
measurement models of latent constructs (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; Byrne, 2010). This study 
focused on the relation between organizational safety culture and individuals‘ safety behavior 
based on the proposition that human attitudes and behaviors can be shaped by organizational 
safety culture to reduce human errors and safety violations in high-risk organizations. The study 
variables were latent constructs having multiple indicators. Safety climate was conceptualized 
via four components including individual attitude, group norms, management attitude, and 
workplace pressures. Safety behavior was conceptualized as multidimensional construct having 
two components: violation and error behavior. These components were first validated separately. 
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Then the validated components of organizational safety climate and individual safety behavior 
were integrated as multi-factor measurement models and validated by confirmatory factor 
analysis (Wan, 2002). This study, therefore, has the potential to introduce valid and reliable 
measurement concepts for organizational- and individual-level safety constructs by using 
confirmatory factor analysis.  
 The complex relationship between the high-risk environment and the individual was 
studied by many researchers. In the following section, accidents analysis and human factors 
models were discussed to comprehend the literature. Organization culture, climate, safety culture 
and climate, and conceptualization of these constructs were further evaluated. Several studies on 
safety culture and behavior were presented based on their theoretical and methodological 
backgrounds. The theory of planned behavior guided the study model to make clear the 
mechanisms underlying the relations between culture and behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Several models explain human factors in aviation accidents, including individual failures 
and contributing latent factors such as preconditions and organizational influence. Mainstream 
human error models are presented at the beginning of this section; then organizational culture, 
safety culture, and climate concepts are discussed in detail. The formation of individuals‘ 
behavior in the workplace is discussed based on three organizational climate approaches. The 
conceptualization of safety culture is assessed based on previous studies and their results. Lastly, 
the theory of planned behavior (TPB) is presented to guide the theoretical model of this study.  
2.1 Human Error Models 
 Human error is the largest contributing factor in all aviation accidents and incidents (Li et 
al., 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Duffey & Saull, 2004; Dekker, 2005). High-risk 
industries, such as construction, transportation, nuclear power, and oil production, as well as 
aviation, are more vulnerable to human error (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Duffey & Saull, 
2004). A significant amount of work has been published about understanding the occurrence of 
human error within complex systems. While organizational design, teamwork, and 
communication are widespread topics, organizational culture, safety behavior, and safety 
performance have been relatively less studied by researchers (Cooper & Phillips, 2004).  
 Throughout the early years of aviation, most research focused on the aircraft itself and 
the individuals who were flying the aircraft (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). In most cases, 
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individuals rather than organizations were charged in aviation accidents for several reasons. 
First, it was easier to assign legal responsibility to individuals. Second, it was easier to link an 
individual‘s error with the accident because the relation was easy to observe. Third, there are a 
limited number of studies demonstrating organizational failures related to aviation accidents 
because of the unobservable nature of the relation between organizational variables and 
accidents. Lastly, blaming individuals rather than corporations was financially advantageous to 
organizations (Maurino et al., 1995). However, in recent years, researchers have realized the 
presence of organizational influences on the complex nature of human-related accidents 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). Researchers in this area have developed accident causation and 
classification models demonstrating how organizational variables influence individual behavior, 
which in turn can lead to mishaps (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  
 Bird‘s (1974) domino theory is known as the earliest and the most famous model of the 
organizational influences on human-related mishaps. The theory proposes that any mishap is a 
consequence of a sequence of events, each influencing the following one in a logical order. 
Immediate causes or the most recent action of the individual had been supposed to be the only 
important factor in accidents before the development of the domino theory. However, Bird 
claims that the last action of an individual should be seen as the last falling domino in a series of 
falling dominos; for example, errors occurring through management-interaction and supervisory 
failures that preceded the final action and might account for the individual‘s failure (Bird, 1974).    
 Bird‘s domino theory has been expanded by renaming the metaphorical dominos as 
management structure, operational, and tactical errors (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). While 
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tactical errors relate to an individual‘s behavior and working conditions, operational errors are 
related to organizational management behavior. The domino theory and additional constructs 
examine the reason for the accident, as well as identifying the organization‘s situation in regard 
to safety knowledge, regulations, and standards relating to safety operations. The theory 
emphasizes the likelihood of confusion among individuals‘ perceptions of the organization‘s 
goal, the roles and responsibilities of other participants, and accountability assignment 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; 2003). 
 Another approach has been proposed by Degani and Wiener (1994) to identify the 
relation between management philosophy, organizational policies, operational procedures, and 
individuals‘ practices during flight-related work. Authors suggest that these factors constantly 
interact during operations. However, ambiguities in these factors or emerging conflicts between 
factors can jeopardize safety (Degani & Wiener, 1994).  Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) offered 
an example clarifying Degani and Wiener‘s (1994) model. Commercial airlines have a 
philosophy based on improving on-time flight percentage and promoting safety. Airline 
companies develop extensive procedures and plans to ensure safe and on-time flight schedules. 
Each phase of the pre- and post-flight routines and their procedures is prepared in detail, and 
both flight crew and support staff are expected to comply with these procedures. However, many 
commercial airlines are motivated by profit rather than operational safety. Moreover, safety 
always takes more effort and requires time. The emerging conflict between an airline‘s 
philosophy, policy, procedures, and practices may pressure individuals into unsafe practices, 
leading to mishaps (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  
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 The organizational factors in aviation accidents may remain unnoticed by organizational 
members for a long time (Turner, 1983). Inactive and unobservable factors may lead to 
unforeseen disasters by triggering any event leading to the accident. Turner‘s model assumed 
that it was necessary to separate the causal factors of the accident from the series of events 
leading to the accident. On the other hand, Perrow (1999) highlighted the essential role of 
organizational management in complex organizations. The complexity of organizations arises 
from the cutting-edge technology of their instruments, as well as the development of their 
management systems. Complex organizations are more vulnerable to accidents than less complex 
organizations. Hence, Perrow (1999) saw aviation accidents as ―normal accidents‖ because of the 
industry‘s complexity. The failures inherent in complex aviation systems can be managed by 
strong management, which is more important in complex organizations than before (Perrow, 
1999).  
 One of the best-known human error models is Reason‘s (1990) Swiss cheese model of 
error causation. Reason focused on active and latent types of error. While active errors are 
almost directly recognizable, latent errors are inactive up to the time they suddenly trigger the 
accident. The importance of latent errors in human-related accidents is emphasized to explain the 
relationship between three hierarchical layers—preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, 
and organizational influences, respectively. Any failure in the interactions of these factors causes 
―holes‖ in the system (Reason, 1990; 2000). With the contribution of these latent factors, an 
accident happens as an end consequence of a number of these failures, the last of which is an 
individual‘s unsafe action (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001; Reason, 1990). 
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 Wiegmann and Shappell (2001; 2003) proposed a further developed version of Reason‘s 
model, identifying subcategories for each of four layers: unsafe behavior of the individual, 
preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational influences. The human 
factor analysis and classification system has been generally accepted as a reliable model to 
explain individuals‘ unsafe behavior by the aviation industry, as well as by the U.S. Department 
of Defense, since the model conceptualizes and applies the Swiss cheese model in the real world 
setting (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Shappell et al., 2007). 
Organizational influences refer to management‘s contributions of fallible decisions that can 
directly influence supervisory practices as well as individual behavior. The authors subcategorize 
organizational influences into resource management, organizational process, and organizational 
climate. Organizational climate refers to a series of organizational characteristics, including the 
structure of the organization, designed policies, and organizational culture (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; 2003; Shappell et al., 2007). Organizational 
climate and culture as latent factors have been detailed and developed parallel to human error 
models.   
 The climate and culture of organizations have been investigated as root factors affecting 
individual‘s safety behavior in the workplace. One of the prominent organizational climate 
scholars, Zohar (1980), defined organizational climate as the shared perceptions of individuals 
about the organization where they work. Organizations develop several distinct climates 
including motivational, creative, and safety, all of which affect individual behavior in the 
workplace. Zohar primarily focused on the safety climate. Accordingly, safety climate refers to 
individuals‘ shared perceptions about organizational and managerial safety commitment, the 
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measures taken to promote safety, and fellow employees‘ devotion to safety precautions, 
standards, and procedures (Zohar, 1980).    
 Organizational culture, a relevant concept with climate, is considered a determining 
factor of individual‘s safety behavior. The culture of an organization significantly influences 
individuals‘ value systems, attitudes, and behaviors (Lundberg, 1985). Schein (2004) defined 
organizational culture as a system of individuals‘ shared beliefs, attitudes, values, and norms that 
governs the behaviors of individuals and groups. Culture is transferred to successive generations 
through the socialization of newcomers into the group. Because of the social learning process, 
several types of culture develop in which ―organizations generate their collections of meaning by 
drawing on and adopting the mores, archetypes, metamyths, and values which form the fabric of 
the host society‖ (Moore, 1985, p. 227). Organizational culture and climate are discussed in 
detail in the following section, as both are closely related to the context of this study.  
2.2 Organizational Culture  
 Culture studies attempts to interpret and understand how culture affects individual-, 
group- and societal-level behaviors (Ostroff, Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003). While a significant 
amount of research was published during the 1940s and 1950s, the Hawthorne studies can be 
seen as the first systematic qualitative analysis examining individual and group behavior (Landy 
& Conte, 2010). During the 1960s, quantitative analyses in organizational studies sharply 
increased. However, the culture and climate concepts were regarded as nearly the same; thus 
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several researchers used the notion of culture instead of climate in early organizational studies 
(Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990).  
 Conceptualization of organizational culture abounded during the 1970s. However, 
theoretical frameworks of organizational culture have often been criticized for being purely 
theoretical and lacking a satisfying empirical methodology (Ostroff et al., 2003). Differences in 
study object priorities also occurred among researchers. The importance of leadership behaviors, 
values, and vision in shaping organizational culture, artifacts and values has been strongly 
emphasized by some theorists (Schein, 2004). On the other hand, the influence of the symbolic 
experiences organizations continuously live has been highly regarded, with a concurrent 
minimizing of the role of leaders, by other theorists. Likewise, the environment and large-scale 
constructs, including market characteristics, ownership and control, resource availability, nature 
of history, and social-cultural dimensions, have been considered factors shaping organizational 
culture by some theorists. Other theorists have examined organizational culture from a narrower 
perspective, naming business and industry environments as the key roots of the phenomena 
(Ostroff et al., 2003).  
 Several perspectives and theoretical frameworks have generated a variety of meanings 
and models for the organizational culture construct. Their content has varied depending on the 
research domain and interests of the theorists (Denison, 1996). However, these approaches also 
have some commonalities. Accordingly, organizational culture includes multiple layers; is 
influenced by historical and spatial boundaries; and names the concept of ―shared‖ as the most 
important interpretative point (Ostroff et al., 2003; Schein, 2004). Schein‘s (2004) definition 
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embraced several qualities and perspectives of culture. Accordingly, culture is ―a pattern of 
shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation 
and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be 
taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those 
problems‖ (Schein, 2004, p.17).  
 Culture has three hierarchical layers: artifacts, values, and basic assumptions (Schein, 
2004). Artifacts consist of the tangible, visible, and audible results of action or reflections of the 
values and assumptions of an organization. Artifacts are mostly embodied in observable rituals, 
ceremonies, technology used, physical environment, uniforms, and furniture (Schein, 2004). On 
the other hand, values are ordered by comparative importance and based on beliefs or concepts 
(Ostroff et al., 2003). Values guide individuals‘ selections among several options; as well, they 
shape the assessment of beliefs and events, which play a critical role in organizational life 
(Hinings, Thibault, Slack, & Kikulis, 1996).  
 According to Schein (2004), basic assumptions are the core of organizational culture, but 
these are difficult to observe directly. Fundamentally, assumptions are generated by values. 
Values are beliefs about reality and human nature over time. They are extremely difficult to 
change and rarely an issue of debate. Basic assumptions are of great importance, because they 
guide organizational members to play certain roles and to rationalize their attitudes depending on 
the circumstances. The culture of any organization can be observed by the climate of the whole 
organization with its codes, values, norms, rules, expected and valued behaviors (Westrum, 
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1996). This study measured organizational culture via its climate facet. Hence, organizational 
climate is discussed in detail in the following section.  
2.3 Organizational Climate 
 Organizational climate studies have received considerable attention from organizational 
sociologists and applied psychologists since the 1980s. Researchers have primarily been 
interested in tracing the organizational dynamics influencing individuals‘ and groups‘ 
perceptions of shared understandings and opportunities to translate these perceptions into 
particular outcomes (Schneider & Salvaggio, 2002). A major consideration stemming from the 
translation of perceptions to outcomes has revolved around whether the concept should be based 
on objective organizational properties or on individuals‘ perceptions. The level of 
conceptualization and measurement characteristics of the construct has been another study 
problem pertaining to organizational climate (Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989; Schneider & 
Salvaggio, 2002). At present, the term has been further refined by sorting through existing 
definitions, such as the definition of organizational climate, which is widely referred to as 
transpersonal perceptions of organizational policies, procedures, and practices (Schneider & 
Salvaggio, 2002).  
 Relying on perceptions and beliefs has presented methodological advantages, in which 
climate was conceptualized as sets of perceptions through organizational features, events, and 
processes (Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989). In the course of time, the perceptual approach has 
dominated other climate definitions and induced shared perception approaches and cognitive 
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schemas (Anderson & West, 1998). Individuals may have a group agreement about 
organizational climate; however, this level of agreement does not necessarily indicate a perfect 
understanding. The intensity of agreement refers to the strength of the climate, which is defined 
as a distinct property or a level of quality for the organization (Brandt, 2000). Relations between 
organizational climate and outcomes have been empirically demonstrated and show that strength 
of climate contributes consistently to individual behavior. A strong climate occurs when 
members perceive events the same way and their expectations are clear (Schneider & Salvaggio, 
2002).   
 Conceptualization of climate has been tested with molar models to explain the relation 
between the perceptions of individuals about organization and their consequent behavior 
(Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989). However, individuals arrive at different general assumptions and 
conclusions about their environment; this differentiation results in behavioral change (Ostroff, 
1993). In other words, it is not necessary for individuals to have a common agreement on 
organizational climate; rather, individuals may perceive their organization‘s climate differently. 
Hence, their perceptions may affect their behaviors differently.   
 Three approaches have been reported on the formation of organizational climate in 
workplaces (Schneider & Reichers, 1983). The structuralist approach emphasizes the 
organizational structure, including size, centrality of authority, number of hierarchy levels, 
technology, and the degree of regulations and policies constraining individual behavior, which 
influences the attitudes, values, and perceptions of individuals. This model acknowledges 
individual differences and the possibility of variances in perceptions; however, the major 
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effective role is assigned to the organization‘s structural features (Schneider & Reichers, 1983). 
Since individuals in an organization live in the same environment and experience similar 
situations formed by the organizational structure, they are affected by and respond to these 
situations in similar ways within the organizational climate. However, this model has been 
criticized for failing to offer empirical support and considering possible climate differences 
among workgroups performing different tasks in the same organization (Schneider & Reichers, 
1983). It can be concluded that structural characteristics are important in the formation of 
organizational climate; however, this model is not adequate to explain the existence of climate 
differences among subgroups despite being influenced by the same structural factors.  
 The attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) approach emphasizes the role of the founders or 
significant members of an organization, who first determine the ideal form of its structure, value 
systems, and processes (Schneider & Reichers, 1983). The emergence of an organizational 
climate is explained by a sequence of concepts. First, individuals are attracted to organizations 
matching their personal attributes. Individuals perceive that they can satisfy their needs and 
implement their self-concepts in the specified organization. On the organization side, however, 
filtering or selection processes are conducted to recruit and select among candidates based on the 
harmony that exists between the candidate‘s personal attributes and the expected job 
performance, values, and goals of the organization. Disharmony between an individual and an 
organization gives rise either to dismissal or resignation of the work agreement. The attrition 
phase consists of the process of improving homogeneity among members, who are expected to 
have similar perceptions and interpretations about the organization (Schneider & Reichers, 
1983). 
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 Both similarities and differences exist between the two approaches. While the 
structuralist approach focuses on the objective features of the organization, the ASA approach 
gives credence to individual perceptions on the supposition that perceptions are similar among 
homogenous members. Both approaches ignore the possible differences among individuals‘ and 
subgroups‘ perceptions of the climate. The ASA approach considers similar and homogenous 
subcultures because individuals are filtered according to organizational requirements. The 
structuralist approach, however, ignores climate differences among subgroups because they live 
in the same environment and experience similar situations. However, Zohar and Luria (2005) 
presented empirical findings on the different climate perceptions among hierarchical levels: A 
supervisor and a line worker have different climate perceptions despite working in the same 
environment (Zohar & Luria, 2005).   
 A third model, the symbolic interaction approach, states that perceptions consist of 
individuals‘ interpretations of the organizational context, resulting in interactions of individual 
and contextual factors. Interactions generate a logical process about organizational environment; 
individuals give interpretations of events that depend neither on objective characteristics nor on 
perceptions alone. As a result, events are interpreted by individuals through the interaction of 
people within the environment. This approach focuses on the interaction process that occurs 
especially during the newcomer‘s socialization phase. Group membership is another important 
function resulting in different types of climate across subgroups in the organization (Schneider & 
Reichers, 1983). Powell and Butterfield (1978) point to the role of departments, hierarchical 
levels, workgroups, and significant reference groups in influencing worker perceptions and 
interpretations of organizational events. The interaction of individuals establishes relationships 
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between people, which guides individuals through defining, responding to, and interpreting 
organizational climate (Powell & Butterfield, 1978).  
 The symbolic interaction approach has several advantages over the previous perspectives 
because it can explain the theoretical basis of group differences. As well, the symbolic 
interaction approach uses specific research techniques such as observation, interviews, and 
surveys in order to define the social units in which individuals frequently interact on a variety of 
issues during working hours (Schneider & Reichers, 1983). Third, the symbolic interaction 
approach perceives organizational climates as dynamic rather than static, in contrast to previous 
approaches. This refers to the possibility of altering, modifying, and designing an organizational 
climate to improve desired outcomes through a set of interventions. Symbolic interaction can 
guide an organization‘s management to design and manipulate climatic dynamics when there is a 
need to reorganize the organizational variables (Schneider & Reichers, 1983). The symbolic 
interaction approach was therefore chosen as the main perspective for and guide in establishing 
the theoretical model of this study.  
2.4 Safety Culture and Climate 
 The safety culture of an organization shapes individuals‘ beliefs, values, and behaviors 
because it creates advantages or disadvantages based on the message it gives to group members 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). Several definitions of the concept exist in the literature. However, 
Wiegmann (2002) aggregates the term‘s common features. The term refers to the shared values 
among an organization‘s members, related to formal safety issues and the organization‘s 
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willingness to learn from errors, ability to integrate contributions from members at every level of 
the hierarchy, power to influence individuals‘ behavior, and status as relatively stable, enduring, 
and resistant to change (Wiegmann et al., 2002). 
 While organizational climate refers to individuals‘ perceptions of the practices, 
procedures, regulations, and structure of an organization (Schneider & Salvaggio, 2002), the 
notion of safety climate pertains to the perceptions of individuals regarding an organization‘s 
safety culture at a particular time (Wiegmann et al., 2002). In other words, safety climate is an 
immediate picture of safety culture, which has an inconstant nature and is subject to change 
based on situational and environmental factors (Baron, 2008). While the safety culture concept is 
difficult to measure, various instruments have been developed to measure safety climate (Hall, 
2006). Organizational safety climate is the measurable facet of organizational safety culture; in 
other words, climate is the tangible and observable part of culture. It can be concluded that safety 
culture can be observed and measured by using a safety climate measurement instrument (Hall, 
2006; Baron, 2008; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). 
2.5 Conceptualization of Safety Culture 
Concern has been growing in recent years over the safety culture in high-risk industries, 
including nuclear power plants, construction, and medicine. However, few researchers have 
studied the safety culture of the aviation industry or organizational failures in relation to aviation 
accidents (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001; Wiegmann et al., 2002). Accident causation theories have 
developed through four stages, all of which sought to pinpoint the root causes of aviation 
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accidents (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). The first stage, the technical period, referred to the 
point at which mechanical systems were still being designed, developed, and tested. Most 
aviation accidents were attributed to mechanical malfunctions, design failures, and equipment 
deficiencies (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). As aviation technology became more reliable, 
failures were attributed to the humans operating this technology. Responsibility and blame for 
accidents were assigned to the individuals performing the last unsafe action leading the accident 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Wiegmann et al., 2002). The socio-technical phase considered the 
interaction of individuals and mechanical systems to be the causes of aviation accidents. The 
organizational culture period emerged as the fourth stage; it emphasizes the importance of 
environment and other factors in the organizational context (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; 
Wiegmann et al., 2002). 
The organizational culture approach offers several advantages compared with the three 
previous approaches. First, the interaction between human and technological tools does not occur 
in area vacuum; rather, it occurs among a coordinated team and within a particular culture 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Wiegmann et al., 2002). Second, considering unsafe behaviors in 
collective terms offers many advantages over blaming the individual who performed the most 
recent action (Maurino et al., 1995; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Third, a reliable 
organizational culture can encourage the development of better technological tools and discipline 
in the operators using them. Lastly, while the first three approaches explore only one facet of the 
whole, the organizational culture approach recognizes each part of the organization, since the 
culture relates to each actor in the organization and covers interactions and relations among these 
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actors. Hence, the conceptualization of safety culture is notable for its ability to reflect an 
organization‘s content and measure its constructs in the aviation context. 
The conceptualization of organizational safety culture has been defined according to the 
area of research and academic discipline (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). Hence, several different 
organizational safety culture concepts have emerged in different areas. We can, however, group 
these approaches into two broad categories (Wiegmann et al., 2002). The socio-anthropological 
perspective examines the original formation of symbols, norms, meanings, heroes, and rituals 
revealed in the shared values and myths of the organization in order to understand the 
organizational culture. The culture of an organization is revealed in members‘ attitudes and 
behaviors. Hence, the root structure of a culture is hard for outsiders to observe; rather, it can be 
most easily sensed by members. The socio-anthropological perspective argues that it is necessary 
to use ethnographic approaches to study a culture, including extensive and intensive 
observations, and interviews with members (Schein, 1991, as cited in Wiegmann et al., 2002). 
The culture of an organization is assumed to be an emergent property produced by the history 
and notable members of the organization. In this view, organizational culture is more than the 
sum of its parts; breaking a culture into subcomponents in order to study it does not necessarily 
yield understanding of the phenomena involved. Lastly, the socio-anthropological perspective 
considers organizational culture an ―evolved construct‖ that is historically rooted, collectively 
held, and adequately resistant to change and direct manipulation (Wiegmann et al., 2002). 
Similarly to the socio-anthropological perspective, the organizational psychology 
perspective identifies organizational culture as the shared values and beliefs of members, myths, 
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stories, legends, rituals, and exceptional language. However, the functional importance of 
organizational culture and the manipulation potential to increase productivity are emphasized 
rather than content and structure (Wiegmann et al., 2002). Members derive a sense of identity 
from the organization and commit themselves to something more important than the self, which 
shapes their behavior in the workplace. The organizational psychology perspective draws a 
relation between strategic management interest and organizational behavior (Wiegmann et al., 
2002).  
For researchers, the organizational psychology perspective is more useful than the socio-
anthropological perspective because it provides a means of manipulating and modifying 
organizational culture, as well as empirically demonstrating the relation between culture and 
desired outputs. Culture has separable subcomponents that are empirically traceable and 
quantitatively observable by traditional analytic methods. Therefore, the majority of 
organizational culture studies have used the organizational psychology perspective while 
observing the culture and its effects on organizational outputs, such as service quality, employee 
motivation, job satisfaction, occupational safety, and productivity (Wiegmann et al., 2002). 
Indeed, the aviation safety literature contains various studies guided by the organizational 
psychology perspective. This study was also guided by the organizational psychology 
perspective to conceptualize the organizational safety culture construct, which was measured as a 
multidimensional measurement model with its subcomponents. Previous studies on aviation 
safety culture were examined to trace the dimensions of organizational culture, as well as to 
construct more reliable measurement models by which to observe the safety culture of the TNP 
Aviation Department. 
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2.6 Previous Studies on Safety Culture  
Many authors prefer to observe safety culture with safety climate measurement surveys. 
Several different models have been established to measure safety culture construct including 
multi-dimensional, higher factor, and theory based models. A couple of example for each was 
presented in the following topics. 
2.6.1 Multi-dimensional Models 
Although Zohar‘s (1980) study did not focus on aviation, but on the metal, food 
processing, chemical, and textile industries, it is worth mentioning first because it was the first 
study on safety culture in high-risk organizations. Zohar developed a safety climate measurement 
survey for industrial organizations in Israel, including 20 Israeli factories, and had a sample size 
of 400. The questionnaire contained 40 items and eight factors and aimed to define 
organizational characteristics in order to separate organizations in terms of low and high accident 
rates. He conceptualized safety climate as comprising eight dimensions, including the 
importance of safety training programs, management attitudes toward safety, the effects of safe 
conduct on promotion, level of risk in the workplace, the effects of the required work pace on 
safety, the status of safety officers, the effects of safe conduct on social status, and the status of 
the safety committee. Each scale was generated by between two and nine questions.  
Zohar found that two climate dimensions were most influential in observing safety 
climate levels: the perceived relevance of safety to job behavior and the perceived management 
attitude toward safety. Management‘s attitude toward safety was regarded as the major factor 
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affecting safety culture in organizations. It was concluded that safety should be regarded as an 
integral part of an organization‘s production system and general management responsibilities. 
Zohar compared organizations from different industries, combining different technologies and 
risk levels in the same model. However, he argued that the measure he used is independent from 
these factors (Zohar, 1980). 
A follow-up study was conducted by Brown and Holmes (1986) in North America to 
assess the validity of Zohar‘s safety climate questionnaire. Confirmatory factor analysis with 
LISREL was used to test the covariance structures of Zohar‘s proposed model with data acquired 
from ten manufacturing and produce companies in the United States, with 425 items in the 
sample. Zohar‘s proposed model was not supported by Brown and Holmes‘ data. Rather, the 
authors investigated a three-factor model as opposed to Zohar‘s eight-factor model. They 
conducted explanatory factor analysis to refine the model and to observe the differences between 
employees who had accidents and those who did not. There was no difference across the groups 
in terms of safety climate structure, and the three-factor model fit the data better. Accordingly, 
the safety climate model had three dimensions, including employee perception of how concerned 
management is with their well-being, employee perception of how active management is in 
responding to this concern, and employee physical risk perception (Brown & Holmes, 1986).  
2.6.2 Higher Order Factor Models 
 Higher-order factor measurement models have been conceptualized to measure safety 
climate construct by many authors (Westrum, 1996; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Reason, 2000; Parker, 
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Lawrie, & Hudson, 2006). Several first-order factors, including individuals‘ perceptions about 
safety-related policies, regulations, management attitudes, procedures, and rewards, were 
proposed as the safety climate construct‘s first-order factors. Griffin and Neal (2000) used 
confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling to test the validation of higher-
factor models with data acquired from 1,264 employees working for the mining and 
manufacturing industry in Australia. An 81-item questionnaire was used to observe employees‘ 
attitudes, behaviors, and safety procedures. First a null model, then 1-, 3-, 4-, and 7-factor 
models were tested respectively. Finally, a higher-order factor analysis was tested, in which 
safety climate was assumed to be first-order, and management values, safety communication, 
safety practices, safety training, and safety equipment were assumed as second-order. The 
higher-factor model had acceptable goodness-of-fit parameters with the data even though the fit 
of the last model had lower scores than previous models. Safety climate, as the second-order 
factor, illustrated the individual‘s perception regarding the extent to which safety is valued in the 
organization. The results supported the relation between the safety climate and the safety 
performance of the organization (Griffin & Neal, 2000).  
 Westrum (1996) developed a four-factor model to observe safety culture. In this model, 
information, stress, pressure on safety, and attitudes toward rogue practitioners were considered 
safety culture dimensions. While information refers to an organization‘s response to information 
about safety, pressure on safety indicates the trade-off power of safety when it is compared to 
time, money, and work risk in such activities as the high-speed pursuit of criminals and search 
and rescue (Westrum, 1996). Similar dimensions were proposed by Reason (2000), who asserted 
that information, reporting, trust, flexibility, and integrity are principal characteristics of an 
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effective safety culture. Organizations having effective safety cultures have information systems 
that collect data from incidents and near misses for analysis. Individuals are encouraged to 
voluntarily report their mistakes and errors without fear of reprisal. Trust is a necessity between 
individuals and managerial staff. An effective safety culture requires a flexible task environment 
that has the ability to reconfigure itself. Lastly, management should be honest in order to reach 
the right conclusion and implement reform measures as required (Reason, 2000). 
  Parker, Lawrie, and Hudson (2006) built upon Reason‘s (2000) model to determine the 
characteristics of an organization having a reliable safety culture. The authors added one 
additional feature, which they termed a ―no-blame‖ culture. The fundamental premise behind the 
no-blame culture is that members of the organization may agree on some actions as totally 
unacceptable. However, the basis for these actions requires a process that has objectively 
assessed the relevant issues without blaming individuals. The authors posited that if agreement 
occurs but blame is assessed, members of the organization are more likely to hide their mistakes 
and errors (Parker et al., 2006). 
 The basic requirements for a safety culture were aggregated by Helmreich (1999) with a 
causal mechanism. Trust, a non-punitive attitude toward individuals‘ errors, commitment to 
reducing error-inducing factors, data gathering about types of errors and probable threats, error 
avoidance and threat recognition training programs, and evaluation of training programs were 
considered the requirements for a safety culture. Trust and non-punitive policies toward 
individuals‘ errors makes members of an organization more likely to report their mistakes and 
take a proactive attitude toward safety. In addition, a training program about error avoidance and 
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threat recognition increases the safety level of flight operations. Training program evaluations 
help to ensure that the safety performance objectives of the organization are met (Helmreich, 
1999). For example, information gathered about the types of errors and probable threats indicates 
the holes in the respective defenses of organizational and managerial layers and presents action 
items for management to consider. The response rate of these observed errors can indicate that 
management is moving toward a more proactive approach to safety (Helmreich, 1999).  
 A safety climate scale was developed by Seo, Torabi, Blair, and Ellis (2004) by including 
several constructs used in the literature. A cross-sectional survey was conducted on 722 grain 
industry workers in the U.S. An item pool was generated by expert reviews, scientific reduction 
processes, and a pilot test. Accordingly, safety climate had five dimensions, including 
management commitment, supervisor support, coworker support, employee participation, and 
competence level. The proposed model was validated by both explanatory and confirmatory 
factor analysis. This study provided a consistent factor structure that most previous studies had 
failed to find. All factors were predominantly accounted for by the proposed constructs except 
for two items, which the unexpected relationship were reasonably justified. All of the indicators 
had statistically significant and acceptable factor loadings in the confirmatory factor analysis, 
and all of the goodness-of-fit indices showed a good fit with the data. The five-factor model was 
cross-validated as having an appropriate level of reliability and validity, and was arguably the 
first study to have a consistent factor structure for safety climate. However, the study was 
conducted on the grain industry and may not generalize to other high-risk industries. Second, the 
study lacked a theoretical framework to guide the causal mechanism of the formation of safety 
culture in the workplace (Seo, Torabi, Blair, & Ellis, 2004).  
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2.6.3 Theory Based Models 
 The previous safety climate conceptualizations demonstrate that the majority of the 
studies were explanatory in nature and aimed to develop safety climate surveys, as well as to 
identify the relations among subscales. However, many of the studies have not been guided by 
substantial theoretical frameworks to explain the formation of safety culture and its effects on 
individual behavior. Fogarty and Shaw (2009) designed their study to clarify the formation of 
safety culture and the mechanisms underlying the relation between the safety climate of an 
organization and the safety behavior of the organization‘s members. A sample of 308 aircraft 
maintenance workers was surveyed to observe employees‘ perceptions on management attitudes 
toward safety, personal attitudes toward safety, group norms, workplace pressures, intentions 
regarding safety behavior, and safety violations. Path analysis was conducted by using AMOS 
software to assess the relations among latent variables constructed by confirmatory factor 
analysis. The relations of the variables and pathway construction were guided by Ajzen‘s (1991; 
2005) theory of planned behavior (TPB), which is discussed in the next section. The results 
indicated excellent goodness-of-fit statistics and r-squared values for all hypotheses proposed 
(Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). The model accounted for 50% of the variance in individuals‘ safety 
violations and 47% of the variance in intention to violate. The safety climate model of this study 
was developed based on Fogarty and Shaw‘s (2009) model using TPB. This study 
conceptualized safety behavior by using Wiegmann and Shappell‘s (2001; 2003; 2005) human 
factor analysis and classification system. Accordingly, individuals‘ unsafe acts could be 
classified into two dimensions: violation and error behaviors. While violation refers to willful 
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disregard for formal safety procedures, error refers to individuals‘ accidental failure to achieve 
intended outcomes (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; 2003; Wiegmann et al., 2005).  
2.7 The Theory of Planned Behavior 
A majority of the previous studies on the organizational factors of safety behavior lacked 
theoretical guidance to explain the psychological aspects of employee safety behavior (Zohar, 
2000; Glendon & Litherland, 2001). Several safety climate surveys have been developed since 
Zohar‘s (1980) study. However, few studies have been designed on a behavior theory basis 
(Hall, 2006; Baron, 2008; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). Organizational culture is an unobservable 
construct with many dimensions, and it is realistic to assume that many employees probably do 
not realize its existence or how culture influences their behavior. This study aims to identify the 
influence of organizational safety culture on the individual safety behavior variance of the TNP 
Aviation Department. A theoretical orientation helps lay the groundwork for the study (Hall, 
2006; Baron, 2008; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009).  
  The theoretical framework of the study was formed by Ajzen‘s (1991; 2005) theory of 
planned behavior (TPB), which explains the psychological aspects of employee behavior (Baron, 
2008). The principal assumption of the TPB has to do with the intentions behind any human 
action. Intentions to perform any kind of behavior are guided by different considerations: attitude 
toward behavior, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control.  
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Figure 1. The Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991) 
 Figure 1 illustrates the principal components of Ajzen‘s theory of planned behavior. 
Individuals‘ intentions regarding any kind of behavior can be predicted with a high degree of 
accuracy by their attitudes toward behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control 
constructs. Second, the predicted intentions, together with perceived behavioral control, can 
explain variances in actual behavior (Ajzen, 1991; 2005). 
 The assumption that individuals have attitudes toward certain behaviors is reasonable. 
However, an individual‘s actual behavior is an output of the individual‘s attitudes, subjective 
norms, and work pressures. Subjective norms refer to the perceived beliefs and behaviors of 
others who have a strong influence on the individual‘s views (Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). These 
might be closely associated friends or colleagues of the individual. Perceived behavioral control 
is the third predictor of intention, and a direct predictor of actual behavior. Perceived behavioral 
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control refers to outside factors that prevent an individual from performing a certain behavior 
even if the individual has a strong inclination to perform it. Examples of external influences can 
include malfunctioning or problematic instrument features, regulations, lack of time or 
personnel, pressures exerted by the management, customers, peers, and self-induced pressure—
in other words, factors beyond an individual‘s control (Hall, 2006).  
 According to Fogarty and Shaw (2009), Ajzen introduced the intention variable to 
strengthen the relation between attitudes and behavior, because attitudes sometimes fail to 
become behavior due to many other factors preventing individuals from converting their attitudes 
into behaviors. In other words, an individual‘s own attitude toward behavior, subjective norms, 
and perceived behavioral control can be used to predict intentions regarding any safety issue. 
Intention can in this way be used to predict actual safety behavior (Hall, 2006; Fogarty & Shaw, 
2009). 
 The theory can be applied to the safety behavior concept with an example from the police 
aviation context. The example demonstrates how an employee‘s safety behavior might occur 
through the guidance of TPB. A flight helmet is a vital safety tool for helicopter pilots because it 
protects them in an accident. It is also a safety rule to put one on during flights. However, some 
pilots do not want to use it. This behavior can be regarded as an unsafe behavior. According to 
TPB, the pilot has developed a negative attitude toward the flight helmet. Second, the pilot is 
influenced by fellow pilots‘ attitudes toward flight helmets. TPB identifies this consideration as a 
―group norm‖ (Baron, 2008). Third, the pilot perceives the flight helmet as a troublesome object. 
The helmet might save the pilot‘s head in case of an accident, but it can also make the pilot‘s 
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head hot and obstruct the pilot‘s movement during flight. These three latent constructs lead the 
pilot to have a specific intention about using the flight helmet, which along with workplace 
pressures can predict his behavior regarding helmet usage (Ajzen, 1991; 2005). Similar examples 
include maintenance personnel‘s attitudes toward safety goggles and office staff‘s attitude 
toward traffic cones. 
 The conceptual model of the study was developed by Fogarty and Shaw (2009) based on 
Ajzen‘s TPB. Although TPB does not include management‘s attitude toward safety, employees‘ 
perceptions of managers‘ attitudes toward safety have been frequently proposed as the most 
important predictor of an organization‘s safety climate (Zohar, 1980; Hall, 2006; Fogarty & 
Shaw, 2009). The difference between Ajzen‘s TPB and Fogarty and Shaw‘s conceptual model 
can be seen in the safety climate conceptualization. While Ajzen proposed correlations between 
safety climate dimensions, Fogarty and Shaw preferred the idea of directional pathways among 
components. The final model put forth by Fogarty and Shaw was quite different from their 
conceptual model in that the paths between perceived behavioral control and violation, as well as 
management attitude and intention, were removed. Moreover, new paths between own attitude 
and violation, and group norms and violation, were inserted in the final model. 
 This study established a conceptual model using Ajzen‘s theory of planned behavior 
(TPB) and included management attitude in the safety climate construct. Safety climate was 
conceptualized with four components, including own attitude, group norms, management 
attitude, and workplace pressures. Correlation arrows were placed between components, as 
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proposed by Ajzen. Safety behavior was conceptualized with two components, including 
violation and error behavior.  
 
Figure 2. Conceptual Model of the Study Based on the Theory of Planned Behavior 
 As seen in Figure 2, the safety climate of an organization directly impacts individual 
intention. Predicted intention, together with workplace pressures, can predict violation and error 
behaviors. A significant relation between violation and error behavior was also proposed because 
violating regulations leads to errors. Within the TPB perspective, it can be proposed that 
organizational safety culture influences individuals‘ safety behavior. In other words, the 
organizational safety culture perceived by individuals can be used to predict individuals‘ actual 
safe or unsafe behaviors. The methodology of the study, including hypotheses, sampling, survey 
instrument, and statistical analysis, is detailed in the methodology chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
 The purpose of the study was to examine the influence of organizational safety climate 
(exogenous variable) on an individual‘s safety behavior (endogenous variable) in the TNP 
Aviation Department. Safety climate and safety behavior are both multidimensional latent 
constructs that cannot be directly observed (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001; Mearns et al., 2001; 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Hence, both endogenous and exogenous variables were measured 
via the measurement models of their latent components. Safety climate is a multidimensional 
construct having four components. Management attitude, group norms, own attitude, and 
workplace pressures were conceptualized to measure the safety climate of the organization. 
Likewise, safety behavior was conceptualized as a multidimensional construct having two 
dimensions (Shappell et al., 2007; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Violation and error behaviors 
were conceptualized to measure safety behavior. 
 The second purpose is to determine whether safety climate perceptions differ in regard to 
different job types, organization size, individual‘s rank, age, education level, service years, and 
flight hours. Identifying differences in the safety climate perceptions of employee subgroups can 
help us understand the formation of organizational subcultures (Glendon & Litherland, 2001). 
Hence, control variables were correlated with safety climate components to identify the 
differences existing among subgroups. 
 Third, the influence of personal and occupational attributes such as age, years of 
employment rank, education level, and flight hours on intentions regarding safety and safety 
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behavior was examined. The study‘s purposes led to the development of the hypotheses proposed 
below.  
3.1 Statement of the Hypotheses 
 The following hypotheses are proposed to test the structural relations among the study 
variables. The study model proposes several relations among latent variables. However, 
management attitude, group norms, individual attitude, and workplace pressures were observed 
in order to measure the safety climate construct via a four-factor model as an exogenous variable. 
Violation and error behaviors were observed to measure the safety behavior construct by a two-
factor model as an endogenous variable. Hence, the relation between safety climate perception 
and self-reported safety behavior was proposed as the first hypothesis. Accordingly, the safety 
climate of the organization positively affects an individual‘s safety behavior, as assumed in the 
literature (Hall, 2006; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009).  
 H1: Police Aviation Department employees’ safety climate perceptions positively affect 
 their self-reported safety behaviors, holding demographic and organizational factors 
 constant. 
 The second hypothesis relates to safety behavior variances based on organizational and 
demographic variables. Testing the safety behavior variance helps us observe the influence of 
demographic and organizational attributes on the individual‘s safety behavior. The proposed 
direction of the third hypothesis is positive, because it is expected that experience (rank, age, 
service years, and flight hours) and education have positive effects on an individual‘s behavior. It 
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is proposed that age, rank, educational level, years of employment, and flight hours have a 
positive influence on self-reported safety behavior. 
 H2: Organizational size, rank, age, educational level, service years, and flight hours are 
 positively associated with self-reported safety behavior.  
 The third hypothesis relates to subgroup differences. To date, safety climate effects have 
only been studied on the individual level (Glendon & Litherland, 2001). However, different 
safety climate perceptions between the upper and lower hierarchical levels of management in the 
same organization were demonstrated by Zohar and Luria (2005). Determining sub-group 
differences helps us understand the formation of safety culture and establish targeted strategies 
based on subgroups‘ differences (Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Zohar & Luria, 2005). 
 H3: There are differences among pilots, maintenance staff, and office staff based on their 
 self-reported safety behaviors. 
 Three different subgroups work in the TNP Aviation Department. Pilots, maintenance 
personnel, and office staff encounter different job characteristics, instruments, policies, 
procedures, and practices when performing their job. Pilots not only fly the aircraft but are also 
commanders of flight missions. They perform the flight mission according to aviation traffic 
regulations and standard and emergency operational procedures. Reckless and unsafe behaviors 
are prevalent deviant pilot characteristics because of the nature of the professional culture (Kern, 
1998). Maintenance personnel are accountable for the aircrafts‘ repair and periodic overhaul. 
However, they work primarily on the ground and do not participate in most of the flight. 
Maintenance personnel perform their jobs according to maintenance manuals and technical 
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procedures. Office staff performs supporting activities, which do not include aviation tasks. They 
are rarely expected to perform their tasks according to procedures specifically designed in an 
aviation and safety context. However, they are a crucial part of the organization; even minor 
errors on their part may cause extensive damage. One of the purposes of this study was to 
identify subgroup differences in safety behaviors. It was proposed that, pilots, maintenance 
personnel, and office staff have different safety behavior performance.  
 The fourth hypothesis is about the formation of the safety culture in an organization and 
its dimensions. Organizational safety culture is measured by its safety climate facet (Zohar & 
Luria, 2005). Safety climate defined as the shared perceptions of organization members 
regarding common attitudes in the workplace toward safety (Hall, 2006). Organizational safety 
climate is shaped by four dimensions including individual own attitude, group norms, 
management attitude, and workplace pressures. It is postulated that own attitude, group norms, 
and management attitude are positively correlated with each others, and negatively correlated 
with workplace pressures.  
 H4: Regarding safety climate dimensions, individual own attitude, group norms, and 
 management attitude are positively correlated with each others, and negatively 
 correlated with workplace pressures. 
 Confirmatory factor analysis with structural equation model was used to test the 
hypotheses above, because it has been proposed as the most appropriate statistical method for 
testing the relations between latent constructs (Byrne, 2010; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). 
Validated measurement models of exogenous, endogenous, and mediating variables were 
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connected with control variables to identify the organizational and demographic variables that 
account for the variation in study constructs for testing the first two hypotheses. Task group 
variables were re-coded as three dummy variables to observe the subgroup differences in the 
third hypothesis. 
 Study variables are latent constructs, which require multiple indicators to observe. The 
measurement models of latent constructs were designed by multiple indicators considered in the 
literature. Operational definitions of the variables and brief explanations are presented in the next 
section. 
3.2 Study Variables 
The operational definitions of the study variables are illustrated in the table below. Safety 
climate is an exogenous variable having four components. Safety behavior is an endogenous 
variable designed as a two-factor model including violation and error components. Intention is 
the latent construct mediating the relation between organizational safety climate and individual 
safety behavior based on the TPB model. Table 1 indicates the dimensions of and explanations 
for the latent variables, as well as their measurement levels.  
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Table 1. Operational Definitions of Study Variables 
Study Variables Dimensions Explanation Measurement Level 
Exogenous Variable 
Safety Climate Own Attitude 
toward Safety 
Individual‘s value expectancy of the safety issues. Ordinal (5-point Likert S.) 
Group Norms Fellows' beliefs and behaviors toward safety in the workplace Ordinal (5-point Likert S.) 
Management 
Attitude 
How individual perceive management commitment and 
support to safety issues 
Ordinal (5-point Likert S.) 
Workplace 
Pressures 
Pressures obstructing to follow safety procedures, Ordinal (5-point Likert S.) 
Endogenous Variable 
Safety Behavior Violation 
Behavior 
Willful disregard from the formal safety regulations and 
procedures 
Ordinal (5-point Likert S.) 
Error Behavior Activities accidentally failing to achieve intended outcomes Ordinal (5-point Likert S.) 
Mediating Variable 
Intention   Individual‘s intention to perform a safety behavior and follow a 
safety procedure  
Ordinal (5-point Likert S.) 
Control Variables 
Group   In which group are you working now? Pilot, Maintenance, Office Staff 
City 
  
In which city are you working now? Ankara, Istanbul, Diyarbakir, Izmir,  
Adana, Antalya 
Rank   What is your rank? Police Officer, Sergeant, Captain, Major  
Age 
  
What is your age? Up to 30 years old, 30-39, more than 40 
Educational   What is the highest degree you completed? High School, college, BA, Master above 
Years of Service 
  
How long have you been in the TNP Aviation 
Department? 
Less than 5 years, 6-10, 10-15,  
more than 15 years 
Flight Hours 
  
What is your total flight hour? No flight, less than 500, 500-1000,  
1001-1500, 1501-2500, more than 2500 
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 The study variables and their explanations, dimensions, sources, and measurement levels 
are illustrated in Table 1. The study had seven latent variables. Safety climate perception was 
conceptualized with the guidance of Ajzen‘s (1991) theory of planned behavior by using four 
latent constructs to explain the origins of an individual‘s particular behavior. Likewise, safety 
behavior is conceptualized with the guidance of Wiegmann and Shappell‘s (2001; 2003) human 
factor analysis and classification system by using violation and error constructs. Lastly, the 
intention construct was included in the model to strengthen the relation between the safety 
climate of the organization and an individual‘s safety behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Fogarty & Shaw, 
2009). Study variables were measured by using multiple indicators. The rationale behind each 
dimension is discussed in detail in the following topics. 
3.2.1 Individual‘s Own Attitude toward Safety 
 Individual’s own attitude toward safety refers to an individual‘s own value expectancy 
for safety (Mearns et al., 2001; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). Attitude refers to the feelings of an 
individual about something, which are evaluated and generalized according to individual‘s 
personality. It in turn affects the individual‘s actions and behaviors (Baron, 2008). The individual 
expects a positive or negative outcome associated with the intended behavior (Hall, 2006). The 
expectation about the behavior is a subjective value based on the individual‘s assessment. 
However, the subjective value of the intended behavior leads an individual to develop an attitude 
toward the behavior because of the expected outcome. Hall (2006) identifies the strength of the 
individual‘s own attitude, which primarily depends on the behavioral belief based on the 
subjective evaluation of the expected outcome. Own attitude indicators were designed to reflect 
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an individual‘s feelings toward work risks, safety tool usage, and safety commitment, as well as 
attitudes toward the necessity of safety regulations, safety violations, and errors.  
 Own attitude of the individual is considered one of the components of the safety climate 
construct and one of the predictors of intention in the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991; 
2005). In the study model, it was suggested that an individual‘s own attitude had significant 
correlations with group norms, management attitude toward safety, and workplace pressures. An 
individual‘s own attitude toward safety had a direct influence on their intention to follow safety 
procedures and an indirect influence on violation and error behaviors mediated by the intention 
variable.  
3.2.2 Group Norms 
 Group norms is the second component of safety climate, referring to a generally 
acknowledged way of performing a particular task (Baron, 2008; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009), as well 
as perceived social pressures in the workplace (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001; Hall, 2006). The 
rationale behind group norms is the presence of fellow workers‘ influence on an individual‘s 
attitude and intention toward any kind of behavior. Organizations do not have a homogenous and 
monolithic culture; rather, they contain many subcultures based on profession, age, educational 
level, and work performed (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). The beliefs and behaviors of group 
members are most likely to influence the attitudes of individuals (Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). This 
argument resembles the assumptions of the symbolic interaction approach, which focuses on the 
interaction process occurring between an individual and other people within the environment 
(Schneider & Reichers, 1983). Events, regulations, policies, and procedures are interpreted by 
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individuals throughout group member interactions. Working in the same environment, doing the 
same job, socialization processes, and frequent interaction lead individuals to develop common 
norms over time. Negative norms or deviant versions of formal rules are more likely to be 
developed by group members (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001).  
 In the conceptual model, it was suggested that group norms had significant correlations 
with own attitude, management attitude, and workplace pressures. The rationale for the 
management influence was emphasized by Helmreich and Merritt (2001), who noted that 
management plays a central role in modifying and manipulating subgroups‘ norms by specifying 
expected behaviors. Moreover, it is management‘s job to make group members establish positive 
norms (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). Second, it was suggested that perceived group norms had a 
direct influence on an individual‘s intention to follow safety procedures, and an indirect 
influence on violations and error behavior, mediated by the intention variable.  
3.2.3 Management Attitude toward Safety 
 Management attitude toward safety is the third component of the safety climate, referring 
to management‘s commitment, devotion, and support to safety as perceived by individuals. The 
theory of planned behavior does not include the management‘s attitude toward safety (Garson, 
2009; Hall, 2006). However, an individual‘s perception of managers‘ attitudes toward safety has 
been proposed as the most important predictor of organizations‘ safety climate (Zohar, 1980; Seo 
et al., 2004; Hall, 2006; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). Hence, safety climate studies have highlighted 
the importance of management attitudes toward safety. In an empirical study, Helmreich and 
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Merritt (2001) surveyed pilots working at two airline companies to observe the variance in 
perceptions of management attitudes toward safety. While 84% of pilots working at one 
company were confident that management never compromised safety, only 12%  of pilots 
working at the other company believed in the management‘s commitment to safety (Helmreich 
& Merritt, 2001). The authors emphasized that management attitudes influence pilots‘ attitudes 
regarding safety practices and norms. Indeed, 68% of pilots working at the first company 
believed that management would seriously consider their safety suggestions, compared with 19% 
of the pilots working at the second company (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). 
 The causal mechanism of management attitudes‘ influence on pilot behavior can be 
explained by the second company‘s environment. Up to 88% of pilots working at the second 
company believed that the management compromised safety for the sake of profit. Moreover, 
they believed that management ignored their suggestions to improve the organization‘s safety 
processes. Demoralized and cynical pilots are likely to be more willing to deviate from safety 
procedures and norms (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). In other words, pilots develop an attitude 
favoring low safety standards, because it is difficult to maintain high safety standards when 
perceiving management to have low standards. Westrum (1996) claims that management‘s 
signals about safety priorities are noted by aviators so that they can comply with rewarded 
behaviors.  
 Management attitude toward safety was included in the conceptual model as a component 
of safety climate and a predictor of intention and safety behavior. In the conceptual model, it was 
suggested that management attitude toward safety had significant correlations with individual‘s 
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own attitude, group norms, and workplace pressures. Second, management attitude had a direct 
influence on individuals‘ intentions to follow safety procedures, and an indirect influence on 
violation and error behaviors, mediated by the intention variable.  
3.2.4 Workplace Pressures 
 The last component of the safety climate is workplace pressures, referring to the 
perceived ease or difficulty of the safety procedures followed by individuals. This perception is 
formed from workers‘ experiences and anticipated obstacles (Hall, 2006). This safety climate 
component is also related to the availability of appropriate instruments and procedures in the 
organization. The theory of planned behavior supposes that individuals‘ behaviors are strongly 
influenced by their perceived confidence in their ability to perform them (Ajzen, 1991; 2005). In 
other words, when individuals agree with the reliability of procedures, coherence of instruments, 
and convenience of following regulations, workplace pressures remain at the minimum level. 
Individuals may have a strong intention to perform a safety behavior or follow safety procedures; 
however, actual performance is shaped by the influence of exterior factors, such as workplace 
pressures (Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). Examples of workplace pressures include lack of time, 
personnel, equipment, and production pressures. According to Baron (2006), company, 
customer, peer, and self-induced pressure can influence individuals as workplace pressures.  
 The presence of workplace pressures was suggested to be a component of safety climate, 
and also to be a predictor of intention, violation, and error behaviors. The theory of planned 
behavior assumes that workplace pressures have direct and indirect effects on safety behavior 
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(Ajzen, 1991; 2005). In the conceptual model, it was suggested that perceived workplace 
pressures had significant correlations with own attitude, group norms, and management attitude 
variables. It was assumed that management has a strong influence on individuals‘ perceptions 
about workplace pressures. Second, workplace pressures had a significant direct influence on 
individual intention. Third, workplace pressures had a significant direct influence on violation 
and error behaviors, as well as an indirect influence on violation and error behaviors, mediated 
by the intention variable. Ajzen‘s (1991; 2005) theory of planned behavior suggests that an 
individual‘s intention, together with perceived workplace pressures, can predict the individual‘s 
safety behavior. It can be concluded that holding intention constant, workplace pressures are the 
principal predictor of violation and error behaviors.  
3.2.5 Intention toward Safety Behavior 
 Intention refers to motivational factors, which influence performing a behavior (Ajzen, 
1991). Intentions ―are indications of how hard people are willing to try, of how much effort they 
are planning to exert, in order to perform the behavior‖ (Ajzen, 1991, p. 181). The intention 
construct was conceptualized to observe an individual‘s intention toward safety commitment, 
pre-checking, safety processing manipulation, risk-taking behaviors, and safety perspectives. The 
intention variable was included in the model to mediate the relation between safety climate and 
safety behavior. The theory of planned behavior identifies the intention as an outcome of three 
variables: own attitude, group norms, and workplace pressures (Ajzen, 1991). Intention, together 
with workplace pressures, is accounted for by safety behavior.  
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 The rationale behind the intention construct can be explained by the variation between 
intention and behavior. Ajzen (1991) speculated that individuals cannot constantly realize their 
intentions because of several exterior factors that prevent the attitude from expressing as a 
behavior. Therefore, intention is included in the model to strengthen the relation between attitude 
and behavior (Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). In this way, individual attitude, group norms, 
management attitude, and workplace pressures are observed to predict the individual‘s intention, 
which in turn, with workplace pressures, will predict the behavior. Intention can be considered a 
mediating variable to strengthen the relation between behavior and attitude (Fogarty & Shaw, 
2009). 
 Intention is the mediator variable of the conceptual model. It was suggested that an 
individual‘s intention toward safety was influenced by the safety climate. Individual intention 
had a direct significant influence on violation and error behavior. A stronger intention toward a 
safety behavior means that the individual is more likely to perform that behavior safely and less 
likely to violate safety procedures and make safety errors.  
3.2.6 Violation Behavior 
 Safety behavior is the latent endogenous variable, and has two dimensions. Violation 
refers to willfully and consciously disregarding approved safety regulations and procedures 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Shappell et al., 2007). Two distinct 
forms of violation are defined in the literature (Reason, 1990; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; 
Shappell et al., 2007). Routine violations are habitual activities that are often tolerated by the 
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system and by supervisors. ―Bending the rules‖ is a common expression used to identify routine 
violations. For example, driving an automobile consistently at five to ten miles above the 
allowed limit is a routine violation. The system (local authorities and law enforcement) often 
tolerates and does not enforce punishment for this kind of behavior (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2001; 2003). However, such tolerance does not change the reality that it is a violation behavior. 
Exceptional violation is the second form of violation, referring to isolated departures from 
authority. As an example, driving 100 mph in a 45-mph zone is considered exceptional because 
of the appalling and highly dangerous nature of the behavior (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; 
2003). The system certainly does not condone exceptional violation behaviors. 
 Violation behavior was observed via questions observing individuals‘ own assessments 
of their behaviors—the extent to which they bent the rules to complete a task faster, performed 
tasks without checklists, preferred shortcuts, and believed in the safety regulations and 
procedures. Safety behavior was conceptualized as a two-factor model including violation and 
error components. It was suggested that violation had a significant correlation with error 
behavior. In the conceptual model, violation had a significant influence on error behavior, 
meaning that the more individuals violated safety procedures, the more safety errors they made. 
For the violation variable, predicted intention by organizational safety climate variable together 
with workplace pressures had a significant influence on violation behavior.  
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3.2.7 Error Behavior 
 Error behavior is the second dimension of safety behavior, referring to an individual‘s 
accidental failure to achieve an intended outcome (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; 2003). Error 
behavior can be classified into decision errors, skill-based errors, and perceptual errors. Decision 
errors refer to honest mistakes, which are often committed due to improper choices, poorly 
executed procedures, or misuse or misinterpretation of related information (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2001; 2003). Skill-based errors occur when unintentional attention and memory 
failures occur. Forgotten intentions, omitted items in the checklists, and accidental activation of 
switches are examples of skill-based errors. Lastly, perceptual errors occur when working in 
unusual conditions, such as flying at night, in extreme weather conditions, or completing rarely 
performed tasks (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; 2003).  
 Error behavior was measured by questions targeted to observe individuals‘ own 
assessments of their competence and knowledge about safety, as well as the extent to which they 
made errors during rarely performed tasks. Error behavior is the second component of individual 
safety behavior because unsafe behaviors were performed either by violating safety procedures 
or by accidentally failing to achieve an intended outcome (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; 2003).  
 The two-factor measurement model of safety behavior suggested that a significant 
correlation existed between the violation and error variables. Second, violation, intention, and 
workplace pressures had a significant influence on the error variable.  
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3.2.8 Control Variables  
 Based on the safety culture and safety behavior literature, generally accepted personal 
and occupational attributes of TNP Aviation Department members were used as control 
variables. Task group, city, rank, age, education, years of service, and flight hours were included 
in the study model to test their influence on the individual‘s safety behavior. A positive 
correlation was suggested between the demographic and organizational variables, as well as  
individual safety behavior, because it was expected that experience and education positively 
influenced individuals‘ behavior. 
3.3 Sampling 
 The population of the study consisted of members of the Turkish National Police (TNP) 
Aviation Department. The unit of analysis of the study was individual TNP Aviation Department 
employees. The TNP Aviation Department has its headquarters in Ankara and five regional units 
serving the various geographical regions of Turkey. Aviation units are placed in Turkey‘s largest 
regional cities, including Istanbul, Diyarbakir, Izmir, Adana, and Antalya. These units are 
coordinated and administered from the central agency in Ankara, meaning that the organization 
consists of a single hierarchical structure that serves the entire country. The top-level 
management personnel in Ankara are accountable for assigning personnel and helicopters to 
regional units. However, operational command in the regional units belongs to the city police 
manager. Three subgroups—police helicopter pilots, maintenance personnel, and office staff—
work in the TNP Aviation Department. These three types of personnel, serving in six cities, 
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permitted the observation of group differences as well as regional office differences in terms of 
safety performance variance.  
 The study questionnaire was distributed to the majority of TNP Aviation Department 
personnel because there are approximately 300 personnel in the department. The entire 
population of the TNP Aviation Department was targeted by the study. Hence, the study results 
represented almost the entirety of the studied organization. Between 60 and 100 individuals from 
each subgroup were included in the study survey. The representation of subgroups was important 
to observing group differences. For this purpose, 300 subjects, consisting of 60 to 80 helicopter 
pilots, 90 to 120 maintenance personnel, and 100 to 120 office staff, were targeted for the study. 
Several strategies were used to reach almost all TNP Aviation Department members. First, the 
top management was conferred with to acquire their permission and support. Second, fellow 
personnel were assigned from each unit to ensure a high participation rate. Employees were 
informed of the study topic and purposes through safety meetings, which are held once a month 
and attended by all unit members. A response rate adequate for the study‘s power analysis was 
expected.  
3.4 Power Analysis and Sample Size Justification 
 Power analysis provides an estimation of the sample size needed for the model. The 
concept of power can be defined as the likelihood of rejecting the null hypothesis when the null 
hypothesis is in fact false (Kaplan, 1995). Power analysis depends primarily on the confidence 
level considered for the study. This study had an alpha level of 0.05 (the confidence level), 
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which determines the p value. The results of this study made the researcher 95% confident in 
drawing the conclusion that the results ensure the integrity of the study.  
 Several arguments have been proposed regarding the necessary sample size of a 
covariance structure model. Boomsma and Hoogland (2001) claimed that 200 cases constitute a 
reliable sample size for a correct model—one in which any problem related to power analysis is 
less likely to occur. On the other hand, smaller samples have also been used in the literature. 
According to Hox & Bechger (1998), maximum-likelihood estimation requires larger samples: 
At least 400 cases are needed to ensure enough power for the analysis. Kline (2005) claimed that 
sample size estimation should be made based on the number of parameters. While a ratio of 10 
respondents per parameter is reasonable, a ratio of 20 respondents per parameter ensures 
adequate power for the analysis (Kline, 2005). For this study, the targeted organization was a 
relatively small organization comprising approximately 300 employees. Hence, the necessary 
sample size was suggested based on Bentler and Chou‘s (1987) general rule for structural 
equation modeling sample size estimation. The authors argued that five times the number of the 
parameters should be the minimum sample size of the study (Bentler & Chou, 1987). Since the 
study had almost 40 parameters, a minimum of 200 study subjects would ensure enough power 
for the analysis. Indeed, similar structural equation models were tested with 308 participants in 
Fogarty and Shaw‘s (2009) study and 270, 302, and 383 participants respectively in Hall‘s 
(2006) studies.  
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3.5 Data Collection 
 The purpose of the study was made clear to the study participants, who were expected to 
be familiar with the study‘s concepts because of their occupation. An informed consent form was 
provided to all participants prior to their participation in this study. This form provides 
information about participants‘ confidentiality as well as information about the purpose of the 
study. Participation in this study was voluntary. 
 The survey was uploaded to a website in order to reach TNP Aviation Department 
personnel located in six cities. The web link for the survey was sent to participants by e-mail, as 
all regional police aviation offices provide Internet access to their personnel. Three e-mail 
follow-ups were forwarded to non-respondents at two-week intervals to maximize the response 
rate. The study‘s researcher has worked in the TNP Aviation Department as a police helicopter 
pilot for seven years. Utilizing this organizational connection, several colleagues were assigned 
to follow the data collection process to encourage organization members to participate in the 
study. As a result, the data collection process took place without any major problems.  
3.6 Human Subjects 
Federal law requires Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval because the study uses 
human subjects. This requirement ensures the protection of individuals‘ rights and interests. This 
study involved no risk of harm to its subjects. Participants were invited to participate in the study 
on a voluntary basis. Consent forms were obtained before conducting the study. As well, 
personal information regarding human subjects had to remain anonymous, which means the 
61 
 
researchers had to keep individuals‘ identities confidential. The survey questions in this study did 
not include personal information; rather, it utilized demographic variables and the perceptions of 
employees regarding specific issues. Respondents were coded with a sequential number based on 
their participation order, but no link between the respondents‘ identities and their number existed 
in the data. Study data, including survey responses and the demographic and organizational 
variables of the individuals, were stored securely.  
3.7 Survey Instrument 
Studies on human factors in aviation have used either retrospective incident/accident 
reports or employee perceptions to measure study concepts (Maurino et al., 1995; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003; Li & Harris, 2006). However, it has been argued that retrospective 
incident/accident reports are subject to inaccurate measurement because of inconsistent reporting 
by performers and biased information (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). Human factor measurement 
models based on accident or incident reports have several research issues to overcome. First, the 
incidence of a single aviation accident does not mean that an organization has an unreliable or 
negative safety culture. Likewise, a low accident rate in an organization does not mean it has a 
highly reliable safety culture (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). Accidents are infrequent events, 
especially for aviation organizations, that do not reflect organizational safety culture. Accident 
and incident reports focus on outlier events, which may not provide an accurate measurement of 
the study‘s concepts. Hence, the evaluation of individuals‘ perceptions was preferred in 
measuring study concepts based on the theoretical model. A survey questionnaire was developed 
for this study. 
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The survey questionnaire was developed by evaluating questions from three surveys 
designed by Seo et al. (2004), Hall (2006), and Fogarty and Shaw (2009).  Written permission to 
use the relevant questions was obtained from the author of each study. Questions were selected 
from these surveys because each survey has both strong and weak aspects, as the authors 
expressed in their studies. While Fogarty and Shaw (2009) focused solely on the violation side of 
human error, Hall (2006) did not conceptualize ―safety behavior‖ in his study but used 
―intention‖ as the endogenous variable. Lastly, Seo et al. (2004) did not include an ―intention 
toward safety‖ variable. All three surveys have different reliability scores ranging from 0.70 to 
0.94. This study‘s new safety climate measurement instrument utilized the strongest aspects of 
these three surveys. 
Several criteria were determined for the question selection process. Among identical 
items from the three surveys, short and clear items were preferred. Double-barreled items, 
ambiguous items, items with multiple negatives and difficult vocabulary, and lengthy items were 
avoided to reduce redundancy and promote clarity (Babbie, 2008). The national and professional 
cultures of the TNP Aviation Department were considered for the selection process (Helmreich 
& Merritt, 2001). A couple of negatively worded questions were included to test the robustness 
of the instrument (Babbie, 2008). Each latent construct of the study model was conceptualized by 
identifying its observable dimensions. For example, the theoretical model of the study contained 
seven latent variables: management attitude toward safety, individual‘s own attitude toward 
safety, group norms, perceived work pressures, intention, violation, and error behaviors were all 
measured by survey questions. Management, individual, and group attitudes regarding safety 
were conceptualized through six dimensions: 1) devotion, 2) support, 3) reporting, 4) leading, 5) 
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attendance, and 6) prioritization (Minvielle et al., 2005). Questions were selected from three 
surveys to observe these dimensions. The question selection process for each latent construct is 
discussed below.  
Individual attitude was conceptualized by using Hall‘s (2006) risk items and Fogarty and 
Shaw‘s (2009) ―own attitude toward violation‖ items. The attitude toward safety and 
commitment to safety items were included from the Hall (2006) survey. The individual‘s own 
attitude construct was observed via seven items, regardless of the internal consistency reliability 
score; the methodology of the construct was considered robust enough to support this approach.  
Perceived group norms questions were selected from Seo et al.‘s (2004) coworkers‘ 
support construct, which had a 0.78 Cronbach‘s alpha score. However, one of the six questions 
was removed because of cultural nonconformity. Another item from Seo et al.‘s (2004) 
coworker‘s support construct was modified to ensure the item‘s conformity with Turkish culture. 
The original item was ―Employees feel it is important to recognize and report near miss 
incidents.‖ The item was replaced with ―Employees feel it is important to discuss/elaborate upon 
near miss incidents‖ because reporting on peers is culturally not considered appropriate among 
fellows working in the same organization. Two items were included in the group norms construct 
to enable the observation of the commitment and prioritizing dimensions. Finally, the group 
norms construct measurement instrument contained eight items.  
The management attitude toward safety construct was observed via nine items selected 
mostly from Seo et al.‘s (2004) survey based on six dimensions. Seo et al. (2004) reported the 
Cronbach‘s alpha score of this construct as 0.84. However, several items were found to be 
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identical. Moreover, perceived supervisory support was considered part of management attitude. 
Two items observing supervisory support were included in the management attitude construct 
because the supervisor could have a different attitude from the management. 
Perceived work pressures was conceptualized with six dimensions, including perceived 
time pressures, excessive workload, tradeoff power of safety against performance and task, 
implementation difficulty of safety regulations, individual‘s competence to safety, and 
attainability of safety instruments in the organization. Questions were mostly selected from Seo 
et al.‘s (2004) perceived work pressures construct, which had a scale of seven items and a 
Cronbach‘s alpha score of 0.88. The first item, ―Production is given a higher priority than 
safety,‖ was replaced with ―Getting the task done is given a higher priority than safety‖ because 
the TNP Aviation Department does not produce goods but rather performs tasks. Among the 
identical items referring to time pressures, a couple of items were preferred based on the 
selection criteria mentioned above. Two new items were included to observe individuals‘ 
competence in safety and the attainability of safety instrument from the organizational resource. 
The workplace pressures construct contained seven items. 
Intention was included in the model as a mediating variable to strengthen the relation 
between perceived safety climate and self-reported safety behavior. Intention was observed via 
six items derived from questions designed by Hall (2006) and Fogarty and Shaw (2009). Self-
reported safety behavior, an endogenous variable of the study, was conceptualized via the human 
factors analysis and classification system developed by Wiegmann and Shappell (2001; 2003). 
Accordingly, individual safety behavior in the workplace can be classified into two categories. 
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While ―error‖ refers to legal activities that fail to achieve the intended outcome, ―violation‖ 
represents willful disregard for formal safety regulations and procedures (Shappell & Wiegmann, 
2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). Violation items were designed to observe routine and 
exceptional violations, of which Fogarty and Shaw‘s (2009) violation items were preferred. For 
the error construct, questions reflecting the decision, skill-based, and perceptual error dimensions 
were selected from Seo et al.‘s  (2004) unsafe behavior construct based on the error definitions 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). The violations construct contained 
five items and the error construct contained four items to enable the observation of individuals‘ 
safety behavior in the workplace.  
 The survey questionnaire contained three sections. The first section aimed to measure 
safety climate dimensions, including own attitude, group norms, management attitude, and 
workplace pressures components. This section had 31 questions. The second section sought to 
measure intention variable and safety behavior dimensions, including violation and error 
behavior. This section had 15 questions. Participants were asked to respond to questions by using 
a five-point Likert scale: ―(1) Strongly agree,‖ ―(2) Agree,‖ ―(3) Neither agree nor disagree,‖ 
―(4) Disagree,‖ and ―(5) Strongly disagree.‖ The survey questions were translated into Turkish to 
ensure that respondents would comprehend the questions accurately. The Turkish version of the 
survey was checked by Dr. Kapucu, who is a native Turkish speaker and one of the committee 
members for this study. Dr. Ozmen and Dr. Yalcinkaya, experienced police helicopter pilots, 
were asked to check the appropriateness of the translation because of their familiarity with the 
study‘s concepts.  
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 The last section was established to measure demographic and occupational variables such 
as task group, assigned city unit, rank, age, educational level, years of employment, and flight 
hours. The task group variable contained three subgroups, including office staff (1), maintenance 
personnel (2), and pilot (3). The study survey was conducted in six cities, including Antalya (1), 
Adana (2), Izmir (3), Diyarbakir (4), Istanbul (5) and Ankara (6). Numbers were assigned to 
cities based on organizational size. The main body of the organization is in Ankara, so this city 
has the largest organizational size and the largest number of personnel. Istanbul is the most 
populous city in Turkey and has the second largest organization size. Diyarbakir is the largest 
city in southern Turkey and has the third biggest organization. Izmir, Adana, and Antalya are the 
largest cities in their regions and have relatively smaller organization sizes. Aviator rank was 
asked to determine respondents‘ level in the hierarchy. Police officer (1), sergeant (2), captain 
(3), and major (4) were the rank categories. The age of the police aviators was scaled into three 
categories including ―up to 30 years old‖ (1), ―between 30 and 40 years old‖ (2), and ―more than 
40 years old‖ (3). High school (1), college (2), bachelor‘s degree (3), and master‘s degree and 
above (4) were the educational level subcategories that determined the educational variance of 
the respondents. The years of employment variable was scaled into four categories including 
―less than 5 years‖ (1), ―between 5 and 10 years‖ (2), ―between 10 and 15‖ (3), and ―more than 
15 years‖ (4). The flight hours variable was scaled into six categories including ―no flight‖ (0), 
―less than 500 hours‖ (2), ―between 500 and 1000 hours‖ (3), ―between 1001 and 1500 hours‖ 
(3), ―between 1501 and 2500 hours‖ (4), and ―more than 2500 hours‖ (5). 
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3.8 Statistical Analysis 
The statistical analysis of the study was conducted on the four main topics and included 
descriptive analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, structural equation modeling, and hypotheses 
testing. The methods preferred for each analysis were detailed below. 
3.8.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 The descriptive analysis was presented via frequency tables for control, with exogenous 
and endogenous variables displayed separately to identify the distributional properties of the 
survey data. Two different correlation matrices were generated through the descriptive analysis. 
First, correlations between latent indicators and control variables were presented in order to 
delineate the relationships between the indicators and control variables proposed, and the 
strength as well as the direction of the relationship if any existed. Second, correlation matrixes 
were created to observe the association among latent indicators for an initial check to identify the 
multicollinearity problem. The most popular ordinal measures of association, Spearman rho and 
gamma tests, were conducted to analyze the correlations (Agresti & Finlay, 2009). While 
Spearman rho is conducted on continuous ordinal data having a relatively broad range of 
categories, gamma is more appropriate for collapsed variables, in which all observations are 
classified in a limited number of response categories. The gamma test was preferred for 
analyzing the correlations, as the measurement level of variables were collapsed ordinals ranging 
on a five-point Likert scale. The gamma test generates a value falling between -1 and +1. While 
the sign of the value indicates the direction of the association, the magnitude of the gamma 
68 
 
number indicates the strength of the association, where an absolute value of gamma closer to 1 
indicates a stronger association (Agresti & Finlay, 2009). The pattern of relationship and 
percentage distributions were also provided by the gamma coefficient.  
Second, multicollinearity, which is a problem in measuring social research, was 
examined. Multicollinearity arises when the intercorrelations between at least two variables are 
too high. Kline (2005) suggested that multicollinearity can happen when theoretically separate 
variables (or variables that ought to be separate theoretically) actually measure the same 
phenomenons. The most widely used cutoff points are .80 and .90; a correlation score among 
variables higher than these numbers can signal multicollinearity (Kline, 2005). The initial check 
to identify multicollinearity problem was made using the Spearman rho correlation test to detect 
high correlations (those having more than .80 coefficient values).  
3.8.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The second part of the statistical analysis consisted of confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA). CFA is an extension of factor analysis, which evaluates the validity of measurement 
models (Hox & Bechger, 1998; Wan, 2002; Byrne, 2010). CFA is a powerful tool for validating 
the measurement models of latent constructs (Wan, 2002; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Model 
validation refers to the degree to which the proposed measurement model measures what it is 
intended to measure (Trochim, 2001). Latent variables, often called constructs, are variables that 
cannot be directly observed, but can be measured by their observable indicators (Schumacker & 
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Lomax, 2004; Byrne, 2010). The study had four endogenous factor variables, two exogenous 
factor variables, and one latent mediating variable. 
 CFA was used to develop and validate the best measurement models by revising and 
improving generic measurement models. A three-stage approach was followed step-by-step, as 
suggested by Wan (2002). The first stage  involved identifying the appropriate indicators by 
assessing critical ratios and standardized regression weights. Significance and adequate factor 
loading are two criteria in identifying the appropriate indicators. First, critical ratio is used to 
specify the significance of the standardized regression weights, which equals the estimate 
divided by its standard error (Wan, 2002; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; Byrne, 2010). Indicators 
are postulated to be significant if the critical ratio value is equal to +1.96 or higher and -1.96 or 
lower at the preferred .05 level (Hox & Bechger, 1998; Byrne, 2010).  
 Second, the estimate power of factor loading was assessed. Factor loading (standardized 
regression weights) refers to the extent to which the indicator (observed variable) is related to the 
latent construct (unobserved variable) (Byrne, 2010). ―A one-way arrow between two variables 
indicates a postulated direct influence of one variable on another‖ (Wan, 2002, p. 95). The 
absolute value of factor loading reflects the strength of the association between the latent 
construct and its indicator. While high values indicate strong relationships, low values indicate a 
negligible association and can be removed from the model to increase the measurement validity. 
For factor loadings, .50 was established as a cutoff threshold. Indicators having factor loadings 
lower than .50 were excluded from the measurement models. 
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The second stage involved determining how well the model fit with the study data. 
Evaluating the measurement model‘s overall fit involves assessing whether the model fit is 
within acceptable limits despite having significant and high factor loadings. Indicators having 
not statsitically significant factor loadings were dropped from the model, and the measurement 
errors of factor loadings were correlated depending on the theoretical framework (Hox & 
Bechger, 1998; Wan, 2002). In the measurement models, one indicator was selected as a scale 
factor in order to derive factor loading estimates for other indicators. The AMOS (Analysis of 
Moment Structures) software produced goodness-of-fit statistics to assess whether the 
measurement model fit the data. A fitting model means that the difference between the sample 
covariance matrix and the model-implied covariance matrix is small enough (Wan, 2002; 
Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). The similarity of the matrixes is interpreted as the data‘s fitting 
the theoretical model.  
Several parameters have been used in the SEM literature for assessing model fitness 
including chi-square statistics and fit indexes. There is no consensus as to which fit indices to 
report. However, reporting all of them is not recommended, while using at least three fit tests 
was recommended (Garson, 2009). The determination of fit indexes and the rules-of-thumb 
cutoff criteria were the most important issues for many researchers (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The 
goodness-of-fit indices and index criteria selected for this study were based on Garson‘s (2009) 
recommendations.   
The most widely used ways to evaluate model fit are the chi-square goodness-of-fit 
statistics and fit indexes. Modeling chi-square goodness-of-fit statistics is the most common fit 
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test for assessing the magnitude of discrepancy (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The chi-square test 
compares the given model‘s covariance structure with the observed covariance matrix. A lower 
chi-square value means that the model fits better with the data (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 
2005). A significant chi-square value indicates the lack of a satisfactory model fit (Wan, 2002; 
Garson, 2009). However, the chi-square test is sensitive to the size of the correlations because 
larger correlations lead to greater differences between the given and observed covariance 
matrixes (Kline, 2005). Hence, normed chi-square statistics are used to reduce the sample size 
effect. A ratio of chi-square and degrees of freedom (CMIN/DF) as high as 4.0 is preferred as the 
cutoff level for considering reasonable fitness (Kline, 2005).  
The second way of evaluating model fit is via so-called fit indexes, which can be 
classified into absolute and incremental fit indexes. An absolute fit index evaluates how well an 
a priori model produces the sample data (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) and Hoelter‘s critical N were selected among the absolute goodness-
of-fit tests because the test has been reported as the most sensitive index for maximum likelihood 
(ML) based tests (Hu & Bentler, 1999). All measures overvalue goodness of fit for samples 
below 200, though RMSEA is less sensitive to sample size than others (Garson, 2009). Hence, 
RMSEA is a popular parameter that ―measures the degree of model adequacy as based on 
population discrepancy in relation to degrees of freedom‖ (Wan, 2002, p. 82). While an RMSEA 
value below .05 indicates good model fit, a value between .05 and .08 is acceptable (Wan, 2002). 
Hu and Bentler (1999) suggested .06 as the cutoff value for RMSEA. Likewise, p-close assesses 
whether the RMSEA score is less than .05; a p-close value higher than .05 indicates a close 
model fit (Wan, 2002). Second, Hoelter‘s critical N is used to compute the minimum sample size 
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for accepting the model by chi-square at the .05 level. While a Hoelter‘s critical N below 200 is 
reasonable for accepting a model by chi-square, a value below 75 is considered unacceptable 
(Wan, 2002; Garson, 2009).  
In contrast to absolute-fit indexes, incremental-fit indexes calculate the proportionate 
improvement in fit by comparing the null model, in which all the observed variables are typically 
uncorrelated, with the theoretical model (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The comparative fit index (NFI) 
and Tucker Lewis index (TLI) were selected among the incremental fit indexes to assess the 
improvement in fit because the goodness of fit index (GFI) and adjusted goodness of fit index 
(AGFI) are not recommended for evaluating model fit due to poor performance (Hu & Bentler, 
1999; Garson, 2009). CFI, also known as the Bentler comparative fit index, compares the best 
fitting model with the null model to reflect the proportion of improvement. A CFI value of .50 
indicates that the revised model improves fit by 50% compared to the null model. While CFI 
values above .95 are good, values between .90 and .95 are acceptable (Hu & Bentler, 1999; 
Garson, 2009). The Tucker Lewis index (TLI) is a fit index that is less sensitive to sample size. 
A TLI score close to 1 indicates a good fit, while a score greater than .95 is the generally 
accepted cutoff for a good model fit; a score below .90 indicates the need to restructure the 
model (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Given the goodness-of-fit statistics, model fit was assessed based 
on the selected criteria (Hox & Bechger, 1998; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). The fit indices 
used for this study are outlined in the table 2. 
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Table 2. Goodness-of-Fit Indices and Criteria for Model Validation 
Index Estimation Approach Criterion 
Chi-square (x²) magnitude of discrepancy between 
observed and predicted relationships 
among measures (Hu & Bentler, 1999) 
The discrepancy 
should be minimal 
Degrees of Freedom (df) number of sample moments minus 
number of distinct parameters to be 
estimated (Wan, 2002) 
greater than or equal 
to 0 
Likelihood Ratio (x²/df) sample covariance matrix is drawn 
from the population as characterized by 
the hypothesized covariance matrix 
(Wan, 2002) 
smaller than 4.0 
suggests a good fit 
P value significance of chi-square (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999) 
a non-significant 
value (>0.05) is 
desired 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) also known as NNFI, compares 
alternative models (Hu & Bentler, 
1999) 
>0.90 suggest a good 
fit 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) compares the best fitting model and the 
null model (Hu & Bentler, 1999) 
>0.90 suggest a good 
fit 
Root Mean Squared Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
degree of model adequacy based upon 
population discrepancy respecting 
degrees of freedom (Wan, 2002) 
smaller than 0.05 
suggests a good fit 
Probability (p-close) test the population RMSEA is no 
greater than 0.05 (Wan, 2002)  
>0.05 suggests a close 
fit  
Hoelter's Critical N (CN) evaluates the sample size to determine 
the largest sample to confirm that the 
model is correct using x² (Wan, 2002) 
greater than 200 
 
After assessing goodness-of-fit parameters, the third stage, identifying the possible 
reasons of lack of fit, was launched (Wan, 2002). Eliminating indicators not contributing to the 
measurement and freeing parameters based on their modification indices are possible solutions 
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for improving the model fit. The modification index of a particular parameter indicates that when 
this parameter is allowed to be free, the value of the chi-square decreases by at least the value of 
the index (Wan, 2002; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). The AMOS program reported modification 
indices for all non-free parameters. The structural paths were inserted based on the modification 
indices to further improve the model fit. At each step, one pair of error terms with the largest 
improvement in the model was correlated by a two-way arrow, which ―indicates that they are 
correlated‖ (Wan, 2002, p. 95). This process was repeated until the model showed a reasonably 
good model fit.  
Lastly, the internal consistency of the instruments was tested by obtaining Cronbach‘s 
alpha scores after the validation of the measurement models. SPSS version 16 produced 
Cronbach‘s alpha scores for the measurement instruments. As a general rule, values of .70 and 
above are regarded as reliable (Bland & Altman, 1997). Reliability analysis demonstrated the 
consistency of the measurement instrument used.   
3.8.3 Structural Equation Modeling 
 The third part of the statistical analysis consisted of structural equation modeling (SEM). 
After validating the measurement models, a covariance structure model was created and 
validated based on the goodness-of-fit statistics. The measurement model and covariance 
structure model are two main parts of the structural equation model (Hox & Bechger, 1998; 
Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). SEM consists of measurement models of exogenous and 
endogenous variables, as well as control variables. The validated measurement models were 
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connected with each other based on the theoretical framework of the study to test organizational 
safety climate’s effects on individual safety behavior. Control variables were included in the 
model to identify the organizational and demographic variables that account for the variation in 
the study construct. The following figure illustrates the structural equation model of the study. 
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Figure 3. Structural Equation Model for Safety Behavior 
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This study had seven latent constructs, including management attitude toward safety, own 
attitude toward safety, group norms, workplace pressures, intention, violation behavior, and error 
behavior. While safety climate is an exogenous variable conceptualized as a four-factor 
measurement model, safety behavior is an endogenous variable conceptualized as a two-factor 
measurement model. After the validation of the measurement models for the study variables, a 
covariance structure model was developed to observe the effects of the exogenous variables on 
the endogenous variable. Control variables were also included in the covariance structure model 
to identify the possible causal relations of the study variables (Hox & Bechger, 1998; 
Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). The theoretical framework of this study proposes that 
organizational safety culture has a positive effect on individuals’ safety behavior. The last part of 
the statistical analysis consisted of the hypotheses testing section. Four hypotheses were tested 
based on the results of the structural equation model. In the following section data analysis was 
conducted through four steps including descriptive statistics, confirmatory factor analysis, the 
structural equation model, and hypotheses testing. 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
CHAPTER 4 FINDINGS 
The methodology of the findings chapter was developed based on four main topics: 
descriptive statistics, confirmatory factor analysis, the structural equation model, and hypotheses 
testing. A descriptive analysis of the study was created by using frequency tables for the control, 
exogenous and endogenous variables separately to identify the distributional properties of the 
survey data. Then a correlation matrix was conducted for each latent construct to observe the 
association between indicators and control variables. Correlation matrixes were also used to 
check for a possible multicollinearity problem.  
 The second main topic was established for three purposes. The application of structural 
equation modeling starts with the specification of a measurement model (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted for each latent construct to establish and validate 
measurement models. Second, the internal consistency of the measurement instruments was 
discussed in this topic by conducting Cronbach‘s alpha scores. Lastly, validated measurement 
models were tested with control variables to identify the organizational and demographic 
variables that account for the variation in study construct.  
 After validating the measurement models, a generic structural equation model was 
established by aggregating the validated exogenous, endogenous, and control variables. The 
generic model was revised based on critical ratios and modification indices. Lastly, the 
hypotheses were assessed based on the results generated by structural equation modeling. 
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4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 This study was conducted in the Turkish National Police (TNP) Aviation Department and 
its subunits, which employs a relatively limited number of employees. A web-based survey was 
conducted via www.surveymonkey.com. The survey questionnaire was distributed to a majority 
of the TNP Aviation Department employees, which numbered 297 in all. Fourteen subjects were 
either on temporary assignments or excused for medical or personal reasons. The survey 
questionnaire was thus conveyed to 283 subjects through e-mails, phone calls, or manually via 
assigned personnel in each city. It was important to reach most of the personnel working in the 
six cities because city and group differences were important to assess. Of the 283 subjects 
reached, 225 personnel participated in the survey, which represented a 79.5% response rate. A 
considerably higher response rate was achieved by using several strategies, including acquiring 
the top-level management‘s permission and support, assigning fellow personnel in six cities to 
ensure the highest participation rate, and informing employees about this research through the 
flight safety meetings held once a month in every unit of the TNP Aviation Department. 
 Fifteen respondents were eliminated because of missing responses exceeding 30% of 
survey questions. There remained 210 subjects with limited missing responses, which were 
handled by the data imputation method. Missing variables were replaced by the series mean 
because most of the variables were ordinal measurement level. Data imputation permitted the use 
of the 210 samples without losing any cases.  
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4.1.1 Control Variables 
Control variables were the demographic and organizational characteristics of the subjects 
postulated as influencing the study variables. Task group, city, rank, age, educational level, years 
of service, and flight hours were considered to have effects on the safety climate perceptions and 
safety behaviors of organizational members. Table 3 indicates the descriptive statistics of control 
variables including frequency and percentage distributions. 
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Table 3. Frequency and Percentage Distributions for the Control Variables 
Variable # Attributes Frequency Percent Cumulative % 
Group 1 Staff 84 40 40 
In which group are you 
working? 
2 Maintenance 60 28.6 58.6 
3 Pilot 66 31.4 100 
City 1 Antalya 15 7.1 7.1 
In which city are you 
working? 
2 Adana 25 11.9 19 
3 Izmir 25 11.9 30.9 
4 Diyarbakir 44 21 51.9 
5 Istanbul 53 25.2 77.1 
6 Ankara 48 22.9 100 
Rank 1 Police Officer 126 60 60 
What is your rank? 2 Sergeant 33 15.7 75.7 
3 Captain 27 12.9 88.6 
4 Major 24 11.4 100 
Age 1 Up to 30 28 13.3 13.3 
What is your age? 2 Between 30 and 40 109 51.9 65.2 
3 More than 40  73 34.7 100 
Education 1 High School 19 9 9 
What is the highest 
degree you completed? 
2 College 75 35.7 44.8 
3 University 86 41 85.7 
4 Master and above 30 14.3 100 
Years of Service 1 Less than 5 years 52 24.8 24.8 
How long have you 
been in the TNP 
Aviation Department? 
2 Between 5 and 10 58 27.6 52.4 
3 Between 10 and 15 61 29 81.4 
4 More than 15 years 39 18.6 100 
Flight Hours 0 No flight  84 40 40 
What are your total 
flight hours? 
1 Less than 500 15 7.1 47.1 
2 500 to 1000 25 11.9 59 
3 1000 to 1500 30 14.3 73.3 
4 1500 to 2500 41 19.5 92.9 
5 More than 2500 15 7.1 100 
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The survey was delivered to three groups of employees including pilots, maintenance 
personnel, and office staff. Pilots are the employees principally responsible for the aircraft and 
the mission performed. Of the 210 respondents, 66 respondents were pilots, accounting for 
31.4% of all respondents. Maintenance personnel, the other main personnel in aviation 
organizations, have special training in aircrafts‘ technical aspects and perform at the operation 
line. Standard overhaul and troubleshooting tasks are performed via collaboration with pilots. 
Sixty maintenance personnel participated in the survey, which represents 28.6% of the total 
number of respondents. Office staff, the third group, consists of personnel dealing with air traffic 
control, petrol tanker and transportation vehicle driving, hangar and administrative building 
guarding, and clerical services. Of the 210 respondents, 84 respondents were office staff, 
representing 40% of all respondents. This group of respondents does not work in the operation 
line; however, their safety performance influences the overall safety of the organization. The task 
group variable was operationalized as the ordinal variable based on their closeness to the 
operation line and association with flight safety. Office staff respondents were assigned to 1 
because these are subordinate personnel in terms of flight safety. Maintenance personnel 
respondents were assigned to 2 and pilot respondents were assigned to 3, because these are the 
principal personnel when flight safety is in question.  
The survey was conducted in six cities, including the three biggest cities of Turkey—
Ankara, Istanbul, and Diyarbakir—and regional leader cities—Adana, Izmir, and Antalya. These 
cities were ordered based on organization size and number of employees. Ankara has the biggest 
organization size and employee count because the top management and headquarters of the 
organization are located in this, the capital city of Turkey. Istanbul is the most crowded city in 
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Turkey, coming in after Ankara according to organizational size and number of employees. 
Diyarbakir is the biggest city in the southern area of the country, with the third biggest 
organizational size. Adana, Izmir, and Antalya are the biggest cities of their regions, containing 
relatively smaller size units with respect to the first three cities. The assigned values of these 
cities reflect their organization sizes. Hence, the city variable was operationalized as having an 
ordinal measurement level because the values simultaneously reflect the size of the units. Of the 
respondents, 48 were from Ankara, representing 22.9% of all respondents. Istanbul has the most 
active Police Aviation Unit participating in the survey, with 53 respondents representing 25.2% 
of all respondents. The number of respondents working in Diyarbakir was 44, accounting for 
21% of all respondents. A relatively small numbers of respondents were from Adana, which had 
25 respondents (11.9%), while Izmir had 25 respondents (11.9%) and Antalya had 15 
respondents (7.1%).  
Most of the pilots are selected from ranked officers and trained by the TNP Aviation 
Department. Maintenance personnel are selected from police officers, but they have the 
opportunity to take the ranked personnel exams after maintenance training. Hence, most of the 
pilots but few maintenance personnel are ranked officers. Office staff consists primarily of non-
ranked police officers and a few ranked officers that organize the office work. Of the 210 
respondents, 126 respondents were non-ranked police officers, accounting for 60% of the total 
respondents. Of the respondents having rank, 33 sergeants (15.7%), 27 captains (12.9%), and 24 
majors (11.4%) participated in the study.  
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Regarding the age variable, TNP has a personnel policy that considers attrition time. TNP 
members must retire when police officers are 55 years old and ranked officers are 57 years old. 
Second, pilots, maintenance personnel, and air traffic controllers must provide medical reports 
for their health status to ensure their ability to continue their aviation duties. Personnel not 
having a qualified health status cannot work in the Aviation Department. Of the respondents, 28 
respondents (13.3%) were less than 30 years old, 109 respondents were between the ages of 30 
and 40 (51.9%), and 73 respondents were the ages of 40 and above (34.7%). 
The TNP use two different methods to recruit personnel: one for ranked police officers 
and one for non-ranked officers. The first difference occurs in general recruiting, as most of the 
ranked police officers are selected from police colleges and high schools and receive subsequent 
training at the Police Academy, where they are awarded a bachelor‘s degree. The TNP also has 
two-year police technical colleges to recruit and train non-ranked police officers. All TNP 
members have at least a two-year college education, while all ranked officers have a minimum 
qualification of a four-year bachelor‘s degree. However, some mature police officers have only 
high school degrees, as they were part of the existing force before the new recruiting policy was 
implemented in 2003. Second, TNP members have the opportunity to obtain higher-level 
educations while they work. Hence, police officers can obtain graduate-level degrees to increase 
their service capacity. Of the total respondents, 19 respondents were high school graduates, 75 
respondents were associate-level college graduates, 86 respondents had obtained their bachelor‘s 
degree, and 30 respondents held a master‘s or PhD-level degree. The percentage distributions 
based on educational level were 9% high school graduates, 35.7% college graduates, 41% 
bachelor‘s graduates, and 14.3% master‘s and PhD graduates.  
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 The years of service variable reflects how long the employee has been employed by the 
TNP Aviation Department. This variable was operationalized into four categories—less than 5 
years, between 5 and 10 years, between 10 and 15 years, and more than 15 years—to refer the 
experience level of respondents. Of the 210 respondents, 52 respondents (24.8%) had less than 5 
years of service, 58 respondents (27.6%) had between 5 and 10 years of service, 61 respondents 
(29%) had between 10 and 15 years of service, and 39 respondents (18.6%) had more than 15 
years of service in the TNP Aviation Department.   
 ―Flight hours‖ is the last control variable and refers to the number of hours for which 
pilots and maintenance personnel have flown an aircraft. Flight hours are formally recorded in 
each aviation unit, not only for employees but also for the aircraft, to ensure the reliability of 
personnel and aircraft on mission assignments, as well as to provide incentives to employees 
having higher performance. The flight hours variable is operationalized according to certain 
levels of formal regulations to indicate the flight experience of pilots and maintenance personnel. 
Office staffs do not fly, so they were coded with a ―0.‖ Of the 210 respondents, 84 respondents 
(40%) had no flight hours, which was equal to the number of office staff. Fifteen respondents 
(7.1%) had fewer than 500 flight hours, which also indicated recently recruited pilots and 
maintenance personnel. The threshold level for becoming a pilot is 500 hours. Twenty-five 
respondents (11.9%) had between 500 and 1,000 flight hours. Thirty respondents (14.3%) had 
between 1,000 and 1,500 flight hours; 1,000 flight hours is another threshold level, at which 
pilots are assigned critical missions. Forty-one respondents (19.5%) had between 1,500 and 
2,000 flight hours. These pilots are considered experienced and are assigned to recruited pilot 
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training and suspended pilot refreshing programs. Fifteen respondents (7.1) had 2,000 or more 
flight hours; these include the most experienced pilots. 
4.1.2 Exogenous Variable 
 The study analyzes the influence of safety culture on individuals‘ safety behavior. Safety 
culture is the exogenous variable, and self-reported safety behavior is the endogenous variable of 
the study. The safety culture of the TNP Aviation Department was measured by the safety 
climate concept, which has been regarded as the measurable facet of the safety culture (Zohar & 
Luria, 2005; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). Safety climate was conceptualized by four latent constructs 
as a four-factor measurement model. The study measures the safety climate of an organization 
via individual attitude toward safety, group norms, workplace pressures, and management 
attitude toward safety. Each of these dimensions is measured as the individual, group, and 
organizational level variables of safety climate (Hall, 2006; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). First, each 
latent construct was explored separately to understand the structure and distributional 
characteristics of the data. Frequency analysis and correlation matrixes were conducted for each 
latent construct to observe the association between indicators, and demographic and 
organizational variables, as well as to identify any multicollinearity problem. A threshold level 
of .70 for the correlation coefficient was assigned to avoid a multicollinearity threat.  
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4.1.2.1 Own Attitude toward Safety  
 The first dimension of safety climate is the individual‘s own attitude toward safety, 
indicating the individual‘s own value expectancy of safety (Baron, 2008; Fogarty & Shaw, 
2009). Own attitude (Own) was measured by seven items including risk perception, importance 
of safety tool usage, commitment to safety, and attitude toward safety regulations, safety 
violations, and errors. Survey participants were asked to respond questions based on the five-
point Likert scale ranging from ―strongly disagree‖ to ―strongly agree.‖ The frequency analysis 
and percentage distributions of the seven items can be seen in Appendix C. 
 Based on the frequency analysis and percentage distributions of Own statements, except 
for the fourth statement, a majority of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed with all 
statements. Own4 statement inquires about the employee‘s level of commitment toward safety, 
as well as his reaction when his safety concerns are overlooked by his fellows and supervisors. 
The cumulative percentage of the respondents who either strongly agreed or agreed with this 
indicator was 20.5%. On the other hand, 39.5% of respondents stated that they either strongly 
disagreed or disagreed with the Own4 statement. The remaining 40% of respondents stated that 
they agreed somewhat.  
 Two different correlation matrices were generated through the descriptive analysis. 
Spearman rho and gamma tests were conducted to analyze the correlations. First, the correlations 
between latent indicators and control variables were presented to reveal the relationships 
between the indicators and control variables proposed, and the strength as well as the direction of 
the relationship, if any existed. The patterns of relationship and percentage distributions were 
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observed by the gamma coefficient. Second, correlation matrixes were conducted to observe the 
association among latent indicators for an initial check to identify any multicollinearity problem. 
The initial check to identify a multicollinearity problem was conducted using the Spearman rho 
correlation test (see Appendix D). 
 According to the correlation matrixes, only two correlations between Own indicators and 
control variables had a significant relationships at the .05 level. The first significant correlation 
was between the Own3 indicator and the task group variable (r= -.227, p= .05). The Own3 
indicator sought to assess an individual‘s reaction when his peers take shortcuts. A negative 
significant correlation showed that principals of flight missions (74.2% for pilots) agreed less 
often with the Own3 statement than did maintenance personnel (83.4%) and office staff (83.4%). 
The second significant correlation was between the Own4 indicator and the years of service 
variable (r= .202, p= .05). The Own4 indicator aimed to observe individuals‘ attitudes about 
reporting their peers‘ mistakes when their concerns are overlooked. A positive significant 
correlation reflected a systematic pattern that respondents‘ agreement that peers‘ mistakes should 
be reported increased as their service years increased. While reporting peers‘ mistakes was more 
acceptable for respondents having more than 15 years of service, the agreement declined as the 
respondent‘s years of service decreased. 
 For the initial check of the multicollinearity problem, the Spearman rho test was 
conducted. Most of the correlations between Own attitude indicators were significant at the 0.05 
level, except for the correlations between Own2 and Own4, Own4 and Own6, and Own4 and 
Own7 indicators. The highest correlation was between the Own6 and Own7 indicators, with a 
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correlation value of 0.563, which was below the 0.70 criterion. These findings showed that Own 
attitude indicators did not have a multicollinearity problem.  
4.1.2.2 Group Norms 
 Group norms is the second dimension of the organizational safety climate, indicating 
perceived social pressures in the workplace (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001; Hall, 2006) and 
generally acknowledged ways of performing particular tasks (Baron, 2008; Fogarty & Shaw, 
2009). The group norms construct was measured by eight items including fellow workers‘ risk 
perception, safety devotion, and attitudes towards maintenance procedures, safety prioritization, 
and value expectancy of safety. The responses were scaled ranging from ―strongly disagree‖ to 
―strongly agree.‖  
 A relatively high percentage of respondents indicated their agreement to most of the 
group indicators regardless of the organizational and demographic differences, except for the 
Group3 statement. The Group3 indicator aimed to observe the perceived support of fellows and 
their complementary level. The cumulative percentages were as follows: 21% of the respondents 
either strongly disagreed or disagreed, 30.5% of the respondents somewhat agreed, and 48.6% of 
the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed with the statement.  
 Correlation matrixes indicated eight significant correlations between Group indicators 
and control variables at the 0.05 level. The first correlation was observed between the Group2 
indicator and the city variable (r=.375, p=.01). The Group2 indicator aimed to observe perceived 
group pressure to disregard safety regulations. The positive and significant correlation between 
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the Group2 and city variables reflects that respondents working in bigger organizations are more 
likely to perceive social pressure to disregard safety regulations than respondents working in 
smaller organizations. 
 Another significant correlation was observed between the Group4 and task group (r=.230, 
p=.05), city (r=-.267, p=.01), and rank (r=-317, p=.01) variables. The Group4 indicator was 
designed to assess co-workers‘ support of the organization‘s safety program; pilots (72.7%) are 
less likely to agree on co-workers‘ support than maintenance personnel (88.3%) and office staff 
(86.9%). The negative significant correlations showed that co-worker support decreases as 
organization size and respondent rank increase.  
 A correlation between the Group6 indicator and the city variable existed that was 
significant at the .01 level (r=-.281). The Group6 indicator was designed to observe the safety 
respect of co-workers. The negative significant correlation showed that co-workers‘ safety 
respect decreased as the size of the organization increased. The city variable also had a 
significant correlation with the Group7 indicator (r=-.158, p=.05). The Group7 indicator aimed 
to observe the safety reliability of the organization. The negative significant correlation reflected 
that safety reliability decreased as the size of the organization increased.  
 The Group8 indicator had a significant correlation with the task group (r=-.189, p=.05), 
and city (r=-.192, p=.05) variables. The Group8 indicator was designed to observe co-workers‘ 
safety priorities over time. The negative significant correlation showed that maintenance 
personnel (76.6%) and office staff (76.2%) were more likely to perceive co-workers‘ safety as a 
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priority than pilots (62.2%). The second correlation showed that the co-workers‘ safety priority 
increased as the size of organization decreased. 
 Correlations between Group indicators were significant except for correlations between 
Group1 and Group2, Group1 and Group3, Group2 and Group3, Group2 and Group8, Group3 and 
Group4, Group5, Group6, and Group7 based on the Spearman rho test. The highest correlation 
was between Group7 and Group8 indicators with a value of 0.470, which was below the 0.70 
criterion. Therefore, the Group Norms indicators did not have a multicollinearity problem.  
4.1.2.3 Management Attitude toward Safety    
Management attitude toward safety was measured by nine questions including 
management‘s commitment, devotion, and support to safety, as well as management‘s attitude 
toward safety issues such as employee ideas and unsafe practices. The responses were scaled 
ranging from ―strongly agree‖ to strongly disagree.‖  
A majority of respondents reported their agreement to the statements except for the 
fourth, sixth and seventh indicators. The Management4 indicator aimed to observe the perceived 
management support when an employee reports his mistake. The cumulative percentages were as 
follows: 17.2% of the respondents either strongly disagreed or disagreed with management 
support, and 58.6% of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with it. The 
Management6 indicator observed the management‘s respect toward safety by asking whether the 
management discusses safety issues with employees. The cumulative percentages were as 
follows: 17.2% of the respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, and 
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60.4% of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with it. The Management7 indicator asked 
about employees‘ perceptions of the management‘s safety priorities over time. The cumulative 
percentages were as follows: 15.7% of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement, and 58.5% of the respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with it.  
Correlation matrixes showed ten significant correlations between management indicators 
and control variables. The Management1 indicator had a significant correlation with the city 
variable (r=-0.179, p=0.05). The Management1 indicator was designed to observe perceived 
management support. The negative significant correlation showed that perceived management 
support perceived decreased as the size of organization increased. The city variable had a 
significant correlation with the Management2 indicator, which aimed to observe the management 
safety training provision (r= -0.183, p= 0.05). Respondents reported that management safety 
training provision increased as the size of the organization decreased.  
Management3 was designed to observe management‘s attitude toward reporting safety-
related incidents. The city variable had a significant correlation with the Management3 indicator 
(r= -0.242, p= 0.01), showing that respondents working in smaller organizations were more 
likely to perceive management as encouraging the reporting of safety-related incidents than 
respondents working in bigger organizations. The city variable had a significant correlation with 
the Management4 indicator, which aimed to observe the perceived management support when 
employees report their mistakes (r= -0.209, p= 0.01). Respondents working in smaller 
organizations are more likely to perceive management support than respondents working in 
bigger organizations. The city variable had a significant correlation with the Management5 
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indicator (r= -0.213, p= 0.01), which aimed to observe management‘s leadership in keeping 
employees focused on safety. The negative significant correlation showed that management‘s 
perceived leadership increased as the size of organization decreased. The years of service 
variable had a significant correlation with the Management6 indicator (r= -0.167, p= 0.05), 
which aimed to observe management‘s respect toward safety. Respondents reported that 
management‘s respect toward safety decreased as the respondents‘ service year increased.  
The management8 indicator was designed to observe supervisors‘ attitudes toward 
employees‘ ideas about improving safety. Management8 had a significant correlation with the 
task group (r= 0.301, p= 0.01), rank (r= 0.324, p= 0.01), age (r= -0.199, p= 0.05), and education 
(r= 0.234, p= 0.01) variables. Pilots (83.3%) were more likely to perceive supervisors‘ respect 
for employees‘ ideas than were maintenance personnel (66.7%) or office staff (57.2%). Second, 
supervisors‘ respect toward ideas that improved safety increased as the rank of the respondents 
increased. Third, younger respondents (89.2%) were more likely to perceive supervisors‘ respect 
than older respondents (67% for between 31-39 years old, 61.6% for more than 40 years old). 
Lastly, supervisors‘ perceived respect increased as the respondents‘ education level increased. 
The systematic pattern between supervisors‘ perceived respect and task group, rank, age, and 
education attributes was noticeable.  
An initial check for the multicollinearity problem was made via the Spearman rho test. 
Most of the correlations between the management indicators were significant, except for 
correlations between Management9, which was a reversed item, and other management 
indicators. The highest correlation was between Management1 and Management5 indicators with 
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a value of 0.535, which was below the 0.70 criterion. These values showed that management 
indicators did not have a multicollinearity problem.  
4.1.2.4 Workplace Pressures 
The ease or difficulty of working with safety procedures is called workplace pressures, 
which emerges as a formation of employees‘ experiences and anticipated obstacles (Hall, 2006). 
Workplace pressures arise from the lack of safety instrument provision and difficulty in working 
with the safety procedures directed by the organization. This construct aimed to observe the 
pressures arising from lack of time, personnel, and equipment; performance pressures exerted by 
the organization; and customer, peer, and self-induced pressure (Baron, 2008). Workplace 
pressures was measured by seven dimensions including time, workload, performance and task 
pressure, difficulty of use of safety regulations, individual‘s competence in safety, and 
accessibility of safety instruments.  
Contrary to the first three constructs, workplace pressures indicators showed mostly 
disagreement on the Pressure5 (67.1% disagreement, 12.4% agreement), and Pressure6 (57.1% 
disagreement, 14.2% agreement) statements. The remaining five indicators had relatively 
balanced responses, as follows: Pressure1 (51.9 disagreement, 28.1% agreement), Pressure2 
(49.1% disagreement, 20.5% agreement), Pressure3 (41% disagreement, 37.1% agreement), 
Pressure4 (50% disagreement, 34.2% agreement) and Pressure7 (50% disagreement, 20.9% 
agreement).  
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The correlation matrixes of pressure indicators and control variables indicated thirteen 
significant correlations. The Pressure1 indicator had a significant relationship with task group (r= 
-.329, p= .01), rank (r= -.304, p= .01), and flight hours (r= -.237, p= .01). The Pressure1 
indicator was designed to observe the pressure stemming from the need to complete tasks on 
time. For the task group variable, office staff (45.2%) more often agreed or strongly agreed about 
the existence of pressure stemming from the need to complete tasks on time than did 
maintenance personnel (20%) and pilots (13.6%). For the rank variable, this kind of pressure 
increased as the respondents‘ rank decreased. Lastly, the pressure perceived decreased as the 
respondent‘s flight hours increased.  
The flight hours variable had a significant correlation with the Pressure2 indicator        
(r= - .146, p= .05), which was designed to observe time pressures. Respondents reported that 
time pressures over safety increased as the respondent‘s flight hours decreased. Pressure3 was 
designed to observe workload pressure over safety. Pressure3 had a significant correlation with 
the task group (r= -.177, p= .05) and age (r= .186, p= .05) variables. Office staff (40.5%) more 
often agreed or strongly agreed with the statement than maintenance personnel (40%) and pilots 
(30.3%). For the age variable, workload pressure over safety increased as the respondents grew 
older.  
Pressure5 had a significant correlation with the task group (r= -.235, p= .01), city (r= 
.185, p= .05), rank (r= -.220, p= .01), age (r= .243, p= .01), and education (r= -.174, p= 0.05) 
variables. Pressure5 aimed to observe workload pressure effects emerging as shortcuts and risk-
taking behaviors. The negative significant correlation showed that office staff (21.4%) more 
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often agreed or strongly agreed to the statement than maintenance personnel (10%) and pilots 
(3%). As the size of organization increased, the perceived prevalence of shortcuts and risk-taking 
behaviors increased. The respondents reported that lower ranks were more likely to agree with 
this statement than higher ranks. Older respondents were more likely to agree with the statement 
than were younger respondents. Lastly, as the education of the respondents increased, the 
prevalence of shortcuts and risk-taking behaviors due to a heavy workload decreased.  
Pressure6 was designed to observe the pressure stemming from an individual‘s own 
safety competence. This indicator had a significant correlation with the task group (r= -.199, p= 
.05) and city (r= .258, p= .01) variables. The negative significant correlation reflects that office 
staff (20.2%) more often agreed or strongly agreed with the statement than maintenance 
personnel (10%) and pilots (10.6%). Second, the pressure stemming from safety competence 
increased as the size of organization increased.  
For the initial check of the multicollinearity problem, the Spearman rho test was 
conducted on workplace pressure indicators. Except for the correlations between the Pressure1 
and Pressure6, and Pressure 3 and Pressure6 indicators, most of the correlations were significant 
at the .05 level. The highest correlation was between Pressure4 and Pressure7 indicators with a 
value of .538, which was below the 0.70 criterion. It can be assumed that the workplace pressure 
indicators did not have a multicollinearity problem.   
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4.1.3 Endogenous Variables 
Self-reported safety behavior is the endogenous variable of the study. Safety behavior 
was conceptualized as a two-factor measurement model including violation and error items. 
Safety behavior was classified into two categories by Wiegmann & Shappell (2001; 2003) in the 
human factors analysis and classification system. The first category is violation, which refers to 
willfully and consciously disregarding approved safety regulations and procedures. The second 
category of unsafe behavior is error, which refers to an individual‘s activities accidentally failing 
to accomplish an intended outcome (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; 
2003).  
Intention was included in the study model to strengthen the relation between the 
exogenous variable and endogenous variables (Ajzen, 1991; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). A 
descriptive analysis of the intention, and then of the violation and error variables, is presented in 
the next sections.   
4.1.3.1 Intention toward Safety Behavior 
Intention is the motivational factor influencing an individual‘s behavior. Intention 
determines how much effort an individual plans to expend in order to achieve a particular 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991). The intention construct was measured by six items including safety 
commitment, pre-checking, manipulation, risk taking, and viewpoint items. The responses were 
scaled based on a five-point Likert scale ranging from ―strongly agree‖ to ―strongly disagree.‖  
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 Except for the fourth indicator, the majority of respondents either agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statements. The Intention4 indicator was designed to observe individuals‘ 
commitments to approved procedures and processes. The cumulative percentage of the 
respondents who either agreed or strongly agreed with Indicator4 was 36.2%. On the other hand, 
38.1% of respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.  
 Thirteen significant correlations were found between the intention indicators and the 
control variables. The Intention1 indicator had a significant correlation with the city variable    
(r= -.235, p= .01). The Intention1 indicator was designed to observe an individual‘s intention to 
thoroughly check safety procedures before starting to work. An individual‘s intention to check 
safety procedures increased as the size of organization decreased. The city variable had a 
significant correlation with the Intention2 indicator (r= -.256, p= .01). Intention2 aimed to 
observe the individual‘s intention to check additional safety measures, which increased as the 
size of the organization decreased. 
 The Intention4 indicator had significant correlations with the task group (r= .386, p= .01), 
rank (r= .291, p= .01), education (r= .202, p= .01), years of service (r= .219, p= .01), and flight 
hours (r= .305, p= .01) variables. Intention4 aimed to observe an individual‘s intention to 
manipulate approved safety procedures, which increased as the rank, education, years of service, 
and flight hours of the respondents increased, because all variables were positively correlated. 
Likewise, pilots (53%) more often agreed or strongly agreed with the statement than 
maintenance personnel (38.4%) and office staff (21.5%). 
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  The city (r= -.207, p= .01) and flight hour (r= .157, p= .05) variables had significant 
correlations with the Intention5 indicator, which aimed to observe individuals‘ intentions to take 
risks. The significant negative correlation between the city variable and the Intention5 indicator 
showed that an individual‘s intention to take risks decreased as the size of the organization 
increased. On the other hand, individuals‘ intentions to take risks increased as their flight hours 
increased. Intention6, the last indicator of the intention construct, observed individuals‘ 
viewpoints on approved safety regulations. Intention6 had a significant correlation with the task 
group (r= -.238, p= .01), city (r= -.314, p= .01), rank (r= -.248, p= .01), and education (r= -.199, 
p= .05) variables. Maintenance personnel (86.6%) more often agreed or strongly agreed with the 
Intention6 statement than office staff (78.5%) and pilots (77.6%). The negative significant 
correlation reflects that individuals‘ commitment to safety regulations decreased as the size of 
the organization and the rank and education of the respondents increased. 
 For the multicollinearity problem, the Spearman rho test was conducted to check the high 
correlations. Most of the correlations of the intention indicators were significant except for the 
correlations between the Intention1 and Intention4, Intention3 and Intention4, and Intention4 and 
Intention6 indicators. The highest correlation was between Intention2 and Intention5 with a 
coefficient value of .476, which was below of the 0.70 criterion. These findings showed that the 
intention indicators did not have a multicollinearity problem. 
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4.1.3.2 Violation Behavior 
 The endogenous variable of the study was self-reported safety behavior. Violation was 
the first factor of the two-factor model, and referred to willful disregard for formal safety 
regulations and procedures. Violations were classified in two groups: routine violations and 
exceptional violations (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Wiegmann 
& Shappell, 2003). Self-reported violation behavior was measured by five indicators, which 
included bending safety regulations, breaking responsibilities, and violating approved 
documentation procedures. Statements were responded to with a five-point Likert scale.  
 More than half of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the first two 
indicators (60% for Violation1, 51% for Violation2). Four significant correlations were observed 
between the violation indicators and the control variables. Violation2 had a significant 
correlation with the city variable (r= .211, p= .01). Violation2 aimed to observe violating 
approved documentation procedures when performing a familiar task; this type of violation 
increased as the size of the organization increased. The Violation4 indicator had a significant 
correlation with the city (r= .155, p= .05), and years of service (r= .253, p= .01) variables. 
Violation4 was designed to observe the extent to which individuals violated part of their job‘s 
requirements to make a job easier. Violating part of a job increased as the size of the 
organization and individuals‘ service years increased. The last correlation was between the years 
of service variable and the Violation5 indicator (r= .144, p= .05), which aimed to observe an 
individuals‘ confidence in their responsibilities for job safety. As individuals‘ years of service 
increased, individuals‘ confidence in their job safety responsibilities increased. 
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 Most of the correlations between violation indicators were significant at the .01 level. 
The highest correlation was between Violation4 and Violation5 indicators with a coefficient 
value of .520, which was below the .70 criterion. This means violation indicators did not have a 
multicollinearity problem. 
4.1.3.3 Error Behavior 
The second factor of safety behavior was the error construct, which referred to 
individuals‘ activities accidentally failing to achieve intended outcomes (Shappell & Wiegmann, 
2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Self-reported error behavior 
was measured by four items, including decision-, skill-based, and perceptual errors.  
The majority of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the error items. The 
Error1 indicator had a significant correlation with the city (r= .335, p= .01), age (r= .224, p= .05), 
years of service (r= .317, p= .01), and flight hour (r= .196, p= .05) variables. The Error1 
indicator aimed to observe decision errors, which arise from improper choices and poorly 
executed procedures (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). Positive significant correlations showed that decision errors increased as the 
size of the organization and the age, years of service, and flight hours of the individual increased.  
 The Error2 indicator was designed to observe skill-based error arising from attention 
and/or memory failures (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Wiegmann 
& Shappell, 2003). The Error2 indicator had a significant correlation with the city variable (r= 
.327, p= .01). Skill-based errors increased as the size of the organization increased. 
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 The Error3 and Error4 indicators were designed to observe perceptual errors arising from 
imperfect or inadequate information, misjudgments, and responding incorrectly to a diverse of 
visual and vestibular illusions (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Error3 had a significant correlation with the city (r= .207, p= .05), 
age (r= .203, p= .05), and education (r= -.181, p= .05) variables. The positive significant 
correlation showed that perceptual errors increased as the size of the organization and the 
respondent‘s age increased. The negative significant correlation showed that skill-based errors 
decreased as the education level of the respondent increased. The Error4 indicator had a 
significant correlation with the city (r= .164, p= .05) and age (r= .295, p= .01) variables. The 
positive significant correlation showed that skill-based errors increased as the size of the 
organization and respondent‘s age increased.  
Most of the correlations between the error indicators were significant at the .01 level. The 
highest correlation was between the Error2 and Error4 indicators with a coefficient value of .458, 
which was below the .70 criterion. These findings showed that the error indicators did not have a 
multicollinearity problem. 
4.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is an extension of factor analysis that evaluates the 
validity of the measurement models of latent constructs (Hox & Bechger, 1998; Byrne, 2010). 
Model validation refers to the degree to which the proposed measurement model measures what 
it is intended to measure (Trochim, 2001). The three-stage approach suggested by Wan (2002) 
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was preferred for the model validation process because it is the most clear and coherent method 
presented in the literature. First, theoretical measurement models were developed as generic 
models via presumed indicators. Specification of the measurement models is the starting point of 
structural equation modeling techniques (Hu & Bentler, 1999). In the generic measurement 
models, one indicator was selected as a scale factor in order to derive factor loading estimates for 
the other indicators. Given parameter estimates and standard errors, appropriate indicators were 
selected using correlations and squared multiple correlations (Wan, 2002). Second, the overall fit 
of the measurement model was evaluated based on the goodness-of-fit statistics. Estimation of 
parameters and the assessment of goodness of fit were the primary goals (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
AMOS software version 18 produced goodness-of-fit statistics to assess whether the 
measurement model fit the data. Third, the model was evaluated to identify the reasons for lack 
of fit (Wan, 2002). The measurement errors of the indicators were correlated with each other 
based on the modification indices to improve the measurement models (Hox & Bechger, 1998; 
Wan, 2002; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). The revised measurement model of each latent 
variable was presented with a figure and goodness-of-fit parameters table.  
After the validation of the measurement models, the internal consistency of the 
measurement instruments was tested by obtaining Cronbach‘s alpha scores. SPSS version 16 
produced a Cronbach‘s alpha score for each latent variable. As a general rule, a score of .70 and 
above was regarded as reliable (Bland & Altman, 1997). Lastly, the validated measurement 
models were tested with control variables to identify the effects of organizational and 
demographic attributes on the variation of the study constructs.  
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4.2.1 Exogenous Variable  
 Safety climate was used as a measurement model along with four correlated theoretical 
constructs including own attitude, group norms, management attitude, and workplace pressures. 
First, four major components of the exogenous variable were validated separately. The validated 
components of safety climate were integrated as a four-factor measurement model and validated 
using confirmatory factor analysis (Wan, 2002).   
4.2.1.1 Own Attitude toward Safety  
 The first major component of the exogenous variable is own attitude toward safety, which 
was measured by seven indicators. Using a five-point Likert scale, respondents were asked to 
state their agreement or disagreement with the statements. Seven indicators were included in the 
hypothesized measurement model, and confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to validate 
the measurement of the Own Attitude latent construct. A three-stage approach was followed step 
by step, as suggested by Wan (2002). 
 The first stage of confirmatory factor analysis is to identify appropriate indicators that 
have statistically significant values based on their critical ratios and possess enough factor 
loadings. Critical ratio is used to specify the significance of the standardized regression weights. 
All the factor loadings of the own attitude indicators had critical ratios higher than 1.96, which 
indicated a statistically significant association at the .05 level. Factor loading (standardized 
regression weights) refers to the extent to which the indicator (the observed variable) is related to 
the latent construct (the unobserved variable) (Byrne, 2010). For this study, .50 was established 
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as a cutoff threshold for factor loadings. Indicators having factor loadings lower than .50 were 
excluded from the measurement models. For the own attitude measurement model, the Own4 
indicator was excluded from the model because it had a factor loading value of .186. After 
removing the Own4 indicator, all remaining indicators had strong factor loadings ranging from 
.584 to .755.  
 The second stage for the own attitude measurement model was the evaluation of overall 
fit—how well the measurement model fit the data. Evaluation of the own attitude measurement 
model showed that the model fit was still not within acceptable limits, despite having significant 
and high factor loadings.  The measurement model of six indicators needed to be modified to 
improve the model fit. An assessment of adequate model fit means that the difference between 
the sample covariance matrix and the model-implied covariance matrix is small enough (Wan, 
2002; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). The similarity of the matrixes is interpreted as the data‘s fit 
to the theoretical model. The third stage of the model validation process is thus launched: 
identifying the possible reasons for lack of fit.  
 In the third stage, freeing parameters based on their modification indices was used. The 
modification index of a particular parameter refers to the fact that when this parameter is allowed 
to be free, the value of the chi-square decreases by at least the value of the index (Wan, 2002; 
Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). The AMOS program reports modification indices for all non-free 
parameters. The structural paths were inserted based on the modification indices to further 
improve model fit. At each step, one pair of error terms having the largest improvement in the 
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model was correlated. This process was repeated until the model showed a reasonably good 
model fit. Figure 4 shows the revised measurement model of the own attitude construct. 
 
Figure 4. Revised Measurement Model for Own Attitude 
 Figure 4 shows the revised measurement model for the own attitude construct, which 
consists of six indicators. The factor loadings have values ranging from .58 to .75. Three pairs of 
errors were correlated based on the modification indices to improve the model fit. All regression 
coefficients were significant at the .05 level. Table 4 indicates parameter estimates for the 
generic and revised own attitude measurement models. 
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Table 4. Parameter Estimates for the Own Attitude Measurement Models 
      Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator URW SRW SE CR P URW SRW SE CR P 
Own1 <- Own 1.038 .685 .121 8.601 *** 1.321 .755 .169 7.806 *** 
Own2 <- Own .838 .660 .101 8.329 *** 1.044 .712 .137 7.632 *** 
Own3 <- Own .768 .593 .102 7.555 *** 1.092 .727 .167 6.555 *** 
Own4 <- Own .278 .186 .114 2.442 .015      
Own5 <- Own .871 .580 .118 7.408 *** 1.014 .584 .139 7.307 *** 
Own6 <- Own 1.032 .694 .119 8.701 *** 1.014 .591 .109 9.310 *** 
Own7 <- Own 1 .717       1 .620       
 
Several parameters have been used in the SEM literature for assessing model fitness. 
There is no consensus as to which fit indices to report. However, it has been recommended to 
avoid reporting all of them, while using at least three fit tests from different categories has been 
recommended (Garson, 2009). Determination of fit indexes and the rules of thumb for cutoff 
criteria have been the most pressing issues for many researchers (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The 
goodness-of-fit indices and index criteria were selected based on Garson‘s (2009) 
recommendations. The selection of goodness-of-fit tests was discussed in the methodology 
chapter. Chi-square goodness-of-fit statistics, Hoelter‘s critical N, the Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation (RMSEA), the Tucker Lewis Index (TLI), and the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) were selected to test model fit. Given the selected goodness-of-fit tests, the generic and 
revised measurement models‘ parameters are documented in Table 5.  
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Table 5. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Own Attitude  
Index Criterion Generic Model Revised Model 
Chi-square (x
2
) Low 51.616 4.239 
Degrees Of Freedom (df) ≥ 0 14 6 
Likelihood Ratio (x
2 
/df) < 4.0 3.687 0.707 
P value ≥ 0.05 0 0.644 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) > 0.90 0.855 1.012 
Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) 
> 0.90 0.903 1 
Root Mean Square Error Of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.05 0.113 0 
Probability (p-close) ≥ 0.05 0.001 0.852 
Hoelter‘s Critical N (CN) > 200 96 621 
 
As seen in Table 5, model fit substantially improved in the final model compared with the 
generic model. The difference between the generic and revised models (Δ x2) is computed at 
47.377, which indicates a significant improvement of model fit in the revised model. Most of the 
goodness-of-fit statistics indicate a reasonably good fit of the measurement model to the data. 
The critical ratios for the standardized regression weights demonstrated significant relationships, 
and all correlations were significant at the .05 level for all observed variables. All indicators 
loaded strongly on the factor, ranging from .58 to .75. Confirmatory factor analysis validated that 
the revised measurement model measures the own attitude construct, and that the model fits to 
the data. 
 After the validation of the own attitude measurement model, the internal consistency of 
the instrument was tested by obtaining Cronbach‘s alpha scores. The Cronbach‘s alpha score of 
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own attitude measurement instrument was determined to be above the recommended level with a 
score of .817, indicating a satisfactory reliability level. 
4.2.1.2 Group Norms   
 The second component of the exogenous variable is group norms, measured by eight 
indicators. The generic measurement model was established with eight indicators, and 
confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to validate the group norms measurement model. All 
the factor loadings had critical ratios higher than 1.96, except for the Group3 indicator, which 
was excluded from the model. The Group2 and Group6 indicators were excluded from the 
measurement model because they had factor loadings lower than .50. The remaining five 
indicators had significant regression weights and adequate factor loadings ranging from .546 to 
.858 at the .05 level.  
 Evaluation of the overall fit showed that the model fit was still not within acceptable 
limits. The measurement model of five indicators needed to be modified to improve the model 
fit. Hence, structural paths were inserted based on the modification indices. Correlating one pair 
of error terms (Group5 and Group8) rendered a model with a reasonably good model fit. Figure 5 
shows the revised measurement model of the group norms construct.  
110 
 
 
Figure 5. Revised Measurement Model for Group Norms  
As seen in Figure 5, the factor loadings have values ranging from .56 to .86. One error 
pair was correlated based on the modification index. All critical ratios were statistically 
significant at the .05 level. Table 6 indicates the parameter estimates for the generic and revised 
group norms measurement models. 
Table 6. Parameter Estimates for the Group Norms Measurement Models 
      Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator URW SRW SE CR P URW SRW SE CR P 
Group1 <- Group .828 .576 .124 6.662 *** .633 .558 .090 7.005 *** 
Group2 <- Group .338 .242 .109 3.092 .002      
Group3 <- Group .243 .132 .142 1.711 .087      
Group4 <- Group .837 .581 .125 6.705 *** .621 .546 .090 6.897 *** 
Group5 <- Group 1.003 .698 .131 7.648 *** .973 .858 .126 7.691 *** 
Group6 <- Group .768 .577 .115 6.67 ***      
Group7 <- Group 1.374 .748 .173 7.962 *** .959 .662 .121 7.902 *** 
Group8 <- Group 1 .619       1 .785       
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 The goodness-of fit statistics for the group norms measurement model substantially 
improved in the revised model compared with the generic model. The goodness-of-fit statistics 
of the generic and revised measurement models are documented in Table 7. 
Table 7. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Group Norms 
Index Criterion Generic Model Revised Model 
Chi-square (x
2
) Low 79.472 4.39 
Degrees Of Freedom (df) ≥ 0 20 4 
Likelihood Ratio (x
2 
/df) < 4.0 3.974 1.098 
P value ≥ 0.05 0 0.356 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) > 0.90 0.782 0.997 
Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) 
> 0.90 0.844 0.999 
Root Mean Square Error Of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.05 0.119 0.022 
Probability (p-close) ≥ 0.05 0 0.595 
Hoelter‘s Critical N (CN) > 200 22 452 
 
 Table 7 indicates the goodness-of-fit statistics of the generic and revised measurement 
models of the group norms construct. The difference between the generic and revised model (Δ 
x
2
) was calculated at 75.082, indicating significant improvement of model fit in the revised 
model. Most of the goodness-of-fit statistics and indices were within recommended limits. 
Therefore, the revised measurement model demonstrates an acceptable fit of the model to the 
data and is confirmed as a measurement model for the latent construct of group norms.  
 To assess the internal consistency of the measurement instrument, the Cronbach‘s alpha 
score was generated by the SPSS software. The group norms measurement instrument had a 
Cronbach‘s alpha score of .782, which was greater than the recommended .70 level. The 
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reliability of the group norms measurement instrument was satisfactory based on the reliability 
test. 
4.2.1.3 Management Attitude toward Safety    
 Management attitude is the third component of safety climate. Nine indicators were 
designed to measure the management attitude construct. The generic measurement model was 
established with nine indicators and validated by confirmatory factor analysis. Most of the factor 
loadings had critical ratios greater than 1.96, except for the Management9 indicator. After 
excluding Management9, the indicators having low factor loadings were identified. 
Management6 and Management8 were excluded from the measurement model they made a 
lesser contribution to the measurement of the group norms. The remaining six indicators had 
significant regression weights and adequate factor loadings ranging from .569 to .823 at the .05 
level.  
 Evaluation of the overall fit showed that the model fit was still not within acceptable 
limits. The measurement model of five indicators needed to be modified to improve the model 
fit. Hence, structural paths were inserted based on the modification indices. Correlating one pair 
of error terms (Management3 and Management5) ensured that the measurement model had a 
reasonably good model fit. Figure 6 shows the revised measurement model of the management 
attitude construct. 
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Figure 6. Revised Measurement Model for Management Attitude 
 The revised measurement model for management attitude had six indicators, with factor 
loadings ranging from .569 to .823. All regression coefficients and covariance between error 
terms were significant at the .05 level. Table 8 indicates the parameter estimates for the generic 
and revised management attitude measurement models. 
Table 8. Parameter Estimates for the Management Attitude Measurement Models 
      Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator URW SRW SE CR P URW SRW SE CR P 
Mng1 <- Management 1.000 .667       .917 .657 .126 7.261 *** 
Mng2 <- Management .991 .593 .134 7.378 *** .917 .589 .136 6.738 *** 
Mng3 <- Management .985 .637 .126 7.846 *** 1.010 .701 .144 7.002 *** 
Mng4 <- Management 1.181 .636 .151 7.839 *** 1.081 .625 .154 7.024 *** 
Mng5 <- Management 1.378 .757 .153 8.992 *** 1.397 .823 .180 7.760 *** 
Mng6 <- Management .963 .509 .149 6.443 *** 
     Mng7 <- Management 1.193 .633 .153 7.8 *** 1.000 .569 
   Mng8 <- Management .879 .520 .134 6.571 *** 
     Mng9 <- Management -.099 -.064 .118 -.845 .398           
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 The management attitude measurement model substantially improved in the revised 
model compared with the generic model. Improvement of the model fit can be seen from the 
table. The goodness-of-fit statistics of the generic and revised measurement models are presented 
in Table 9. 
Table 9. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Management Attitude 
Index Criterion Generic Model Revised Model 
Chi-square (x
2
) Low 37.69 5.97 
Degrees Of Freedom (df) ≥ 0 27 8 
Likelihood Ratio (x
2 
/df) < 4.0 1.396 0.746 
P value ≥ 0.05 0.083 0.651 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) > 0.90 0.969 1.011 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > 0.90 0.977 1 
Root Mean Square Error Of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.05 0.044 0 
Probability (p-close) ≥ 0.05 0.6 0.88 
Hoelter‘s Critical N (CN) > 200 223 543 
 
 The difference between the generic and revised model (Δ x2) is calculated at 31.72, 
indicating significant improvement of model fit in the revised model. Most of the goodness-of-fit 
statistics and indices were within recommended limits. Therefore, the management attitude 
measurement model demonstrated an acceptable fit of the model to the data and was confirmed 
as a measurement model for the latent construct of group norms.  
 The Cronbach‘s alpha score was computed for the internal consistency of the 
management attitude measurement instrument. The Cronbach‘s alpha score for the measurement 
scale of management attitude was .814, which was greater than the recommended .70 level. The 
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reliability of the management attitude measurement instrument was satisfactory based on the 
reliability test. 
4.2.1.4 Workplace Pressures    
 The workplace pressures measurement model contained seven items. According to the 
first stage of confirmatory factor analysis, all indicators had critical ratios higher than 1.96. The 
Pressure1 and Pressure6 indicators were excluded from the model because they had factor 
loading scores lower than .50. The remaining five indicators had significant regression weights 
and adequate factor loadings ranging from .535 to .823 at the .05 level.  
 Evaluation of overall fit showed that the measurement model of workplace pressures had 
a reasonably good model fit without any modification. Figure 7 shows the revised measurement 
model of the workplace pressures construct.  
 
Figure 7. Revised Measurement Model for Workplace Pressures 
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 Most of the factors had significant loadings ranging from .53 to .82. The model has an 
acceptable fit without modification. All critical ratios were statistically significant at the .05 
level. Table 10 indicates parameter estimates for the generic and revised workplace pressures 
measurement models. 
Table 10. Parameter Estimates for the Workplace Pressures Measurement Models 
    Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator URW SRW SE CR P URW SRW SE CR P 
Press1 <- Pressure .669 .452 .110 6.057 ***      
Press2 <- Pressure .822 .652 .093 8.812 *** .791 .631 .095 8.303 *** 
Press3 <- Pressure .934 .596 .116 8.063 *** .930 .597 .118 7.884 *** 
Press4 <- Pressure 1.080 .638 .125 8.63 *** 1.101 .655 .128 8.587 *** 
Press5 <- Pressure .737 .547 .100 7.376 *** .716 .535 .101 7.072 *** 
Press6 <- Pressure .343 .272 .095 3.607 ***      
Press7 <- Pressure 1 .818       1 .823       
 
 The workplace pressures measurement model substantially improved in the revised 
model compared with the generic model. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the generic and 
revised measurement models is documented in Table 11. 
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Table 11. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Workplace Pressures 
Index Criterion Generic Model Revised Model 
Chi-square (x
2
) Low 30.108 4.251 
Degrees Of Freedom (df) ≥ 0 14 5 
Likelihood Ratio (x
2 
/df) < 4.0 2.151 0.85 
P value ≥ 0.05 0.007 0.514 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) > 0.90 0.927 1.006 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > 0.90 0.951 1 
Root Mean Square Error Of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.05 0.074 0 
Probability (p-close) ≥ 0.05 0.126 0.751 
Hoelter‘s Critical N (CN) > 200 165 545 
 
The workplace pressures generic and revised measurement models‘ goodness-of-fit 
statistics had substantial differences. The improvement of the model was evaluated based on the 
chi-square difference. The difference between the generic and revised model (Δ x2) was 
calculated at 25.857, indicating significant improvement of model fit in the revised model. Most 
of the goodness-of-fit statistics and indices were within recommended limits. Therefore, the 
revised measurement model demonstrates an acceptable fit of the model to the data and is 
confirmed as a measurement model for the latent construct of workplace pressures.  
The Cronbach‘s alpha score was computed for the internal consistency of the workplace 
pressures measurement instrument. The Cronbach‘s alpha score for the measurement scale of 
workplace pressures was .774, which was greater than the recommended .70 level. The reliability 
of the workplace pressures measurement instrument was satisfactory based on the reliability test. 
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4.2.1.5 Safety Climate  
 The safety climate measurement model was established by four correlated constructs, 
including own attitude, group norms, management attitude, and workplace pressures. The same 
principals of confirmatory factor analysis were applied to validate the four-factor measurement 
model of safety climate construct. Safety climate is defined as a multi-dimensional construct 
(Ajzen, 1991; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). The validated components of safety climate were 
aggregated in the one-measurement model and validated by confirmatory factor analysis.  
 For the four-factor measurement model of safety climate, all the factor loadings had 
critical ratios greater than 1.96. All the factor loadings were greater than .5, ranging from .54 to 
.82. However, evaluation of the overall fit showed that the model fit was still not within 
acceptable limits. The measurement model of five indicators needed to be modified to improve 
the model fit. Hence, structural paths were inserted based on the modification indices to improve 
the model fit. The correlating five pairs of error terms provided the model with a reasonably 
good fit to the data. Figure 8 indicates the revised measurement model of the safety climate 
construct.  
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Figure 8. Revised Measurement Model for Safety Climate 
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 As seen in the revised measurement model, all factor loadings were statistically 
significant, having values ranging from .53 to .81. All covariance values were significant at the 
.5 level. The estimated correlations between own attitude and workplace pressures were 
relatively low (r= -.30 for workplace pressures, r= .31 for management attitude, and r= .32 for 
group norms). On the other hand, group norms‘ correlations between management attitude (r= 
.48) and workplace pressures (r= -.40) were relatively high. The highest correlation was between 
workplace pressures and management attitude (r= -.52), at the .05 level. Table 12 indicates 
parameter estimates for the generic and revised safety climate measurement models. 
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Table 12. Parameter Estimates for the Safety Climate Measurement Models 
      Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator URW SRW SE CR P URW SRW SE CR P 
Own1 <- Own 1.296 .750 .162 8.006 *** 1.309 .752 .164 7.975 *** 
Own2 <- Own 1.031 .711 .132 7.806 *** 1.039 .712 .134 7.772 *** 
Own3 <- Own 1.051 .710 .153 6.861 *** 1.076 .721 .157 6.870 *** 
Own5 <- Own 1.013 .591 .137 7.371 *** .992 .579 .136 7.317 *** 
Own6 <- Own 1.010 .596 .108 9.319 *** .998 .589 .107 9.316 *** 
Own7 <- Own 1.000 .628    1.000 .624    
Group1 <- Group 1.000 .585    1.000 .587    
Group4 <- Group .990 .578 .138 7.154 *** .988 .579 .138 7.178 *** 
Group5 <- Group 1.374 .804 .172 7.993 *** 1.388 .814 .171 8.119 *** 
Group7 <- Group 1.532 .701 .186 8.227 *** 1.532 .700 .183 8.374 *** 
Group8 <- Group 1.431 .746 .189 7.587 *** 1.411 .737 .186 7.576 *** 
Mng1 <- Management 1.000 .681    1.000 .681    
Mng2 <- Management .978 .597 .128 7.659 *** .977 .597 .128 7.653 *** 
Mng3 <- Management 1.002 .661 .126 7.953 *** 1.003 .662 .126 7.960 *** 
Mng4 <- Management 1.164 .640 .143 8.155 *** 1.166 .641 .143 8.166 *** 
Mng5 <- Management 1.415 .793 .151 9.359 *** 1.413 .792 .151 9.341 *** 
Mng7 <- Management 1.089 .590 .144 7.576 *** 1.089 .590 .144 7.571 *** 
Press2 <- Press 1.000 .640    1.000 .620    
Press3 <- Press 1.151 .593 .163 7.044 *** 1.139 .569 .172 6.632 *** 
Press4 <- Press 1.376 .656 .180 7.625 *** 1.454 .662 .195 7.471 *** 
Press5 <- Press .902 .540 .138 6.53 *** .918 .528 .145 6.319 *** 
Press7 <- Press 1.237 .816 .143 8.675 *** 1.283 .808 .154 8.325 *** 
 
 Goodness-of-fit statistics for generic and revised safety climate measurement models are 
documented in Table 13. 
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Table 13. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Safety Climate 
Index Criterion Generic Model Revised Model 
Chi-square (x
2
) Low 252.938 222.68 
Degrees Of Freedom (df) ≥ 0 198 193 
Likelihood Ratio (x
2 
/df) < 4.0 1.277 1.154 
P value ≥ 0.05 0.005 0.07 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) > 0.90 0.956 0.976 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > 0.90 0.963 0.98 
Root Mean Square Error Of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.05 0.036 0.027 
Probability (p-close) ≥ 0.05 0.962 0.997 
Hoelter‘s Critical N (CN) > 200 192 213 
 
 Table 13 indicates the goodness-of-fit statistics of the generic and revised four-factor 
measurement models of the safety climate construct. The improvement of model fit in the 
revised model is substantial. Most of the goodness-of-fit statistics and indices were within 
recommended limits. Therefore, the revised measurement model demonstrates an acceptable fit 
of the model to the data and is confirmed as a measurement model for the multidimensional 
latent construct of safety climate.  
4.2.2 Endogenous Variables 
The self-reported safety behavior and intention variables were validated by confirmatory 
factor analysis. Intention is a latent construct measured by six items. Self-reported safety 
behavior was measured via a measurement model with two correlated theoretical constructs: 
violation and error behavior. First, two major components were validated separately. Then 
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validated components were integrated as a two-factor measurement model and validated using 
confirmatory factor analysis. 
4.2.2.1 Intention toward Safety 
 Intention is the mediating variable of the theoretical model. Six indicators were designed 
to measure individuals‘ intentions toward safety. A generic measurement model was established 
with six indicators and validated by confirmatory factor analysis. Most of the factor loadings had 
critical ratios greater than 1.96, except for the Intention4 indicator. After excluding the 
Intention4, the remaining indicators had adequate factor loadings ranging from .55 to .70.  
 Evaluation of the overall fit indicated that model fit was still not within acceptable limits 
despite significant and high factor loadings. Hence, structural paths were inserted step by step 
until the model had a reasonably good model fit. Correlating three pairs of error terms ensured 
that the model had a reasonably good model fit. Figure 9 shows the revised measurement model 
of the intention construct. 
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Figure 9. Revised Measurement Model for Intention toward Safety 
 As seen in Figure 9, all factor loadings have significant values ranging from .514 to .71. 
Table 14 indicates parameter estimates for generic and revised “Intention” measurement models. 
Table 14. Parameter Estimates for the Intention Measurement Models 
    Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator URW SRW SE CR P URW SRW SE CR P 
Intent1 <- Intention .684 .583 .102 6.707 *** .768 .629 .103 7.429 *** 
Intent2 <- Intention .782 .634 .110 7.125 *** .833 .650 .130 6.419 *** 
Intent3 <- Intention .745 .630 .105 7.095 *** .874 .710 .119 7.356 *** 
Intent4 <- Intention .242 .129 .150 1.619 .105 
     Intent5 <- Intention .660 .561 .101 6.501 *** .631 .514 .112 5.618 *** 
Intent6 <- Intention 1 .693       1.000 .666       
 
 The goodness-of-fit statistics of the generic and revised measurement models of the 
intention construct are presented in Table 15. 
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 Table 15. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Intention toward Safety 
Index Criterion Generic Model Revised Model 
Chi-square (x
2
) Low 52.305 3.174 
Degrees of Freedom (df) ≥ 0 9 2 
Likelihood Ratio (x
2 
/df) < 4.0 5.812 1.587 
P value ≥ 0.05 0 0.205 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) > 0.90 0.716 0.977 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > 0.90 0.83 0.995 
Root Mean Square Error Of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.05 0.152 0.053 
Probability (p-close) ≥ 0.05 0 0.364 
Hoelter‘s Critical N (CN) > 200 68 395 
 
 The generic and revised measurement models of the intention construct had substantial 
differences, as seen in Table 15. The difference between the generic and revised models (Δ x2) 
was calculated at 49.131, which indicated significant improvement in the revised model. Most of 
the goodness-of-fit statistics were within the recommended limits in the revised model. 
Therefore, the revised measurement model demonstrates an acceptable fit of the model to the 
data and is confirmed as a measurement model for the latent construct of intention toward safety.  
 The Cronbach‘s alpha score was computed for the internal consistency of the 
measurement instrument. The Cronbach‘s alpha score was .77 for the intention indicators, which 
was greater than the recommended limit. The reliability of the intention measurement instrument 
was within satisfactory limits. 
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4.2.2.2 Violation Behavior 
 Violation behavior is the first component of the safety behavior measure, containing five 
indicators. The generic measurement model of violation behavior was established and validated 
by confirmatory factor analysis. Most of the factor loadings were significant, having critical 
ratios greater than 1.96. Five indicators had adequate factor loading values ranging from .69 to 
.73. Evaluation of the overall fit showed that the model had a reasonably good model fit without 
any revision. Figure 10 shows the final measurement model of the intention construct.  
 
Figure 10. Final Measurement Model for Violation Behavior 
 As seen in Figure 10, all factor loadings have significant factor loading ranging from .69 
to .73. Table 16 indicates the parameter estimates for the violation behavior measurement model. 
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 Table 16. Parameter Estimates for the Violation Behavior Measurement Model 
Indicator URW SRW SE CR P 
VioB1 <- Violation .949 .686 .110 8.647 *** 
VioB2 <- Violation .963 .730 .106 9.099 *** 
VioB3 <- Violation .978 .697 .112 8.761 *** 
VioB4 <- Violation .883 .700 .100 8.793 *** 
VioB5 <- Violation 1.000 .711       
 
 The violation behavior measurement model indicates a reasonably good fit to the data. 
The goodness-of-fit statistics of the final measurement model are presented in Table 17. 
Table 17. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Violation Behavior 
 Index Criterion Final Model 
Chi-square (x
2
) low 6.501 
Degrees Of Freedom (df) ≥ 0 5 
Likelihood Ratio (x
2 
/df) < 4.0 1.3 
P value ≥ 0.05 0.26 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) > 0.90 0.991 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > 0.90 0.996 
Root Mean Square Error Of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.05 0.038 
Probability (p-close) ≥ 0.05 0.526 
Hoelter‘s Critical N (CN) > 200 356 
 
 Most of the goodness-of-fit statistics were within recommended limits in the revised 
model. Therefore, the final measurement model demonstrates an acceptable fit of the model to 
the data and is confirmed as a measurement model for the latent construct of violation behavior. 
For the reliability test, the Cronbach‘s alpha score was computed with the five indicators. The 
violation behavior measurement instrument had a Cronbach‘s alpha value of .831, which was 
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greater than the recommended limit. The internal consistency of the measurement instrument 
was at the satisfactory level. 
4.2.2.3 Error Behavior 
 The second component of the safety behavior construct is error behavior, measured by 
four indicators. A generic measurement model was established and validated by confirmatory 
factor analysis. As a result, all indicators had critical ratios greater than 1.96. Most of the factor 
loadings had values over .50. Evaluation of the overall fit showed that the model fit was within 
acceptable limits. Figure 11 shows the final measurement model for error behavior.   
 
Figure 11. Final Measurement Model for Error Behavior 
 As seen in Figure 11, all factor loadings have significant factor loadings ranging from .60 
to .74. Table 18 indicates the parameter estimates for the ―Error Behavior‖ measurement model. 
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Table 18. Parameter Estimates for the Error Behavior Measurement Model 
Indicator URW SRW SE CR P 
ErrB1 <- Error .857 .604 .123 6.992 *** 
ErrB2 <- Error .956 .742 .123 7.792 *** 
ErrB3 <- Error .819 .609 .116 7.035 *** 
ErrB4 <- Error 1.000 .701       
 
 The error behavior measurement model indicates a reasonably good fit to the data. The 
goodness-of-fit statistics of the final measurement model are documented in Table 19. 
Table 19. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Error Behavior 
Index Criterion Final Model 
Chi-square (x
2
) low 6.232 
Degrees of Freedom (df) ≥ 0 2 
Likelihood Ratio (x
2 
/df) < 4.0 3.116 
P value ≥ 0.05 0.044 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) > 0.90 0.934 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > 0.90 0.978 
Root Mean Square Error Of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.05 0.101 
Probability (p-close) ≥ 0.05 0.125 
Hoelter‘s Critical N (CN) > 200 201 
 
 As seen in Table 19, most goodness-of-fit statistics are in the recommended limits, except 
for the p-value of the chi-square test and the RMSEA. However, all critical ratios are significant 
and the factors have adequate loadings. Therefore, the final measurement model demonstrates an 
acceptable fit of the model to the data and is confirmed as a measurement model for the latent 
construct of error behavior. To assess the internal consistency of the measurement instrument, 
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the Cronbach‘s alpha score was computed. The error behavior measurement instrument had a 
Cronbach‘s alpha score of .76, which was greater than the recommended level. The reliability of 
the error behavior measurement instrument was satisfactory.  
4.2.2.4 Safety Behavior 
 The safety behavior measurement model was established by two correlated constructs, 
including violation and error behaviors. The same principles of confirmatory factor analysis were 
applied to validate the two-factor measurement model of safety behavior. Safety behavior is 
conceptualized as a multi-dimensional construct (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2001; 2003). The validated components of safety behavior were aggregated into one 
measurement model and validated by confirmatory factor analysis.  
 Most of the indicators of the two-factor measurement model were significant, having 
critical ratios greater than 1.96. All the factor loadings were greater than .50, ranging from .62 to 
.73. Evaluation of the overall fit indicated that the model fit was within acceptable limits without 
any revision. Figure 12 shows the final measurement model for the safety behavior construct. 
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Figure 12. Revised Measurement Model for Safety Behavior 
 Most of the indicators of the two-factor measurement model have significant factor 
loadings ranging from .62 to .73. A relatively high correlation was found between violation and 
error behavior at the .05 significance level (r= .69). The parameter estimates of the safety 
behavior measurement model are presented in Table 20. 
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Table 20. Parameter Estimates for the Safety Behavior Measurement Model 
Indicator URW SRW SE CR P 
ErrB1 <- Error 1.000 .621 
   ErrB2 <- Error 1.062 .725 .139 7.630 *** 
ErrB3 <- Error .941 .617 .137 6.885 *** 
ErrB4 <- Error 1.129 .697 .151 7.471 *** 
VioB1 <- Violation 1.000 .691 
   VioB2 <- Violation 1.005 .728 .111 9.059 *** 
VioB3 <- Violation 1.002 .682 .117 8.575 *** 
VioB4 <- Violation .931 .705 .105 8.825 *** 
VioB5 <- Violation 1.053 .716 .118 8.935 *** 
 
 The safety behavior measurement model has a good fit to the data. Goodness-of-fit 
statistics for the final measurement model are presented in Table 21. 
Table 21. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Safety Behavior 
Index Criterion Final Model 
Chi-square (x
2
) low 24.338 
Degrees of Freedom (df) ≥ 0 26 
Likelihood Ratio (x
2 
/df) < 4.0 0.936 
P value ≥ 0.05 0.557 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) > 0.90 1.004 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > 0.90 1 
Root Mean Square Error Of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.05 0 
Probability (p-close) ≥ 0.05 0.948 
Hoelter‘s Critical N (CN) > 200 334 
 
 As seen in Table 21, most of the goodness-of-fit statistics are within the recommended 
limits. Moreover, all critical ratios are significant and factors have adequate loadings. Therefore, 
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the final measurement model demonstrates an acceptable fit of the model to the data and is 
confirmed as a measurement model for the latent construct of safety behavior.  
4.3 Structural Equation Modeling  
The third part of the statistical analysis is Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). After 
validating the measurement models, a covariance structure model was created and validated 
based on the goodness-of-fit statistics. SEM consists of measurement models of exogenous and 
endogenous variables, as well as control variables. This study had seven latent constructs 
including management attitude, own attitude, group norms, workplace pressures, intention, 
violation behavior, and error behavior. Safety climate is the exogenous variable, conceptualized 
as a four-factor measurement model. Safety behavior is the endogenous variable, conceptualized 
as a two-factor measurement model. Accordingly, a generic structural equation model was 
established by connecting the exogenous and endogenous variables based on the theoretical 
framework, which proposed that safety climate has a positive effect on individual‘s safety 
behavior. The validated measurement models were connected with the control variables to 
identify the organizational and demographic variables that account for the variation in study 
constructs. The generic structural equation model of safety behavior is presented in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Generic Structural Equation Model for Safety Behavior 
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The structural equation model was validated based on Wan‘s (2002) three-stage method. 
First, a theoretical structural equation model was established as seen in the figure. Given 
parameter estimates and standard errors, factor loadings and correlations having not statistically 
significant p-values were identified. These factor loadings and correlations were eliminated from 
the model one at a time until all variables had significant p values at the .05 level. The task group 
variables were re-coded as three dummy variables to observe subgroup differences, which was 
the third hypothesis. However, the relations between the endogenous variable (violation and 
error behavior) and the three dummy variables were not statistically significant. As a result, age 
and years of service were retained in the structural equation model because they had significant 
critical ratios at the .05 level. Task group variables (dummy variables recoded as pilot, 
maintenance, and office staff), and control variables (city, rank, education, and flight hours) were 
excluded from the model because they did not have statistically significant p-values. Variables 
having not statistically significant p-values were removed from the model one at a time until all 
variables had p-values smaller to .05. Likewise, the regression path between workplace pressures 
and intention constructs was removed because it did not have statistically significant critical 
ratios.  
After removing variables and paths having not statistically significant p-values, SEM 
analysis was conducted again. All critical ratios were significant at the .05 level for the 
remaining items. Table 22 shows the parameter estimates for the generic and revised structural 
equation models. 
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Table 22. Parameter Estimates for the Generic and Revised SEM 
      Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator URW SRW SE CR P URW SRW SE CR P 
Intent <- Own .334 .350 .08 4.46 *** .326 .343 .07 4.48 *** 
Intent <- Group .350 .346 .09 4.07 *** .427 .439 .09 4.69 *** 
Intent <- Manegm .203 .240 .07 2.76 .006 .194 .245 .06 3.08 .002 
Intent <- Press -.092 -.117 .07 -1.41 .159 
     Viol.B. <- Intent -.855 -.585 .15 -5.64 *** -.840 -.582 .15 -5.59 *** 
Viol.B. <- Press .235 .204 .10 2.42 .016 .264 .234 .10 2.76 .006 
Viol.B. <- AGE .039 .034 .07 0.59 .555 
     Viol.B. <- EDU .039 .043 .05 0.75 .456 
     Viol.B. <- YEAR .099 .138 .04 2.35 .019 .110 .156 .04 2.59 .010 
Viol.B. <- FLIGHT .022 .052 .02 0.90 .368 
     Viol.B. <- RANK -.124 -.174 .04 -2.94 .003 
     Viol.B. <- CITY -.013 -.027 .03 -0.47 .637 
     Viol.B. <- GROUP .023 .025 .05 0.44 .660 
     Err.B. <- Intent -.451 -.433 .12 -3.63 *** -.477 -.460 .12 -3.84 *** 
Err.B. <- Viol.B. .185 .260 .08 2.28 .022 .177 .246 .08 2.20 .028 
Err.B. <- Press .172 .210 .07 2.45 .014 .185 .228 .07 2.64 .008 
Err.B. <- GROUP .067 .105 .04 1.81 .070 
     Err.B. <- CITY .053 .152 .02 2.60 .009 
     Err.B. <- RANK .023 .046 .03 0.77 .444 
     Err.B. <- AGE .094 .116 .05 2.00 .046 .140 .173 .05 2.86 .004 
Err.B. <- EDU -.066 -.103 .04 -1.78 .075 
     Err.B. <- YEAR .068 .134 .03 2.23 .026 
     Err.B. <- FLIGHT -.045 -.151 .02 -2.58 .010 
     Own7 <- Own 1.000 .642 
   
1.000 .645 
   Own6 <- Own 1.005 .610 .11 9.45 *** 1.006 .611 .11 9.42 *** 
Own5 <- Own .985 .591 .13 7.44 *** 1.008 .602 .13 7.63 *** 
Own3 <- Own 1.008 .697 .14 7.22 *** .996 .691 .14 7.31 *** 
Own2 <- Own .998 .704 .13 7.95 *** 1.007 .707 .12 8.13 *** 
Own1 <- Own 1.241 .733 .15 8.14 *** 1.235 .732 .15 8.35 *** 
Group8 <- Group 1.337 .710 .18 7.63 *** 1.242 .681 .16 7.59 *** 
Group7 <- Group 1.559 .723 .18 8.47 *** 1.683 .815 .21 8.12 *** 
Group5 <- Group 1.330 .794 .16 8.27 *** 1.138 .695 .15 7.62 *** 
Group4 <- Group .989 .589 .14 7.19 *** .795 .492 .13 6.06 *** 
Group1 <- Group 1.000 .597 
   
1.000 .627 
   Mng7 <- Manegm 1.095 .592 .14 7.61 *** 1.026 .592 .13 7.79 *** 
Mng5 <- Manegm 1.420 .794 .15 9.44 *** 1.291 .771 .13 9.91 *** 
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Mng4 <- Manegm 1.170 .642 .14 8.19 *** 1.048 .611 .13 8.00 *** 
Mng3 <- Manegm .996 .656 .13 7.95 *** .861 .602 .11 7.89 *** 
Mng2 <- Manegm .977 .595 .13 7.65 *** .962 .626 .13 7.44 *** 
Mng1 <- Manegm 1.000 .680 
   
1.000 .726 
   Press7 <- Press 1.212 .784 .14 8.49 *** 1.208 .788 .14 8.70 *** 
Press5 <- Press .927 .548 .14 6.62 *** .961 .566 .14 6.89 *** 
Press4 <- Press 1.452 .678 .19 7.77 *** 1.417 .668 .18 7.81 *** 
Press3 <- Press 1.080 .553 .16 6.61 *** 1.108 .568 .16 6.87 *** 
Press2 <- Press 1.000 .635 
   
1.000 .639 
   ErrB1 <- Err.B. 1.000 .639 
   
1.000 .634 
   ErrB2 <- Err.B. .989 .695 .12 7.97 *** .995 .693 .13 7.87 *** 
ErrB3 <- Err.B. .933 .628 .13 7.39 *** .936 .625 .13 7.29 *** 
ErrB4 <- Err.B. 1.049 .666 .14 7.73 *** 1.096 .691 .14 7.85 *** 
VioB1 <- Viol.B. 1.000 .710 
   
1.000 .707 
   VioB2 <- Viol.B. .957 .712 .10 9.29 *** .913 .676 .11 8.60 *** 
VioB3 <- Viol.B. .984 .689 .11 9.01 *** .927 .646 .11 8.23 *** 
VioB4 <- Viol.B. .909 .707 .10 9.23 *** .923 .715 .10 9.12 *** 
VioB5 <- Viol.B. 1.046 .730 .11 9.51 *** 1.044 .726 .11 9.24 *** 
Intent6 <- Intent 1.344 .684 .17 7.97 *** 1.356 .689 .17 8.01 *** 
Intent5 <- Intent .802 .497 .15 5.52 *** .804 .497 .15 5.52 *** 
Intent3 <- Intent 1.144 .709 .14 8.10 *** 1.138 .705 .14 8.06 *** 
Intent2 <- Intent 1.010 .600 .14 7.03 *** 1.007 .598 .14 7.02 *** 
Intent1 <- Intent 1.000 .625       1.000 .624       
 
As seen in Table 22, all critical ratios are significant at the .05 level for the revised 
model. Likewise, all factor loadings are greater than .50. The model improved after removing 
variables and pathways having not statistically significant p-values. However, the overall fit of 
the structural equation model was still not within acceptable limits. Hence, the structural 
equation model was evaluated to identify the reasons for the lack of fit (Wan, 2002). The 
measurement errors of indicators were correlated based on the modification indices to improve 
the model fit (Hox & Bechger, 1998; Wan, 2002; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Goodness-of-fit 
statistics were observed after each correlated pair of errors. The goodness-of-fit statistics showed 
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substantial improvement through the process, and the revised structural equation model had a 
reasonably good model fit. The differences between the goodness-of-fit statistics of the generic 
and revised structural equation models are presented in Table 23. 
Table 23. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for the Generic and Revised SEM  
Index Criterion Generic Model Revised Model 
Chi-square (x
2
) low 1820.533 683.087 
Degrees of Freedom (df) ≥ 0 825 627 
Likelihood Ratio (x
2 
/df) < 4.0 2.207 1.089 
P value ≥ 0.05 0 0.06 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) > 0.90 0.694 0.977 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > 0.90 0.721 0.980 
Root Mean Square Error Of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.05 0.076 0.021 
Probability (p-close) ≥ 0.05 0 1 
Hoelter‘s Critical N (CN) > 200 103 211 
 
As seen in Table 23, most of the goodness-of-fit parameters for the revised structural 
equation model are within recommended limits. Improvement of the model fit in the revised 
model is substantial. The difference between the generic and revised model (Δ x2) is calculated at 
1137.446, indicating significant improvement of model fit in the revised model. Most of the 
goodness-of-fit statistics are within recommended limits. Overall, the revised structural equation 
model provided a satisfactory fit to the data. Figure 14 shows the revised structural equation 
model of the study.  
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Figure 14. Revised Structural Equation Model for Safety Behavior 
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According to the revised SEM results, it was demonstrated that the safety climate of the 
TNP Aviation Department influences individuals‘ safety behavior. As anticipated, intention is 
the mediating variable, which strengthens the relationship between safety climate and safety 
behavior. While age has a positive significant relationship with error behavior (r= .173, p= .01), 
years of service has a positive significant relationship with violation behavior (r= .156, p= .01). 
Overall, these predictor variables accounted for 65% of variance in intention, 55% of the 
variance in violation behavior, and 68% of variance in error behavior.  
 The influences of the variables were classified as partially and fully mediated effects. The 
term partially mediated through the mediator variable means that the variable has significant 
direct and indirect effects on the endogenous variable. The relation between the workplace 
pressures and error variables is an example of a partially mediated effect. On the other hand, the 
term fully mediated through the mediator variable means that the variable has no direct effect, 
but does have a significant indirect effect on the endogenous variable (MacKinnon, Krull, & 
Lockwood, 2000). The relation between own attitude and violation is a fully mediated effect 
through the mediator variable, which is the intention in this case. Table 24 presents the direct, 
indirect, and total effects of each variable in the model on error and violation behavior. 
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Table 24. Effects of Exogenous Variables on Endogenous Variables 
Exogenous 
variables 
  Endogenous 
variable 
DIRECT 
β 
INDIRECT 
β 
TOTAL 
β 
TYPE 
Own Attitude --> Violation  -0.2 -0.2 Fully mediated 
Group Norms --> Violation  -0.255 -0.255 Fully mediated 
Management Att. --> Violation  -0.142 -0.142 Fully mediated 
Workplace Press. --> Violation 0.234  0.234 Direct effect 
Intention --> Violation -0.582  -0.582 Direct effect 
Year --> Violation 0.156  0.156 Direct effect 
Own Attitude --> Error  -0.207 -0.207 Fully mediated 
Group Norms --> Error  -0.264 -0.264 Fully mediated 
Management Att. --> Error  -0.148 -0.148 Fully mediated 
Workplace Press. --> Error 0.264 0.058 0.322 Partially mediated 
Intention --> Error -0.46 -0.143 -0.603 Partially mediated 
Violation --> Error 0.246  0.246 Direct effect 
Age --> Error 0.173   0.173 Direct effect 
Note: All correlations are significant at the p= .05 level. 
 
  As seen in Table 24, own attitude, group norms, and management attitude have fully 
mediated effects on violation and error behaviors, as assumed by the theory of planned behavior. 
However, ―workplace pressures‖ does not have indirect effects mediated by the intention 
variable. The only assumed relation having not statistically significant p-value was between 
workplace pressures and intention. Workplace pressures had direct and indirect effects (mediated 
by violation) on error behavior. Likewise, intention had direct and indirect effects (mediated by 
violation) on error behavior. Control variables, age, and years of services had significant direct 
effects on the endogenous variables. Based on the SEM results, the study‘s hypothesis testing is 
discussed in the following section. 
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4.4 Hypothesis Testing  
 Four research hypotheses were tested through this study: 
 H1: Police Aviation Department employees‘ safety climate perceptions of their 
 organization positively affect  their self-reported safety behaviors, holding demographic 
 and organizational factors constant. 
H2: Organizational size, rank, age, educational level, service years, and flight hours are 
positively associated with self-reported safety behavior.  
 H3: There are differences among pilots, maintenance staff, and office staff based on their 
 self-reported safety behaviors. 
 H4: Regarding safety climate dimensions, individual own attitude, group norms, and 
 management attitude are positively correlated with each others, and negatively correlated 
 with workplace pressures.  
 Based on the results, the first hypothesis, that organizational safety climate influences 
individuals‘ safety behavior, is supported. Assuming intention as a mediating variable between 
the exogenous and endogenous variables, the safety climate of the organization positively 
influences individuals‘ safety behavior. Each component of the safety climate has a significant 
influence on safety behavior components. Significant direct and indirect relations between the 
components were presented in the table 24. Own attitude (r= -.2, p=.05), group norms (r=-.25, p= 
.05), and management attitude (r= -.142, p= .05) have significant negative indirect effects on 
violation behavior, mediated by the intention variable. Likewise, own attitude (r= -.207, p= .05), 
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group norms (r= -.264, p= .05), and management attitude have significant negative indirect 
effects on error behavior, mediated by the intention variable. Workplace pressures had a 
significant positive direct effect on violation behavior (r= .234, p= .05), as well as error behavior 
(r= .264, p= .05). Workplace pressures also had a significant positive indirect effect on error 
behavior (r= .058, p= .05), mediated by violation behavior. Using Ajzen‘s theory of planned 
behavior, the only relation having not statistically significant p-value was found between 
workplace pressures and the intention variable, and it was excluded from the final model. The 
results demonstrate that the safety climate of the TNP police aviation organization positively 
influences individuals‘ safety behavior.  
 The second hypothesis is not supported, according to findings that organizational size, 
rank, age, educational level, service years, and flight hours are not positively associated with 
self-reported safety behavior. However, the relationship between age and error behavior (r= .173, 
p= .01), as well as years of service and violation behavior (r= .156, p= .01) were found to be 
significant despite the original supposition that a reversed relationship would appear. 
Accordingly, individuals’ self-reported error behaviors increase as they age. As well, 
individuals’ self-reported violation behaviors increase as their years of service increase. Overall, 
along with safety climate, these predictor variables accounted for 65% of the variance in 
intention, 55% of the variance in violation behavior, and 68% of the variance in error behavior. 
 The third hypothesis is not supported, according to the findings. There is no significant 
difference among pilots, maintenance personnel, and office staff based on their self-reported 
safety behaviors. Therefore, it is concluded that pilots, maintenance personnel, and office staff 
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working in the TNP Aviation Department do not differ based on their self-reported safety 
behaviors.  
 The last hypothesis is supported that individual own attitude, group norms, and 
management attitude are positively correlated with each others, and negatively correlated  with 
workplace pressures. Individual attitude has positive correlations with group norms (r= .36, p= 
.01), management attitude (r= .338, p= .01), and a negative correlation with workplace pressures 
(r= -.334, p= .01). ―Group norms‖ has a positive correlation with management attitude (r= .525, 
p= .01), and a negative correlation with workplace pressures (r= -.506, p= .01). Lastly, 
management attitude has a negative correlation with workplace pressures (r= -.59, p= .05). 
 Based on the study findings, the influence of organizational safety culture on individual 
safety behavior was demonstrated. Except for the positive relationship between age and error 
behavior, and years of service and violation behavior, no significant relationship was found 
between demographic/organizational attributes and individual safety behavior. No significant 
difference was found among pilots, maintenance personnel, and office staff. Lastly, significant 
correlations were found between safety climate dimensions. In the following chapter, study 
findings were discussed, theoretical, policy, and managerial implications were presented. 
Conclusion, limitations of the study, and future studies were discussed in detail.  
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSION, AND 
LIMITATIONS  
 This study was designed to answer the question ―What is the influence of organizational 
safety culture on an individual‘s safety behavior in a high-risk environment?‖ The study found 
that, in the case of the TNP Aviation Department, employees‘ perceptions of the organizational 
safety climate positively affected their self-reported safety behaviors, holding demographic and 
organizational factors constant. Positive significant correlations were found between age and 
error behavior, as well as between years of service and violation behavior. No significant 
difference was observed among the subgroups based on employees‘ safety behavior variance. 
Significant correlations were found among safety climate dimensions. These findings are 
discussed in detail in the following topic. The implications of the study are separated into three 
topics: theoretical, policy, and managerial. The conclusion and limitations of the study are then 
discussed. Lastly, future studies are recommended. 
5.1 Discussion 
 The impact of organizational safety culture on individuals‘ safety behavior was 
demonstrated using the theory of planned behavior (TPB). The variance of individuals‘ safety 
behavior in an organization is explained via the study model established by Ajzen‘s theory. 
Fogarty and Shaw (2009) argued that TPB does not lend itself to the study of unintentional error 
behavior; however, the intention construct was designed to reflect an individual‘s motivational 
factors, including safety commitment, value expectancy for pre-checking, standpoint regarding 
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risk-taking behavior, and attitude toward safety regulations. The relation between individuals‘ 
intentions toward safety and their error behavior was established in the model because it was 
assumed that individuals lower in motivational factors would be more likely to perform error 
behaviors. Overall assessment of the study indicated that TPB is useful in explaining individual 
safety behavior variance in relation to the influence of organizational safety culture. A more 
detailed assessment was performed by focusing on the relations between the sub-components of 
organizational safety climate and individual safety behavior. 
 Safety climate was conceptualized as a multidimensional construct having four 
components. Based on the TPB, own attitude, group norms, management attitude, and workplace 
pressures were correlated with each other to observe the perceived safety climate of the TNP 
Aviation Department. The four-factor measurement model of organizational safety climate fit 
reasonably well to the data, and most correlations between the safety climate components were 
significant at the .05 level. Correlations between own attitude and the other three components 
were relatively low (r= -.334 for workplace pressures, r= .338 for management attitude, and r= 
.36 for group norms). On the other hand, correlations between group norms and management 
attitude (r= .525), as well as workplace pressures (r= -.506), were relatively high. The highest 
correlation occurred between workplace pressures and management attitude (r= -.59, p= .05). 
 The safety climate components had different standardized regression weights on the 
exogenous variables. In the case of the TNP Aviation Department, the component most 
influential on the exogenous variable was the group norms variable, which had the greatest 
influence on individuals‘ intention (r= .43, p= .05) and violation behavior (r= -.255, p= .05), and 
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(after workplace pressures) the second greatest influence on error behavior (r= -.264, p= .05). A 
similar study (Fogarty & Shaw, 2009) conducted on the Australian Air Force, on the other hand, 
highlighted management attitude as the most influential construct of the model. The differences 
between the two studies may be attributable to national culture, which influences individuals‘ 
values, attitudes, and behaviors (Hofstede et al., 1990; Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). According to 
the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions scale, Turkish culture is highly collectivist; members of the 
culture have strong, cohesive in-group ties and are influenced by others in the integrated group. 
On the other hand, Australian culture demonstrates dominant individualistic characteristics, loose 
ties, and weak influence among individuals (Hofstede, 2010). 
 Own attitude had the second greatest influence on individuals‘ intentions (r= .34, p= .05) 
and violation behavior (r= -.2, p= .05), and the third greatest influence on error behavior (r= -
.207, p= .05). Management attitude had a relatively weak influence on individuals‘ intention (r= 
.172, p= .05), violation behavior (r= -.142, p= .05), and error behavior (r= -.148, p= .05) as 
compared with other components, as well as compared with Fogarty and Shaw‘s (2009) study. 
The differences in the influence of management attitude between the two studies can be 
explained by the difference between individual and collective cultures. While people living in an 
individualistic culture may focus on management attitude in order to avoid difficulty in the 
workplace, collective cultures encourage individuals to support each other in establishing group 
solidarity against management enforcement.  
 The workplace pressures component was designed to observe employees‘ experiences 
and anticipated obstacles regarding the ease or difficulty of working with safety procedures.  
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Lack of available safety instruments, lack of time and personnel, and pressures exerted by the 
organization, customers, peer, and self were assumed to influence individuals‘ intention toward 
safety and safety behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). Workplace pressures had a 
significant positive influence on violation behavior (r= .234, p= .05) and error behavior (r= .322, 
p= .05). However, the relationship between the workplace pressures and intention variables was 
found to be not statistically significant in the case of the TNP Aviation Department, despite the 
assumptions made on the basis of TPB. The only relationship having not statistically significant 
p-values in the model can be accounted for by national culture, as TPB was constructed in a 
western culture. Turkish culture focuses on individuals‘ intentions rather than the consequences 
of their actions. Intention is the most important thing—if not everything—in evaluating 
individuals‘ behavior in Turkish culture. Hence, individuals are encouraged to have good 
intentions despite the presence of barriers and pressures that may affect their fulfillment of the 
intended task. The influence of workplace pressures on intention was found not statistically 
significant in this study, which can be attributed to Turkish national culture‘s attaching different 
and stronger meanings to intention relative to western culture.  
 The relationship between violation behavior and error behavior was also found to be 
significant, with a standardized regression coefficient of .246. Safety behavior was 
conceptualized as a two-factor model and separated into two components: violation and error 
behavior.  Violation behavior refers to willful disregard for formal safety regulations and 
procedures, and was classified in two ways: routine and exceptional. On the other hand, error 
behavior occurs when an individual’s activities accidentally fail to achieve an intended outcome. 
Error behavior was classified into three categories: decision, skill-based, and perceptual 
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(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). The 
causal mechanism between the violation and error constructs was assumed to be a significant 
positive influence of violation behavior on error behavior. Violations create errors because 
disregarding safety regulations can result in activities that accidentally fail to achieve intended 
outcomes. However, errors do not necessarily involve violations, because violation consists of 
intentional and willful disregard for safety regulations.  
 The influence of an individual’s age on error behavior was significant at the .05 level, 
with a standardized regression coefficient of .173. This positive relationship shows that one 
standard deviation increase in an individual’s age results in a .173 standard deviation increase in 
error behavior. In other words, older employees of the TNP Aviation Department are more likely 
than younger employees to perform error behaviors. Aging may erode employees’ attention, 
concentration, and information-retaining ability, leading to incorrect decisions, improper 
judgments, and inaccurate responses. The years of service variable had a significant correlation 
with three error indicators. The first significant correlation was with the Error1 indicator (r= 
.224, p= .05), which observed decision errors arising from improper choices and poorly executed 
procedures. Other significant correlations were with the Error3 (r= .203, p= .05) and Error4 (r= 
.295, p= .01) indicators, designed to observe perceptual errors arising from imperfect or 
inadequate information, misjudgments, and responding incorrectly to a diverse of visual and 
vestibular illusions (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). 
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 The second significant finding related to demographic and organizational factors was the 
relationship between years of service and violation behavior, which had a standardized 
regression coefficient of .156. This positive relationship means that one standard deviation 
increase in an individual’s service years results in a .156 standard deviation increase in violation 
behavior. In other words, the more experienced TNP Aviation Departments employees are, the 
more frequently they violate safety regulations and procedures. It had initially been assumed that 
experienced employees worked more safely than newly recruited ones. The extreme confidence 
of experienced employees may lead them to take shortcuts and engage in risk-taking behaviors. 
Indeed, the years of service variable had a significant correlation with the Violation4 indicator 
(r= .155, p= .05), which aimed to observe the extent to which individuals violate regulations to 
make their jobs easier; and the Violation5 indicator (r= .144, p= .05), which aimed to observe 
individuals’ confidence in their responsibilities regarding job safety. 
 The control variables of task group, assigned city, rank, education, and flight hours were 
found to have not statistically significant relations to safety behavior. Additionally, the relations 
between age and violation behavior and years of service and error behavior were also not 
statistically significant using a .05 level of significance.  
5.2 Implications 
 The theoretical, policy, and managerial implications of the study findings are discussed in 
the next three sections.  
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5.2.1 Theoretical Implications 
 The theory of planned behavior was tested in this study, and its usefulness in explaining 
individual safety behavior variance was demonstrated. However, the findings of the study make 
it evident that safety culture studies and models should take into account the impact of national 
culture, because concepts have different meanings and weights in different cultures. According 
to Helmreich and Merritt (2001), aviation culture has been designed for Anglo-Saxon culture and 
can be modified according to cultural and ethical differences. Differences between Anglo-Saxon 
culture and Turkish culture emerged in the study findings. The study model and constructs were 
established based on the theory of planned behavior (TPB), which was established for a western 
culture dominated by Anglo-Saxon countries. The findings of this study indicated that TBP could 
be modified to account for national culture differences.  
 The influence of national culture on individual behavior can be explained by ethical 
considerations. Ethical theories consider the application of rules with different viewpoints. 
Deontological ethics strongly emphasizes the moral importance of means and rules to justify an 
action. On the other hand, in teleological ethics the moral value of an act, rule, or policy emerges 
from its consequences rather than its intentions or motives (McKinnon, 2004). As regards the 
intention construct, Turkish culture more closely echoes deontological ethics, which focuses on 
individuals’ intentions rather than the consequences of their actions. The intention of the 
individual is the most important factor in justifying a performed behavior, even if the action fails 
to achieve its objectives or outcomes due to disregard for formal safety regulations. Hence, 
assumed but rejected relationship between workplace pressures and the intention variable can be 
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accounted for the cultural difference of Turkey because respondents struggle to have good 
intentions toward safety despite pressures in the workplace that do not support safety. However, 
the direct influences of workplace pressures on violation and error behaviors are significant, as 
TPB assumes. The findings of the study supported the rationale that TNP Aviation Employees 
have good intentions despite barriers and pressures that may impede performance. Their 
behaviors are more likely to be influenced by workplace pressures that potentially lead to 
violation and error behaviors. The respondents wish to be consistent in their intentions towards 
safety, which is independent of workplace pressures because of their self-concepts as 
conscientious. Safety-minded officers are prized in the Turkish culture. 
 Other than workplace pressures, three components of safety climate directly influence the 
intention variable, which mediates the relationship between organizational safety climate and 
individual safety behavior, as TPB assumes. Fogarty and Shaw (2009), who conducted their 
study in the dominantly individualist country of Australia (Hofstede, 2010), emphasized 
management attitude as the most influential construct in their study. For this study, the most 
influential component was group norms, indicating that Australian Aviation Department 
employees’ safety behaviors are most influenced by their colleagues’ attitudes toward safety. 
According to Hofstede (2010), individuals living in individualist cultures have loose bonds with 
others. On the other hand, individuals in collectivist cultures are integrated into groups and 
strongly influenced by others. Considering the cultural differences between western countries 
and Turkey, results that indicate a strong influence of group norms on safety behavior in the 
Turkish case and a strong influence of management attitude on safety behavior in the Australian 
case are reasonable.    
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 This study makes several theoretical contributions to the current literature. First, carefully 
designed safety climate survey instruments, as well as measurement models of safety climate and 
safety behavior, were confirmed by confirmatory factor analysis and reliability tests. The four-
factor model of organizational safety climate and the two-factor model of individual safety 
behavior were conceptualized and used in this study. Both multidimensional measurement 
models indicated a good fit to the data. The study survey can be used to evaluate the effects of 
any intervention program on improving the safety culture of an aviation organization. In 
addition, the generic nature of the survey lends itself to use in other aviation organizations 
regardless of the task performed. Second, the influence of informal structures in the workplace 
on individuals was demonstrated in the case of the TNP Aviation Department. As emphasized by 
natural theories, individuals are shaped not only by prescribed rules, regulations, and job 
descriptions, but also by informal structures emerging from human interaction, individual 
characteristics, and human relations (Scott, 1998).  
5.2.2 Policy Implications 
 The most important policy implication presented by this study relates to the emergence of 
informal organizational structures. Examples of organizational structures include prescribed 
rules, regulations, job descriptions, and work flow charts, which are not adequate to ensure a safe 
workplace environment. However, individuals bring to the workplace their own ideas, interests, 
and values that shape the informal structure of the organization and present a platform for 
positive influence (Scott, 1998). This study demonstrated the influence of organizational safety 
culture on individual safety behavior in the TNP Aviation Department. Organizations performing 
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in high-risk environments should consider the influence of informal structures while designing 
their safety systems, safety policies, and regulations. 
 As mentioned in the Theoretical Implications section, aviation systems, including aircraft 
technology, flight and maintenance operation manuals, work flow charts, checklists, safety 
procedures, and regulations, are heavily influenced by western culture (Helmreich & Merritt, 
2001). Countries importing aircrafts operate their own aviation systems by simulating western 
systems, regardless of cultural conformity issues. However, designing culturally ergonomic 
aviation systems—including aircraft controls, operation procedures, safety procedures, and 
regulations—will help improve the safety performance of individuals (Cooper & Phillips, 2004). 
This study provides evidence that it is necessary to design aviation safety policies and 
regulations with greater consideration for cultural differences. 
 Policy modifications can be suggested based on the study findings. It was found that 
workplace pressures significantly increased error and violation behaviors. Employees reported 
that both anticipated obstacles and the difficulty of working with current safety procedures 
resulted in unsafe behaviors. Obstacles and difficulties should therefore be identified and 
removed to as great a degree as possible from current regulations and procedures. Work flow 
charts can be established for each task to determine the time required to perform procedures; 
they can also include the number of personnel required to perform tasks in a timely fashion in 
order to remove time and personnel deficit pressures. 
 The influence of the age variable on error behavior can be reduced by modifying task 
distribution, personnel recruitment, and health report requirement policies. The current hiring age 
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limit can be decreased to encourage the recruitment of younger employees. Regarding the task 
distribution policy, high-risk tasks can be assigned to younger employees rather than older ones. 
Employees older than a specific age can be assigned to low-risk tasks. Lastly, health report 
frequency can be increased as employee age increases. 
 Years of service had a significant relationship with violation behavior. The impact of 
collective culture can explain this relationship: Once social ties are developed, people are more 
likely to disregard safety rules and regulations. Several policy alterations can be suggested to 
minimize the negative influence of service years on violation behavior (violations consist of 
willful disregard for formal safety regulations and procedures). Anonymous violation report 
forms can be made available to encourage younger and newly recruited employees to inform 
management about witnessed violations. Such a policy would obligate experienced employees to 
obey safety regulations, as well as prevent the passing on of violation behavior to younger 
employees. 
5.2.3 Managerial Implications 
 This study enables organizational management to formulate proactive solutions that 
reduce safety problems typically leading to accidents and injuries. While reactive solutions are 
put in place immediately after disasters and accidents, proactive solutions can be identified 
before accidents happen and applied to problematic areas. Subsequently, organization 
management can improve the safety level of the organization and the safety performance of 
156 
 
individuals based on safety culture observations. Several managerial implications manifest for 
the TNP Aviation Department based on the findings of this study.  
 Among the safety climate components, group norms was the most influential variable 
shaping individuals’ intentions toward safety and violation behavior; after workplace pressures, 
it was the second most influential variable on error behavior. As mentioned in the Discussion 
section, the collectivist culture of Turkey places weight on the group norms variable. The second 
highest correlation was found between the group norms and management attitude components 
(r= .53, p= .05), suggesting that group norms can be influenced and manipulated via 
management attitude, thereby increasing groups’ positive safety attitude. In addition, safety 
training programs can be applied through flight safety meetings to increase the safety perceptions 
of employee groups. 
 Workplace pressures, including anticipated obstacles and the difficulty of performing up 
to par with the additional burden of safety procedures, increase violation and error behavior in 
the organization, as assumed by TPB. Based on this finding, the TNP Aviation Department can 
identify pressures against and barriers to safety. Pilots, maintenance personnel, and office staff 
can be interviewed to specify the most influential pressures—among them lack of time, 
personnel, and safety instruments—exerted by management, peers, and individuals’ own 
attitudes. Uncertainty regarding safety behavior is another pressure opposing safety. 
Management can examine the uncertainty regarding safety that emerges from the difficulty of 
observing safety regulations, inadequate information given to individuals, or the insufficient 
competence of individuals. Standard operation procedures, work flow charts, safety regulations, 
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and task definitions can be evaluated to observe the implementing difficulty. Likewise, 
individuals’ information and competence regarding safety can be improved via specifically 
designed safety programs. 
 Contrary to initial assumptions, a positive significant relationship was found between the 
age and error variables, showing that older employees are more likely to make safety errors than 
younger ones. Error behavior had four indicators that observed decision, skill-based, and 
perceptual errors. Apart from the indicator observing skill-based error, age had a significant 
correlation with decision and perceptual errors. While decision errors arise from improper 
choices and poorly executed procedures, perceptual errors take place due to imperfect or 
inadequate information, misjudgments, and responding incorrectly to a diverse of visual and 
vestibular illusions (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; 2003). These 
findings suggest that aging erodes individuals’ attention, concentration, and information, leading 
individuals to make incorrect decisions, improper judgments, and inaccurate responses. This 
study suggests that the management of the TNP Aviation Department can improve the safety 
level of the organization through an intervention program that refreshes older employees’ 
familiarity with safety procedures. Contrary to the study’s initial assumption, experienced older 
employees are no less fallible than younger employees—a significant finding, especially for the 
aviation industry, which is characterized by a high-risk environment requiring complete 
information, proper judgment, and full concentration. To address this issue, younger candidates 
can be preferred in recruiting new personnel. As well, the upper age limit for personnel can be 
decreased, especially for high-risk tasks. Additionally, health report frequency can be increased 
once personnel reach a certain age. 
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 The relationship between years of service and violation behavior was found to be 
significant at the .05 level, with a standardized regression coefficient of .156. Contrary to the 
second hypothesis, TNP Aviation Department employees with more years of service are more 
likely to violate safety regulations and procedures than employees with fewer service years, 
despite the hypothesis that service years would be positively associated with safety behavior. 
Two of the five correlations between violation indicators and the years of service variable were 
significant. While the Violation4 indicator aimed to observe the extent to which individuals 
violate a part of a job to make a job easier, the Violation5 indicator was designed to observe 
individuals’ confidence in their responsibilities for job safety. Increasing service years may give 
employees greater confidence, which could lead them to take shortcuts and engage in risk-taking 
behaviors. To reduce this effect and increase safety levels, management can prepare an 
intervention program for experienced members in order to increase risk awareness. An 
understanding of the hazards of extreme confidence in high-risk jobs can be disseminated among 
experienced members by discussing aviation accidents during flight safety meetings. Checklists 
can be modified to prevent shortcuts, because experienced employees often skip what they 
believe to be unnecessary items. The negative relationships between safety behavior, age, and 
service years revealed the importance of safety training and refreshing timeworn knowledge.    
5.3 Conclusion 
Tragic aircraft accidents fill the pages of aviation history. Aviation accidents cause 
significant hazards, loss of lives, and excessive cost, as well as damage in the public opinion. 
Contemporary human error models highlight a collectivist rather than an individual approach, 
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because human-related accidents do not happen in an isolated area but within an organizational 
context. In other words, organizational failures are more common factors in aviation accidents 
than individuals‘ failures. It is important to identify which organizational factors lead to failures, 
as well as which organizational features strengthen barriers against individual failures. This 
study aimed to trace the influence of organizational safety culture on individuals‘ safety 
behavior. 
A comprehensive literature review of safety culture in aviation and a quantitative 
research design were established based on the theory of planned behavior (TPB). The data set 
was obtained through a survey of Turkish National Police Aviation Department members, who 
are influenced by two professional cultures. The contextual environments of aviation and law 
enforcement both affect police aviation departments. Safety culture studies have been conducted 
in high-risk industries, such as construction, transportation, nuclear power, and oil production, as 
well as in the aviation industry. Studying the organizational culture of the TNP Aviation 
Department has the potential to provide valuable guidelines for reducing human error and 
improving the safety reliability of high-risk organizations.  
Confirmatory factor analysis with structural equation modeling was used to test the study 
hypotheses. According to the study findings, the safety climate of the organization, along with 
individual age and years of service, accounted for 65% of the variance in intention, 55% of the 
variance in violation behavior, and 68% of the variance in error behavior. No subgroup 
difference was observed in safety behavior variance. The theory of planned behavior is useful—
with a minor cultural modification—in explaining individual safety behavior. Theoretical, 
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policy, and managerial implications were presented based on the study‘s findings. The purposes 
of the study included the isolation of factors affecting the development of recommendations for 
safety policy, safety procedure modifications, and strong safety culture design, because 
organizational culture should be considered during the constitution of safety norms and 
regulations. This study aimed to present empirical findings so that future researchers can develop 
strong organizational safety cultures to mitigate organizational and individual failures. 
Safety culture observations enable an organization with multiple units to make valid 
comparisons among different locations, as well as to accurately evaluate safety intervention 
programs. The effectiveness of safety improvement programs can be evaluated via follow-up 
studies. This study took a snapshot of the safety climate of the TNP Aviation Department and the 
safety behaviors of its employees in the beginning of 2010.   
5.4 Limitations 
 Several limitations should be noted for this investigation of the influence of 
organizational safety culture on individuals‘ safety behavior in the TNP Aviation Department. 
First, the data conducted for this study was obtained via survey questions that asked employees 
about their perceptions of safety culture, as well as their self-reported safety behaviors. It is 
within the realm of possibility that survey participants might have been reticent about making 
public their safety performance level, due to privacy concerns. Indeed, TNP Aviation 
Department employees had no reason to express their sincere attitudes and behaviors toward 
management, colleagues, and work pressures in the study. Individuals may have reported what 
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they felt were desirable answers rather than what they really believed when conducting these 
self-reported surveys. Self-reported safety behavior may have been subject to measurement bias 
in this study, because younger and less experienced employees may have avoided reporting their 
actual safety levels. Hence, the study‘s findings are dependent upon the sincere and honest 
answers of each respondent. The five-point Likert scale constitutes another limitation on the 
measurement part of the study because participants were asked to rank their beliefs, attitudes, 
and behaviors through self-report. Their personal responses represent their own opinions and can 
be expected to be one-sided. The study survey does not include questions addressing potential 
response bias, which refers to the reliability of participants‘ answers. Moreover, neither the 
―agree‖ nor the ―disagree‖ option may have provided adequate response choices for the 
respondents. 
 Several arguments can be presented to overcome the survey-related limitations. First, 
survey questions did not include personal information, which permitted the protection of the 
respondents‘ identity. Survey participants were assured of their confidentiality and anonymity. 
Indeed, the method used to conduct the survey removed the possibility of any association 
between the responders‘ answers and their identity. Additionally, the researcher for this study is 
an active member of the TNP Aviation Department and is known by most of the members. The 
close relationship between the researcher and the respondent population established trust and 
encouraged them to participate in the study. Lastly, voluntary participation in the survey was 
declared to maximize the integrity of the responses. Negative response items were addressed to 
ensure that any systematic response bias was eliminated and corrected. Participants 
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systematically scoring in the same response category for every item were traced via the negative 
response items and excluded from the data.  
 Study variables are latent constructs; hence, they are measured by their indicators. 
Construct validity is an issue when measuring abstract concepts. Construct validity refers to the 
compliance between theoretical constructs and operationalized variables. It is important to 
consider whether the intended constructs are truly measured via measurement models. However, 
this study conducted confirmatory factor analysis to test and maximize the construct validity of 
the study. Moreover, the measurement models of latent constructs were adapted from Fogarty & 
Shaw‘s (2009) model, which has been tested by various studies (Hall, 2006; Baron, 2008). 
Hence, the construct validity of the study is not a significant threat for this study. 
 Most of the members of the TNP Aviation Department were included in the study. 
Therefore, the results of the study represent the perspectives of most members in the target 
organization. One of the major strengths of the study is that its findings reflect the perceptions of 
almost the entire population of the target organization. Working as a police helicopter pilot for 
six years in Istanbul, the largest city of Turkey, provided the study‘s researcher with a 
practitioner‘s point of view. The study‘s validity is significantly improved by the researcher‘s 
practitioner point of view.   
 Lastly, other factors may not have been considered when the theoretical and 
measurement models of the study were established. Although the human factors literature was 
widely studied, the study model may not have covered every dimension of the study variables. 
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These omitted factors may have an influence on the formation of organizational safety culture 
and individual safety behavior.  
5.5 Future Research 
 Human error models for high-risk industries have recently highlighted a collectivist 
approach rather than an individualist one. It is widely believed that organizational failures more 
commonly cause aviation accidents than individual failures. Identifying the reasons for 
organizational failures is as important as establishing organizational features that strengthen the 
barriers against individual failures. Future researchers could design more complex studies by 
including national and professional cultures to identify organizational failures. 
 The formation of organizational safety culture is another important factor in 
strengthening barriers against accidents. The components of safety culture were limited in this 
study.  In the future, researchers could perform studies to identify the differences within 
organizational subcultures and among organizations performing within the same high-risk 
industry. Examining the differences between industry sectors and between countries or cultures 
will address the negative aspects of organizational safety culture, as well as those processes that 
could strengthen the traditional safety culture.  
 The theory of planned behavior could be extended by including more components that 
predict safety behavior. Management attitude was included as a component of safety climate for 
this study because individuals consider managers when performing their jobs. Safety behavior 
was designed as a multidimensional construct that included violation and error behavior. 
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Violation and error behavior were designed based on the Human Factor Analysis and 
Classification System presented by Wiegmann & Shappell (2000; 2001; 2003).  
 National culture can be included in safety culture studies because it influences 
individuals‘ attitudes and behaviors. Cultural differences play an important role in safety climate 
components‘ relative bearing on safety behavior. While management was highlighted as the 
decisive safety climate component in Fogarty and Shaw‘s study, group norms were the most 
influential component in this study. Moreover, the assumed relationship between workplace 
pressures and intention was found to be not statistically significant in this study.  
 Among seven demographic and organizational variables, only the age and years of 
service variables were significant. The control variables having not statistically significant 
influence could be tested by more robust measurement levels. Although the city variable was 
intended to reflect organization size, size differences could be operationalized according to the 
number of flight mission performed or the units’ number of flight hours. The task group variable 
could have been significant if the sample size had been large enough for multiple group analysis.  
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1. Bölüm: Personelin İş Güvenliği Kültürü Algısı 
 İş güvenliği, iş yerlerinde işin yapımı sırasında,sağlığa, işe ve işyerine zarar verebilecek 
kaza ve olumsuz şartlardan korunmak amacı ile konulmuş kural ve prosedürlere uygun çalışmak 
anlamına gelir.  
 1. Bölüm çalıştığınız yerde, sizin, iş arkadaşlarınızın ve yöneticilerinizin iş güvenliği 
hakkındaki tutumlarını, ve iş güvenliğini aksatan faktörleri nasıl algıladığınızı ölçmek amacıyla 
hazırlanmıştır.  
 Lütfen aşağıdaki her bir önermeyi dikkatle okuyun ve kendi görüşünüzü en iyi şekilde 
ifade eden seçeneği işaretleyin. 
1.1. Bireyin Tutumu 
1. İş güvenliği kuralları yaptığım işin daha güvenli olmasını sağlar.  
Kesinlikle katılıyorum  
Katılıyorum   
Kısmen katılıyorum 
Katılmıyorum   
Kesinlikle katılmıyorum  
2. İşimi yaparken gerekli güvenlik ekipmanlarını kullanırım. 
3. İş arkadaşlarımın iş güvenliğine aykırı hareketlerine şahit olursam onları uyarırım. 
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4. Eğer iş arkadaşlarım ikazlarımı dikkate almazlarsa güvenli olmayan işlemleri amirime 
bildiririm. 
5. İş performansımı düşürse bile iş güvenliği kurallarını takip etmeye çalışırım. 
6. İş güvenliği olmayan şartlarda, herhangi bir kazayla karşılaşma ihtimalimiz yükselir. 
7. Yaptığım iş için öngörülen güvenlik kuralları kazaları önlemek için gereklidir. 
1.2. Grup Tutumu 
8. Çalışanların çoğu çalışırken gereksiz yere risk alan personeli uyarırlar. 
9. İş arkadaşlarım çoğu zaman iş güvenliği kurallarını gözardı etmemi telkin ederler. 
10. İş arkadaşlarım muntazaman birbirlerinin iş güvenliği açıklarını kapatırlar. 
11. Hemen hemen bütün çalışanlar işyerinin güvenlik politikasına aktif destek verirler. 
12. İş arkadaşlarım iş güvenliği konusunda birbirlerine yardımcı olmayı isterler.  
13. İş arkadaşlarım kazaya yol açabilecek olayları konuşup değerlendirme yapmaya önem 
verirler.  
14. Çalıştığım yerde işler güvenlik kuralları ve prosedürlerine uygun bir şekilde yapılır. 
15. İş arkadaşlarım, görev zamanlamasını etkilese bile iş güvenliğine uygun şekilde çalışırlar. 
1.3. Yönetimin Tutumu 
16. Yönetim çalışanları iş güvenliği konusunda ciddi biçimde destekler. 
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17. Yönetim iş güvenliği hakkında çalışanlara yeterli eğitimi sağlar. 
18. Yönetim iş güvenliği ile ilgili bütün olayları üstlerine bildirmeleri için çalışanları teşvik eder.  
19. Eğer yaptığım bir hatayı üstlerime bildirirsem yönetim bana destek olacaktir.  
20. Yönetim, iş güvenliğine hassasiyet göstererek çalışabilmeleri için çalışanlara öncülük eder. 
21. Yöneticilerimiz iş güvenliği ile ilgili konularda çalışanlarla sık sık gayri resmi müzakerelerde 
bulunur. 
22. İşin güvenli bir şekilde yapılması görevin zamanında bitirilmesini aksatsa bile, 
yöneticilerimiz iş güvenliğini destekler. 
23. Üstlerim, iş güvenliğinin geliştirilmesiyle ilgili görüşlerime değer verirler. 
24. Üstlerim bazen iş güvenliği ihlallerini görmezden gelirler. 
1.4. İsyerindeki Baskılar 
25. İşyerimde, görevin tamamlanması, işin güvenli bir şekilde yapılmasından daha öncelikli 
görülür.  
26. İşimi zamanında bitirebilmek için gerektiğinde işin bir kısmını kısa yoldan yaparım. 
27. Bazen güvenli olarak yapabileceğimden daha fazla iş yapmam bekleniyor. 
28. İş güvenliği kurallarının hepsini uygulayarak çalışmak zordur. 
29. İşyerimde ağır iş yükünden dolayı kestirmeden yapılan işler ve riskli davranışlar yaygındır. 
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30. Bazı zamanlar işimin güvenli bir şekilde nasıl yapılabileceği konusunda emin olamıyorum. 
31. İşim için gereken güvenlik ekipmanlarını işyerimden rahatlıkla tedarik edebilirim. 
2. Bölüm: Personelin İş Güvenliği Performansı 
 2. bölüm iş güvenliğine yönelik çalışanın niyetini ve bunun ne ölçüde kişinin 
davranışlarına yansıdığını ölçmek üzere hazırlanmıştır. 
 Lütfen aşağıdaki her bir önermeyi dikkatle okuyun ve kendi görüşünüzü en iyi şekilde 
ifade eden seçeneği işaretleyin. 
2.1. Niyet 
32. Çalışmaya başlamadan önce yapacağım iş hakkında gerekli olan bütün güvenlik önlemlerinin 
alındığından emin olmaya çalışırım. 
Kesinlikle katılıyorum  
Katılıyorum   
Kısmen katılıyorum 
Katılmıyorum   
Kesinlikle katılmıyorum  
33. Çalışma ortamının güvenli olmadığını düşünürsem, çalışmaya başlamadan önce hangi ek 
güvenlik önlemlerinin alınabileceğini kontrol ederim.  
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34. İş güvenliği açısından bir risk gördügüm zaman bunu üstlerime bildiririm. 
35. Eğer önerilen iş güvenliği prosedürlerinin fazla titiz veya etkisiz olduğunu düşünürsem, işi 
daha doğru olduğuna inandığım şekilde yaparım. 
36. Verilen işi zamanında tamamlayabilmek için, gorevin gerektirdiginin otesinde is guvenligini 
etkileyecek riskleri de almaya hazırım.  
37. İşi zamanında bitirebilmek icin risk almaktansa güvenli bir şekilde çalışmayı tercih ederim. 
2.2. Ihlal Davranısı 
38. Verilen bir iş için çalışırken iş güvenliği kurallarını genellikle dikkatle takip ettiğimi 
söyleyebilirim.  
39. Aşina olduğum bir işi el kitabına veya yazılı prosedürlere bakmadan yaptığım olmuştur. 
40. Bir işi zamanında bitirebilmek için uyulması gereken kuralları bilinçli olarak “esnettiğim” 
olmuştur. 
41. Bir işi zamanında bitirebilmek için işi kolaylaştırmak adına prosedürlerin bir kısmını 
atladığım ve bunu kayıtlara geçirmediğim olmuştur. 
42. İş güvenliği ile ilgili sorumluluklarımın bilincindeyim. 
2.3. Hatalı Davranıs 
43. İş güvenliği kural ve prosedürlerini takip etmek konusunda herhangi bir tereddütüm yoktur.  
44. Hemen hemen tüm iş güvenliği kurallarını uygulama kapasitesine sahibim. 
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45. Güvenli hareket şeklinden emin olamadığım için bilmeden iş güvenliği kurallarını ihlal 
ettiğim olmuştur.  
46. Seyrek olarak yapılan işlerde, eksik bilgiden dolayı iş güvenliğini riske sokan hatalar 
yaptığım olmuştur.  
3.Bölüm: Personelin Kişisel ve Mesleki Bilgileri 
3. bölüm kişinin demografik ve organizasyonel bilgilerini belirlemek için hazırlanmıştır.  
Lütfen aşağıdaki her bir soruda kendi durumunuzu en iyi şekilde ifade eden seçeneği işaretleyin.  
47. Göreviniz? 
Pilot 
Bakım ekibi (mühendis, teknisyen) 
Destek ekibi (ATC, koruma, şoför, büro) 
48. Hangi ilde görev yapıyorsunuz? 
Antalya  
Adana 
İzmir 
Diyarbakır 
İstanbul  
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Ankara 
49. Rütbeniz? 
Polis memuru 
Komiser yardımcısı – Başkomiser 
Emniyet Amiri 
Emniyet Müdürü  
50. Yaşınız?  
30 ve altı 
30 - 40 arası 
40 ve üstü  
51. Eğitim durumunuz? 
Lise 
Yüksek okul 
Üniversite 
Mastır/Doktora  
52. Kaç yıldır Havacılık Daire Başkanlığı veya bağli taşra şubelerinde çalışıyorsunuz? 
177 
 
5 yıl ve daha az 
5 - 10 yıl arası 
10 - 15 yıl arası 
15 yıldan daha fazla  
51. Toplam uçuş saatiniz? (Destek ekibi için cevap yok şıkkı uygundur) 
Cevap yok  
500 saat ve aşağısı 
500 – 1000 arası 
1001 – 1500 arası 
1500 – 2500 arası 
2500 saatten yukarısı 
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APPENDIX D - FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION 
TABLES  
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Frequency and Percentage Distributions for Own Attitude Indicators 
Indicators   Scale Frequency Percent 
Own1 2 Disagree 11 5.2 
Safety procedures make 
my job safer. 
3 Somewhat agree 62 29.5 
4 Agree 67 31.9 
5 Strongly Agree 70 33.3 
  Total   210 100.0 
Own2 2 Disagree 3 1.4 
I use required safety 
equipment while doing my 
job. 
3 Somewhat agree 40 19.0 
4 Agree 92 43.8 
5 Strongly Agree 75 35.7 
  Total   210 100.0 
Own3 2 Disagree 6 2.9 
I will say something if my 
peers take shortcuts. 
3 Somewhat agree 35 16.7 
4 Agree 97 46.2 
5 Strongly Agree 72 34.3 
 Total  210 100.0 
Own4 2 Disagree 42 20.0 
I will report a mistake if 
my concerns are 
overlooked. 
3 Somewhat agree 84 40.0 
4 Agree 64 30.5 
5 Strongly Agree 19 9.0 
 Total   210 100.0 
Own5 2 Disagree 15 7.1 
I follow work safety 
procedures even if this 
renders my job 
performance slower. 
3 Somewhat agree 55 26.2 
4 Agree 80 38.1 
5 Strongly Agree 60 28.6 
  Total   210 100.0 
Own6 2 Disagree 10 4.8 
Working in unsafe 
conditions increases the 
probability of suffering an 
injury. 
3 Somewhat agree 38 18.1 
4 Agree 64 30.5 
5 Strongly Agree 98 46.7 
Total   210 100.0 
Own7 2 Disagree 5 2.4 
Safety procedures required 
by my job are not 
necessary to protect me 
from injury. 
3 Somewhat agree 35 16.7 
4 Agree 74 35.2 
5 Strongly Agree 95 45.2 
Total   210 100.0 
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Frequency and Percentage Distributions for Group Norms Indicators 
Indicators   Scale Frequency Percent 
Group1 2 Disagree 7 3.3 
Most employees notify 
others when they observe 
them taking unnecessary 
risks. 
3 Somewhat agree 52 24.8 
4 Agree 78 37.1 
5 Strongly Agree 73 34.8 
Total   210 100.0 
Goup2 1 Strongly disagree 4 1.9 
My co-workers often 
encourage me to 
disregard safety rules. 
2 Disagree 19 9.0 
3 Somewhat agree 77 36.7 
4 Agree 95 45.2 
5 Strongly Agree 15 7.1 
  Total   210 100.0 
Group3 1 Strongly disagree 9 4.3 
My co-workers regularly 
compliment each other 
for working safely. 
2 Disagree 35 16.7 
3 Somewhat agree 64 30.5 
4 Agree 64 30.5 
5 Strongly Agree 38 18.1 
 Total   210 100.0 
Group4 1 Strongly disagree 1 0.5 
Most of my co-workers 
actively support our 
safety program. 
2 Disagree 12 5.7 
3 Somewhat agree 23 11.0 
4 Agree 97 46.2 
5 Strongly Agree 77 36.7 
  Total   210 100.0 
Group5 1 Strongly disagree 1 0.5 
My co-workers are 
willing to coach each 
other about safety. 
2 Disagree 12 5.7 
3 Somewhat agree 17 8.1 
4 Agree 92 43.8 
5 Strongly Agree 88 41.9 
  Total   210 100.0 
Group6 2 Disagree 8 3.8 
Employees feel it is 
important to 
discuss/elaborate near 
miss incidents. 
3 Somewhat agree 58 27.6 
4 Agree 99 47.1 
5 Strongly Agree 45 21.4 
Total   210 100.0 
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Group7 1 Strongly disagree 3 1.4 
Where I work, tasks are 
performed in accordance 
with maintenance policy, 
processes, and 
procedures. 
2 Disagree 27 12.9 
3 Somewhat agree 34 16.2 
4 Agree 64 30.5 
5 Strongly Agree 82 39.0 
  Total   210 100.0 
Group8 1 Strongly disagree 2 1.0 
My co-workers follow 
safety concerns even if it 
adversely impacts the 
task deadline. 
2 Disagree 15 7.1 
3 Somewhat agree 42 20.0 
4 Agree 78 37.1 
5 Strongly Agree 73 34.8 
  Total   210 100.0 
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Frequency and Percentage Distributions for Management Attitude Indicators 
Indicators   Scale Frequency Percent 
Management1 1 Strongly disagree 2 1 
Management visibly 
demonstrates support 
(walks the talk) for 
employee safety.  
2 Disagree 8 3.8 
3 Somewhat agree 31 14.8 
4 Agree 72 34.3 
5 Strongly Agree 97 46.2 
Total   210 100 
Management2 1 Strongly disagree 3 1.4 
Management provides 
adequate training and 
education for safety. 
2 Disagree 21 10.0 
3 Somewhat agree 31 14.8 
4 Agree 86 41.0 
5 Strongly Agree 69 32.9 
  Total   210 100 
Management3 1 Strongly disagree 3 1.4 
Management encourages 
employees to report all 
safety-related incidents. 
2 Disagree 9 4.3 
3 Somewhat agree 42 20.0 
4 Agree 81 38.6 
5 Strongly Agree 75 35.7 
 Total   210 100 
Management4 1 Strongly disagree 6 2.9 
Management would 
support me if I reported a 
mistake I had made. 
2 Disagree 30 14.3 
3 Somewhat agree 51 24.3 
4 Agree 65 31.0 
5 Strongly Agree 58 27.6 
  Total   210 100.0 
Management5 1 Strongly disagree 6 2.9 
Management demonstrates 
leadership by keeping 
people focused on safety. 
2 Disagree 24 11.4 
3 Somewhat agree 23 11.0 
4 Agree 80 38.1 
5 Strongly Agree 77 36.7 
  Total   210 100.0 
Management6 1 Strongly disagree 9 4.3 
Members of management 
often informally discuss 
safety issues with 
employees. 
2 Disagree 27 12.9 
3 Somewhat agree 47 22.4 
4 Agree 70 33.3 
5 Strongly Agree 57 27.1 
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Total   210 100.0 
Management7 1 Strongly disagree 8 3.8 
Management supports 
safety concerns when it 
adversely impacts the task 
deadline. 
2 Disagree 25 11.9 
3 Somewhat agree 54 25.7 
4 Agree 61 29.0 
5 Strongly Agree 62 29.5 
  Total   210 100.0 
Management8 1 Strongly disagree 2 1.0 
My immediate supervisor 
values my ideas about 
improving safety. 
2 Disagree 20 9.5 
3 Somewhat agree 45 21.4 
4 Agree 70 33.3 
5 Strongly Agree 73 34.8 
  Total   210 100.0 
Management9 1 Strongly disagree 5 2.4 
Our supervisors sometimes 
overlook unsafe practices. 
2 Disagree 19 9.0 
3 Somewhat agree 59 28.1 
4 Agree 94 44.8 
5 Strongly Agree 33 15.7 
  Total   210 100.0 
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Frequency and Percentage Distributions for Workplace Pressures Indicators 
Indicators   Scale Frequency Percent 
Pressure1 1 Strongly disagree 27 12.9 
Completing the task is given a 
higher priority than safety.  
2 Disagree 82 39.0 
3 Somewhat agree 42 20.0 
4 Agree 33 15.7 
5 Strongly Agree 26 12.4 
Total   210 100 
Pressure2 1 Strongly disagree 27 12.9 
I take short cuts when I need to 
get the job done in a timely 
manner. 
2 Disagree 76 36.2 
3 Somewhat agree 64 30.5 
4 Agree 33 15.7 
5 Strongly Agree 10 4.8 
  Total   210 100 
Pressure3 1 Strongly disagree 26 12.4 
Sometimes I am expected to do 
more work than I can safely do. 
2 Disagree 60 28.6 
3 Somewhat agree 46 21.9 
4 Agree 41 19.5 
5 Strongly Agree 37 17.6 
 Total   210 100 
Pressure4 1 Strongly disagree 40 19.0 
It is difficult to do a job while 
following all of the safety rules. 
2 Disagree 65 31.0 
3 Somewhat agree 33 15.7 
4 Agree 32 15.2 
5 Strongly Agree 40 19.0 
  Total   210 100.0 
Pressure5 1 Strongly disagree 63 30.0 
Short cuts and risk taking are 
common due to the heavy 
workload. 
2 Disagree 78 37.1 
3 Somewhat agree 43 20.5 
4 Agree 14 6.7 
5 Strongly Agree 12 5.7 
  Total   210 100.0 
Pressure6 1 Strongly disagree 36 17.1 
Sometimes I am unsure how to 
do my job safely. 
2 Disagree 84 40.0 
3 Somewhat agree 60 28.6 
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4 Agree 19 9.0 
5 Strongly Agree 11 5.2 
  Total   210 100.0 
 
Pressure7 1 Strongly disagree 30 14.3 
I can get safety equipment that 
is required for my job. 
2 Disagree 75 35.7 
3 Somewhat agree 61 29.0 
4 Agree 40 19.0 
5 Strongly Agree 4 1.9 
  Total   210 100.0 
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Frequency and Percentage Distributions for Intention Indicators 
Indicators   Scale Frequency Percent 
Intention1 1 Strongly disagree 3 1.4 
Before starting a task I make 
sure that I know all the work 
safety procedures that are 
required for that task. 
2 Disagree 5 2.4 
3 Somewhat agree 16 7.6 
4 Agree 86 41.0 
5 Strongly Agree 100 47.6 
Total   210 100 
Intention2 1 Strongly disagree 1 0.5 
If I thought an area was unsafe 
I would check to see what 
additional safety measures 
were needed before I entered. 
2 Disagree 28 13.3 
3 Somewhat agree 75 35.7 
4 Agree 84 40.0 
5 Strongly Agree 22 10.5 
  Total   210 100 
Intention3 1 Strongly disagree 1 o.5 
I would report a work safety 
hazard if I was aware of one. 
2 Disagree 7 3.3 
3 Somewhat agree 30 14.3 
4 Agree 87 41.4 
5 Strongly Agree 85 40.5 
 Total   210 100 
Intention4 1 Strongly disagree 48 22.9 
I am prepared to undertake a 
task in a better way if I 
consider the approved 
procedure or process to be 
overly cautious or inefficient. 
2 Disagree 32 15.2 
3 Somewhat agree 54 25.7 
4 Agree 52 24.8 
5 Strongly Agree 24 11.4 
Total   210 100.0 
Intention5 2 Disagree 17 8.1 
I am prepared to take risks, 
other than those inherent in 
my job, to get a task done. 
3 Somewhat agree 77 36.7 
4 Agree 86 41.0 
5 Strongly Agree 30 14.3 
  Total   210 100.0 
Intention6 1 Strongly disagree 4 1.9 
In my job there is a tradeoff 
between getting the task 
completed and doing it by the 
book. 
2 Disagree 14 6.7 
3 Somewhat agree 29 13.8 
4 Agree 64 30.5 
5 Strongly Agree 99 47.1 
  Total   210 100.0 
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Frequency and Percentage Distributions for Violation Behavior Indicators 
Indicators   Scale Frequency Percent 
Violation1 1 Strongly disagree 48 22.9 
When given a task, I ensure that 
approved procedures are 
followed. 
2 Disagree 78 37.1 
3 Somewhat agree 59 28.1 
4 Agree 15 7.1 
5 Strongly Agree 10 4.8 
Total   210 100 
Violation2 1 Strongly disagree 35 16.7 
I have performed a familiar task 
without referring to the 
maintenance manual or other 
approved documentation. 
2 Disagree 72 34.3 
3 Somewhat agree 70 33.3 
4 Agree 27 12.9 
5 Strongly Agree 6 2.9 
  Total   210 100 
Violation3 1 Strongly disagree 29 13.8 
I have deliberately ‗bent‖ 
formal procedures in order to 
complete a task on time. 
2 Disagree 73 34.8 
3 Somewhat agree 63 30.0 
4 Agree 34 16.2 
5 Strongly Agree 11 5.2 
 Total   210 100 
Violation4 1 Strongly disagree 21 10.0 
I have temporarily disconnected 
or removed a part to make a job 
easier, but not documented the 
disconnection/removal. 
2 Disagree 67 31.9 
3 Somewhat agree 84 40.0 
4 Agree 30 14.3 
5 Strongly Agree 8 3.8 
  Total   210 100.0 
Violation5 1 Strongly disagree 30 14.3 
I am clear about my 
responsibilities for job safety. 
2 Disagree 64 30.5 
3 Somewhat agree 68 32.4 
4 Agree 38 18.1 
5 Strongly Agree 10 4.8 
  Total   210 100.0 
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Frequency and Percentage Distributions for Error Behavior Indicators 
Indicators   Scale Frequency Percent 
Error1 1 Strongly disagree 79 37.6 
It is clear for me how to follow 
the safety regulations and 
procedures. 
2 Disagree 98 46.7 
3 Somewhat agree 20 9.5 
4 Agree 12 5.7 
5 Strongly Agree 1 0.5 
Total   210 100 
Error2 1 Strongly disagree 84 40.0 
I am capable to follow all safety 
rules. 
2 Disagree 93 44.3 
3 Somewhat agree 27 12.9 
4 Agree 6 2.9 
  Total   210 100 
Error3 1 Strongly disagree 84 40.0 
I have made safety errors 
because of not knowing how to 
work safely. 
2 Disagree 98 46.7 
3 Somewhat agree 20 9.5 
4 Agree 6 2.9 
5 Strongly Agree 2 1.0 
 Total   210 100 
Error4 1 Strongly disagree 77 36.7 
I have made errors creating risk 
to safety throughout rarely 
performed works. 
2 Disagree 99 47.1 
3 Somewhat agree 22 10.5 
4 Agree 10 4.8 
5 Strongly Agree 2 1.0 
  Total   210 100.0 
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APPENDIX E - CORRELATION MATRIX TABLES  
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Correlations between Own Attitude Indicators and Control Variables 
    Group City Rank Age Edu Year Flight 
Own1 Gamma -.062 .042 -.062 .037 .006 .138 .074 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .485 .586 .505 .704 .943 .088 .336 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Own2 Gamma -.094 -.002 -.046 .190 .063 .082 -.024 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .319 0.98 0.654 .058 .506 .334 .783 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Own3 Gamma -.227* -.116 -0.182 .116 -.153 .030 -.152 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .014 .165 .066 .243 .095 .728 .064 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Own4 Gamma .106 .046 .084 .037 .089 .202* .120 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .228 .553 .375 .707 .316 .012 .133 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Own5 Gamma -.117 -.090 -.169 .118 0 -.027 -.039 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .170 .257 .069 .216 1 .734 .608 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Own6 Gamma -.156 -.101 -.120 .077 -.053 .034 -.021 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .103 .192 .225 .426 .578 .676 .803 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Own7 Gamma .017 -.115 -.018 -.025 -.015 .108 .076 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .858 .172 .859 .803 .878 .195 .332 
  N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
    *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations between Group Norms Indicators and Control Variables 
    Group City Rank Age Edu Year Flight 
Group1 Gamma -.120 -.128 -.158 .034 -.134 -.035 -.046 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .212 .103 .081 .743 .145 .682 .544 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Group2 Gamma -.095 -.375** -.114 .127 .017 .012 .006 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .321 0 .257 .210 .845 .885 .945 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Group3 Gamma .056 .003 .115 -.018 .111 -.128 .009 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .490 .965 .180 .841 .143 .086 .902 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Group4 Gamma -.230* -.267** -.317** -.036 -.156 -.135 -.116 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .013 .001 .001 .715 .070 .105 .155 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Group5 Gamma -.147 -.165 -.162 -.004 -.116 -.077 -.112 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .129 .055 .107 .968 .200 .361 .166 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Group6 Gamma .039 -.281** .015 -.021 -.022 -.014 .065 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .686 0 .884 .820 .809 .864 .441 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Group7 Gamma -.007 -.158* -.034 -.013 -.043 -.111 -.008 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .936 .031 .717 .887 .624 .141 .914 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Group8 Gamma -.189* -.192** -.157 -.043 -.161 -.041 -.081 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .038 .009 .090 .652 .073 .602 .283 
  N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
    *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
     
 
 
 
 
 
192 
 
Correlations between Management Attitude Indicators and Control Variables 
    Group City Rank Age Edu Year Flight 
Mng1 Gamma .013 -.179* .113 -.035 .083 -.031 -.130 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .890 .035 .249 .733 .351 .693 .123 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Mng2 Gamma .020 -.183* .037 -.173 .116 -.082 -.106 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .816 .014 .693 .062 .169 .316 .172 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Mng3 Gamma -.028 -.242** -.015 -.126 -.112 -.072 -.119 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .753 .001 .869 .184 .178 .397 .143 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Mng4 Gamma -.023 -.209** .006 .024 -.071 .128 .033 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .791 .003 .943 .799 .393 .096 .659 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Mng5 Gamma .048 -.213** .137 -.140 .135 -.004 -.019 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .586 .004 .137 .135 .123 .958 .810 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Mng6 Gamma .062 -.091 .108 -.084 .031 -.167* -.115 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .469 .196 .226 .351 .704 .033 .139 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Mng7 Gamma .007 -.121 .100 .032 -.057 .044 .054 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .937 .074 .251 .723 .466 .581 .467 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Mng8 Gamma .301** -.080 .324** -.199* .234** .009 .120 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .269 .001 .032 .005 .900 .130 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Mng9 Gamma .049 .020 -.005 .114 -.086 .109 .046 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .591 .786 .956 .206 .308 .161 .572 
  N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
    *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations between Workplace Pressures Indicators and Control Variables 
    Group City Rank Age Edu Year Flight 
Press1 Gamma -.329** -.024 -.304** .044 -.118 -.085 -.237** 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .733 .000 .624 .151 .256 .002 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Press2 Gamma -.114 .043 -.027 .101 -.070 -.022 -.146* 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .211 .554 .778 .255 .436 .783 .049 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Press3 Gamma -.177* .091 -.123 .186** -.084* .042 -.088 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .037 .185 .143 .029 .290 .550 .203 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Press4 Gamma -.066 .125 -.048 .091 -.069 -.059 -.013 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .409 .055 .577 .259 .372 .399 .862 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Press5 Gamma -.235** .185* -.22** .243** -.174* .069 -.069 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .012 .010 .007 .035 .396 .390 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Press6 Gamma -.199* .258** -.141 .141 -.134 .017 -.062 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .023 .000 .131 .130 .106 .818 .433 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Press7 Gamma -.126 .086 -.087 .117 -.086 .098 -.076 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .150 .217 .333 .196 .314 .205 .330 
  N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).    
 *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).    
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Correlations between Intention Indicators and Control Variables 
    Group City Rank Age Edu Year Flight 
Intent1 Gamma -.059 -.235** -.113 -.085 -.016 -.041 -.078 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .556 .007 .276 .405 .874 .647 .380 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Intent2 Gamma .047 -.256** -.036 -.082 -.062 .021 .039 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .615 .001 .707 .407 .493 .792 .609 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Intent3 Gamma .048 -.110 .083 -.106 .067 -.075 -.037 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .618 .173 .417 .299 .475 .380 .662 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Intent4 Gamma .386** -.091 .291** .109 .202** .219** .305** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .189 .000 .214 .008 .002 .000 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Intent5 Gamma .092 -.207** -.039 .039 .063 .097 .157* 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .323 .010 .969 .690 .481 .240 .046 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Intent6 Gamma -.238** -.314** -.248** .042 -.199* -.048 -.098 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .000 .007 .675 .031 .552 .228 
  N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).     
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).     
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Correlations between Violation Behavior Indicators and Control Variables 
    Group City Rank Age Edu Year Flight 
VioB1 Gamma .001 .080 -.048 .118 -.073 .148 .128 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .993 .290 .601 .210 .423 .056 .105 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
VioB2 Gamma -.102 .211** -.164 .111 -.016 -.023 -.072 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .224 .003 .071 .222 .852 .766 .377 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
VioB3 Gamma -.118 .110 -.158 .170 -.035 .078 -.017 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .158 .128 .071 .054 .668 .283 .829 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
VioB4 Gamma .056 .155* .003 .150 -.056 .253** .130 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .534 .047 .975 .111 .524 .001 .084 
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
VioB5 Gamma .007 .004 -.048 .162 -.014 .144* .118 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .938 .952 .596 .069 .875 .044 .114 
  N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).     
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).     
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Correlations between Error Behavior Indicators and Control Variables 
    Group City Rank Age Edu Year Flight 
ErrB1 Gamma .016 .335** -.098 .244* -.050 .317** .196* 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .861 .000 .328 .019 .599 .000 .017 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
ErrB2 Gamma -.044 .327** .009 .185 -.104 .098 -.080 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .648 .000 .932 .066 .274 .265 .380 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
ErrB3 Gamma -.073 .207* -.030 .203 -.181 .094 -.036 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .461 .012 .778 .052 .054 .292 .683 
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
ErrB4 Gamma -.129 .164* -.087 .295** -.023 .129 -.048 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .171 .048 .376 .002 .806 .122 .583 
  N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
    *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations of Own Attitude Indicators 
    Own1 Own2 Own3 Own4 Own5 Own6 
Own1 Spearman's rho Correlation  1           
 Sig. (2-tailed)       
 N 210      
Own2 Spearman's rho Correlation  .523** 1     
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000      
 N 210 210     
Own3 Spearman's rho Correlation  .319** .350** 1    
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000     
 N 210 210 210    
Own4 Spearman's rho Correlation  .273** .131 .140* 1   
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .057 .043    
 N 210 210 210 210   
Own5 Spearman's rho Correlation  .461** .454** .362** 0.155* 1  
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .025   
 N 210 210 210 210 210  
Own6 Spearman's rho Correlation  .428** .432** .432** .027 .297** 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .693 .000  
 N 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Own7 Spearman's rho Correlation  .433** .400** .493** .067 .290** .563** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .335 .000 .000 
  N 210 210 210 210 210 210 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).    
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).    
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Correlations of Group Norms Indicators 
    Group1 Group2 Group3 Group4 Group5 Group6 Group7 
Group1 Spearman's rho C 1       
 
Sig. (2-tailed)        
 
N 210       
Group2 Spearman's rho C .044 1      
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .531       
 
N 210 210      
Group3 Spearman's rho C .045 .130 1     
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .514 .060      
 
N 210 210 210     
Group4 Spearman's rho C .318** .153** .058 1    
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .026 .402     
 
N 210 210 210 210    
Group5 Spearman's rho C .464** .160* .112 .418** 1   
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .020 .106 .000    
 
N 210 210 210 210 210   
Group6 Spearman's rho C .321** .217** .111 .175* .309** 1  
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002 .109 .011 .000   
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210  
Group7 Spearman's rho C .252** .204** .135 .244** .396** .425** 1 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .003 .050 .000 .000 .000  
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Group8 Spearman's rho C .386** .092 -.025 .293** .212** .351** .470** 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .184 .723 .000 .002 .000 .000 
  N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).    
 *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).    
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Correlations of Management Attitude Indicators   
    Mng1 Mng2 Mng3 Mng4 Mng5 Mng6 Mng7 Mng8 
Mng1 Spearman's rho C 1               
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
       
 
N 210        
Mng2 Spearman's rho C .297** 1       
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000        
 
N 210 210       
Mng3 Spearman's rho C .368** .340** 1      
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000       
 
N 210 210 210      
Mng4 Spearman's rho C .360** .344** .448** 1     
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000      
 
N 210 210 210 210     
Mng5 Spearman's rho C .535** .434** .366** .435** 1    
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000     
 
N 210 210 210 210 210    
Mng6 Spearman's rho C .309** .265** .372** .302** .317** 1   
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000    
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210   
Mng7 Spearman's rho C .417** .346** .370** .322** .452** .374** 1  
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000   
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210  
Mng8 Spearman's rho C .351** .315** .327** .295** .354** .256** .426** 1 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Mng9 Spearman's rho C -.018 .010 -.021 .013 -.043 -.146* -.082 .040 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .793 .883 .763 .853 .534 .034 .238 .565 
  N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).    
  *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).    
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Correlations of Workplace Pressures Indicators 
    Press1 Press2 Press3 Press4 Press5 Press6 
Press1 Spearman's rho Correlation 1           
 
Sig. (2-tailed)       
 
N 210      
Press2 Spearman's rho Correlation .437** 1     
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000      
 
N 210 210     
Press3 Spearman's rho Correlation .286** .367** 1    
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000     
 
N 210 210 210    
Press4 Spearman's rho Correlation .211** .440** .328** 1   
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .000 .000    
 
N 210 210 210 210   
Press5 Spearman's rho Correlation .319** .319** .342** .384** 1  
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000   
 
N 210 210 210 210 210  
Press6 Spearman's rho Correlation -.033 .167* .125 .162* .159 1 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .633 .015 .071 .019 .021  
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Press7 Spearman's rho Correlation .357** .533** .502** .538** .398** .239** 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
  N 210 210 210 210 210 210 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).    
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).    
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Correlations of Intention Indicators 
    Intent1 Intent2 Intent3 Intent4 Intent5 
Intent1 Spearman's rho Correlation 1         
 
Sig. (2-tailed)      
 
N 210     
Intent2 Spearman's rho Correlation .429** 1    
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000     
 
N 210 210    
Intent3 Spearman's rho Correlation .389** .234** 1   
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001    
 
N 210 210 210   
Intent4 Spearman's rho Correlation .010 .171* .091 1  
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .886 .013 .191   
 
N 210 210 210 210  
Intent5 Spearman's rho Correlation .239** .476** .329** .163* 1 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .018  
 
N 210 210 210 210 210 
Intent6 Spearman's rho Correlation .353** .340** .417** .026 .330** 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .706 .000 
  N 210 210 210 210 210 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
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Correlations of Violation Behavior Indicators 
    VioB1 VioB2 VioB3 VioB4 
VioB1 Spearman's rho Correlation 1       
 
Sig. (2-tailed)     
 
N 210    
VioB2 Spearman's rho Correlation 0.465** 1   
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000    
 
N 210 210   
VioB3 Spearman's rho Correlation .393** .506** 1  
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   
 
N 210 210 210  
VioB4 Spearman's rho Correlation .429** .436** .461** 1 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
 
N 210 210 210 210 
VioB5 Spearman's rho Correlation .431** .471** .476** .520** 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 
  N 210 210 210 210 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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Correlations of Error Behavior Indicators 
    ErrB1 ErrB2 ErrB3 
ErrB1 Spearman's rho Correlation 1     
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .   
 
N 210   
ErrB2 Spearman's rho Correlation .291** 1  
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .  
 
N 210 210  
ErrB3 Spearman's rho Correlation .315** .298** 1 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 . 
 
N 210 210 210 
ErrB4 Spearman's rho Correlation .390** .458** .166** 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .016 
  N 210 210 210 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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